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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND CONTRACT PARTICIPATION 
AS A MECHANISM FOR ENHANCING SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAMS: THE CASE 
OF WOMEN FARMERS IN GHANA 
 
The dissertation consists of three studies that seek to identify school caterer and 
women farmer constraints that have hindered the buy-local policy mandate of the Ghana 
School Lunch program, and to explore gendered agricultural technology adoption and 
contract participation strategies that could facilitate the policy mandate.  
The first study documents the constraints that have minimized caterer purchases of 
school food items from local farmers. The study presents an overview of the Ghana School 
Lunch Program and the buy-local policy mandate issued to school caterers. Survey data 
and descriptive analysis are employed to document and discuss the constraints that prevent 
school caters from purchasing from local farmers as well as the constraints faced by 
smallholder women farmers in supplying to school caters. The study subsequently 
discusses school caterers’ compensating variation of a hypothetical policy that requires 
them to firstly provide recommended portions of vegetables and protein, and secondly 
include fruits in the lunch of the schoolchildren. 
The second study analyses the factors underlying the probability that women 
smallholder farmers - compared to male farmers - adopt less a) improved seeds, b) 
fertilizer, c) herbicides and d) pesticides. The study further examines the sensitivity of 
gender differences in technology adoption to crop choice, particularly maize and legume, 
as well as the possible heterogeneity of technology adoption differences within rural and 
peri-urban communities. The adoption of these improved technologies is modeled using 
multivariate probit regressions.  A gender gap is observed among legume farmers for 
improved seed and pesticide adoption. Moreover, the findings indicate that female maize 
farmers who have input into all cash crop production decisions are more likely to adopt 
improved seeds and pesticides. Among legume farmers, the results indicate that female 
farmers who are educated and have access to credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer, while 
female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop 
farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. These results imply that policy-makers and 
development practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa should consider strategies to target and 
increase educational, financial and productive assets of female farmers in order to close the 
gender technology gap and increase multiple technology adoption. 
The third study examines the use of farm-to-school contracts as a means to provide 
access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban areas and facilitate the buy-local 
policy mandate. In particular, the study examines the factors influencing male and female 
smallholder farmers’ minimum willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch 
contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The minimum WTA simultaneously measures the 
decision to participate as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer 
accepts the contract. Using sex-disaggregated data from a field experiment, a Tobit model 
is applied to explain the underlying factors influencing male and female smallholder 
     
 
farmer’s minimum WTA for a set of hypothetical maize and cowpea beans contracts. The 
results for the pooled sample indicate that the delivery at harvest option increases farmers’ 
minimum willingness to accept both the maize and beans contracts. The study further 
examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder farmers. The results in 
the female specification indicate that, the advance pay option lowers the minimum WTA 
for maize contracts. Additionally, women farmers who own non-farm business, compared 
to a male with a non-farm business, have a lower minimum WTA for the maize and beans 
contracts. The results suggest that if the government considers contractual arrangements 
between school caterers and local farmers to facilitate the buy-local policy mandate, an 
advance pay option to women farmers may yield lower premiums for contracted food 
items.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: smallholder farmers, women farmers, gender-differences, agricultural 
technology adoption, willingness to participate, farm-to-school-lunch 
contract  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE ESSAYS 
1.1 Introduction  
As a policy tool for socio-economic development, a number of developing 
economies, including Ghana, have implemented homegrown school lunch programs. The 
primary goal of these school lunch programs is improved nutrition for disadvantaged 
schoolchildren, reliable markets for local farmers, effective local catering services and 
enhanced local incomes.   
The government of Ghana launched a nationwide school lunch program, a poverty 
reduction and access to primary education strategy, in line with the comprehensive Africa 
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) goals on hunger, poverty and nutrition. The 
school lunch program was implemented under a Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF) 
framework; such a framework requires that the school lunch is administered using food 
that is locally grown by smallholder farmers. Under the HGSF, caterers are mandated to 
purchase 80% of foodstuffs from local sources. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This policy is designed to link caterers of school lunch programs with local farmers; 
provide economic opportunities for local farmers; increase local agricultural production 
and stimulate economic development, while providing nutritious meals for schoolchildren. 
Studies have shown that the ‘buy local’ policy mandate has not been achieved. An 
inventory of the Netherlands Development Organization in 2008 indicated that only one 
out of the ten regions in Ghana had caterer purchases of more than 20% from local farmers. 
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1.3 The Essays 
This dissertation examines factors that may have hindered the successful 
implementation of the homegrown school lunch policy in Ghana, and presents empirical 
studies that may potentially facilitate its implementation. The data used for the dissertation 
involves a series of focus group discussions and interviews with school caterers and 
smallholder farmers in rural and peri-urban areas in Eastern and Northern Ghana. Three 
different data collection exercises were embarked upon in 2016, 2017 and 2018 to provide 
the data for the dissertation.  
The first essay, in Chapter 2, provides a background of the Ghana School Lunch 
Program. The study employs qualitative research methods in documenting the constraints 
that have undermined school caterer purchases from local farmers as stipulated by the ‘buy-
local’ policy mandate of the Ghana School Lunch Program. The discussion is built off data 
on school caterers and women smallholder farmers. The study examines and documents 
the constraints that hinder school caters from purchasing from local farmers. The caterer 
data revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing from local farmers is the time and 
frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration to the school caterers and storage 
facilities. The study further discusses the constraints faced by smallholder women farmers 
in supplying to school caters. Subsequently, the chapter presents a discussion on school 
caterers’ compensating variation for a hypothetical policy, which requires caterers to 
provide recommended portions of vegetables, protein and fruits in the lunches they prepare 
and serve to schoolchildren.  
The women farmer study in suggests that the two major constraints are land infertility 
and access to credit. The infertility of land may be in part because of the use of traditional 
12 
 
methods of farming which rely on long fallow periods to restore lost nutrients in the soil. 
In the light of improved agricultural technology, the second essay, in Chapter 3, analyses 
the factors underlying the probability that women smallholder farmers - compared to male 
farmers - adopt less a) improved seeds, b) fertilizer, c) herbicides and d) pesticides. The 
study further examines the sensitivity of gender differences in technology adoption to crop 
choice, particularly maize and legume, as well as the possible heterogeneity of technology 
adoption differences within rural and peri-urban communities. The adoption of these 
improved technologies is modeled using multivariate probit regressions.  The results 
indicate no difference in male and female maize farmers’ adoption of technology after 
controlling for individual level access to and ownership assets, decision-making power, 
household characteristics and plot characteristics.  However, a gender gap is observed 
among legume farmers for improved seed and pesticide adoption. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that female maize farmers who have input into all cash crop production decisions 
are more likely to adopt improved seeds and pesticides. Among legume farmers, the results 
indicate that female farmers who have education and access to credit are more likely to 
adopt fertilizer, while female legume farmers who have a say in the use of income 
generated from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. These results imply 
that policy-makers and development practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa should consider 
strategies to target and increase educational, financial and productive assets of female 
farmers in order to close the gender technology gap and increase multiple technology 
adoption. 
With regards to credit constraints, Chapter 4 explores a hypothetical farm-to-school-
lunch contract with a credit-advance option. The study examines the factors influencing 
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male and female smallholder farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch 
contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to 
participate as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the 
contract. A conceptual model of farmers’ decision to participate in the contract is presented 
and operationalized into a micro-economic framework of farmer decision-making. Using 
sex-disaggregated data from the hypothetical field experiment, a Tobit model is applied to 
explain the underlying factors influencing male and female smallholder farmer’s WTA a 
set of hypothetical maize and cowpea beans contracts. The delivery at harvest option 
increases farmers’ minimum willingness to accept both the maize and beans contracts. 
Among female respondents, the advance pay option lowers the WTA for maize contracts 
but not for the beans contracts. Furthermore, interactions between gender and contract 
attributes indicate no statistically significant difference between male and female WTA for 
the maize and beans contracts. 
Chapter 5 presents a concluding analysis, which first summarizes the three essays 
and then identifies policy implications of the empirical studies.  
1.4 Context and Population of Study  
This section discusses the methods employed to achieve the data requirements of the 
dissertation. The table below presents the data types, the period collected and the chapter 
in which each dataset is used in the dissertation.  
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Table 1-1 Data and Sources for Study 
Data  Type Year Collected Chapter in Study 
Caterer data Survey/ Questionnaire 2016 2 
Women farmer data Focus group discussions 2017 2 
Supplementary 
nutrition data 
Key informant interviews 2018 2 
Smallholder farmer 
data 
Survey/Questionnaire 2017 3 and 4 
 
1.4.1 Caterer Data, Women Farmer Data and Supplementary Nutrition Data 
The caterer data consists of in-person interviews with 30 caterers of the Ghana 
School Lunch Program in the Eastern and Northern Regions of Ghana. The caterer data 
were collected in 2016 by a team of faculty members from the University of Ghana and the 
University for Development Studies. The dataset provides qualitative documentation of 
caterer constraints and structures, which would facilitate the purchase and use of more local 
food in the school lunch preparation. 
The women farmer data were obtained through focus group discussions with women 
farmers in Adjeikrom and Aseeseso in the Eastern Region of Ghana in 2017. The women 
farmer dataset provides responses on the challenges that hinder them from supplying food 
items to school caterers. 
The supplementary nutrition dataset was obtained through in-person interviews with 
school caterers in private and public schools in the Eastern and Greater Accra Region in 
2018. This dataset elicits a measure of women caterers’ compensating variation for a 
hypothetical policy mandates that requires them to include a recommended portion of 
fruits, vegetables and protein in the school lunch prepared and served to school children.  
15 
 
1.4.2 Smallholder Farmer Data 
The section presents, summarizes and describes the sex-disaggregated survey data 
used for analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 of the dissertation. The primary data was collected 
using structured questionnaires and a semi-structured pre-test interview guide. The survey 
was conducted between July and August 2017 through questionnaires administered to 150 
households. The target population was rural and peri-urban farm households in Northern 
Ghana. Thus, three rural and three peri-urban farm communities were selected to be 
included in the survey. 
A pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted on a sample of 30 women farmers in 
the Eastern and Northern Region of Ghana.  During the pre-test, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with open-ended questions and follow-up questions after respondents had 
given answers. Reconnaissance visits were carried out in some communities to help shape 
impressions of the area and guide the design of the data collection instruments.  
The questionnaire included a background or socio economic characteristics, sections 
on farming activities, access, control and decision making on resources and access to 
resources. The interview guide captured issues which centered on the constraints faced by 
women farmers and the extent to which women farmers could take sole decisions such as 
participating in farming contracts as well as their preferences for attributes on the farming 
contract. Data collected were both quantitative and qualitative. 
1.4.2.1 Sampling Framework  
The objective of the study is to examine gender differences in agricultural technology 
adoption as well as gender differences in the potential and motivation of smallholder 
farmers to participate in farm-to-school-lunch contracts. Thus, the study requires two 
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samples; first, a representative sample of smallholder farmers who live in rural and peri-
urban areas and second, a representative sample of women smallholder farmers. The survey 
instrument was implemented in 6 communities; 3 rural and 3 peri-urban communities 
within 2 districts in the Northern region of Ghana. A sample of 150 households were 
randomly selected; 25 households from each of the 6 communities. Unlike other related 
studies whose sampling frames are drawn from selected Farmer Based Organizations 
(FBO) and fail to capture key characteristics at the community level, the sampling frame 
for this research focuses on the community as a whole and thus captures a representative 
sample of rural farm households. Additionally, smallholder women farmers make up only 
about 5% of farmer based organizations in Ghana thus using FBO’s as a sampling frame 
might exclude or bias our second sample of interest. 
The communities identified for this study were Bukpamo, Garizegu and Kpene in 
the Sanarigu District, and Duunyin, Pagazaa and Wamale in the Tamale District. Bukpamo 
Duunyin and Pagazaa are rural communities while Garizegu, Kpene and Wamale are peri-
urban communities. These communities are fairly representative of rural and peri-urban 
communites found in the Northern Region of Ghana.  
To obtain the two samples of interest - the representative sample of households and 
the women farmer sample - two different sampling frames were employed. 
A. Representative sample of households 
The sample of representative households makes up 60% of the total sample for the 
study. A systematic random sampling technique is used to select 15 households from each 
of the 6 communities. A random starting point was selected within each community, and 
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then every fifth house was selected to be interviewed as part of the sample. A simple 
random sample technique was not used because even though most of the structures had 
house numbers, the numbering was not in any orderly pattern. 
B. Women farmer sample 
The women smallholder sample comprised 40% of the total sample.  While responses 
for the representative sub-sample were being collected, a list of 268 women farmers who 
cultivate either maize and/or legumes and are substantially and actively involved in the 
decision making of their farming activities was simultaneously collected from the 
interviewees. Using this list as a sampling frame, 10 women farmer households were 
randomly selected to be interviewed.  
In each of the samples, responses were collected from both the primary and 
secondary respondent, who were adults above the age of 18 years. The primary respondent 
was typically the male head-of-household and the secondary respondent was typically the 
first wife. In households where the man or woman was widowed, any other adult 
significantly involved in farming activities with the smallholder farmer was interviewed.   
Table 1-2 provides a visual representation of the sampling framework. 
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Table 1-2 Sampling Frame for Survey Data 
Communities 
Districts Area 
Representa
tive sample 
List of 
women 
farmers 
Women 
farmer 
sample  
Total 
households  
sampled Sanarigu Tamale Rural Peri-urban 
Bukpamo YES  YES  15 50 10 25 
Duunyin  YES YES  15 50 10 25 
Garizegu YES   YES 15 48 10 25 
Kpene YES   YES 15 45 10 25 
Pagazaa  YES YES  15 45 10 25 
Wamale  YES  YES 15 30 10 25 
TOTAL 90 268 60 150 
 
1.4.2.2 Pre-test of Data collection Instrument 
A prior version of the survey instrument was pre-tested on fifteen women farmers in 
the Eastern Region and fifteen women farmers in the Northern Region. The pre-test served 
three main purposes. First, it enabled the researcher to assess whether the target 
respondents clearly understood the questions asked. Second, it enabled the researcher to 
assess whether the questions asked elicited the responses needed from the survey for the 
study. Thirdly, it enabled the researcher to assess whether interviewers could administer 
the questionnaire in a timely, efficient and effective manner.  After the pre-test, the survey 
instrument was amended based on the insights gained. 
1.4.2.3 Description of Household Survey 
The survey instrument was divided into 6 main modules, A to F (Table 1). Module 
A asked demographic question at the household level such as age, sex, marital status, years 
of marriage, education, religion, total number of persons in the household, number of 
working adults, number of adults who own farms, number of dependents, number of young 
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children as well as whether any school children in the household benefited from the Ghana 
school feeding program. Subsequent questions were asked about ownership of housing, 
number of rooms in the dwelling place, main source of water, main source of lighting, main 
source of cooking fuel, and the roofing, building and floor material of the dwelling. 
Module B asked about the respondent’s role in household decision making around 
production and income generation. Module B was a modified version of the Abbreviated 
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (A-WEAI). The WEAI is a survey-based 
index developed in 2012 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the 
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (Alkire et al., 2013). It is a monitoring and evaluation tool for the 
U.S. government’s Feed the Future initiative to measure women’s empowerment and 
inclusion levels in the agricultural sector, to identify key areas in which empowerment 
needs to be strengthened and to track progress over time (Malapit et al., 2015). The A-
WEAI is a revised version of the original WEAI. The shorter and more stream-lined A-
WEAI version was developed as an improvement over the original WEAI following a 
discussion event by stakeholders including USAID implementing partners, field teams, 
researchers, and representatives from organizations that had also used the WEAI. 
Module B1 asked about the main activities of food crop farming, cash crop farming, 
livestock raising, non-farm economic activities, wage and salary work, major household 
expenditures and minor household expenditures. This section particularly asked whether 
the respondent participated in the activity, who often paid for the activity, who in the 
household normally took decisions regarding the activity, how much input they had in 
decision making, to what extend they felt they could make their own person decisions 
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regarding the activity and how much input they had in decisions on the use of income 
generated from the activity. Module B2 asked about the respondent’s access to productive 
capital. Specifically, it asked whether the responded owned any of the following, and what 
quantity they owned of: agricultural land, cattle, goats, guinea fowl, chicken, knapsack 
sprayer, tractor, shea-butter processor, shop, radio, TV, cell phone, bicycle and motorcycle. 
The section on the farming activities of the respondent was Module C. The questions 
asked include the total area of farmland (in acres) cultivated; whether the farmland is 
owned, shared with a spouse, or rented; whether the respondent has taken a formal or 
informal loan within the past 2 years to invest in farming activities; whether the respondent 
knows anyone who has ever taken a loan; the respondent’s other financing for his/her farm 
activities; whether the respondent would accept a loan if offered; one and the 3 biggest 
challenges facing his/her farming activities. To get a sense of the expenditure constraints 
of rural and peri-urban households and what they would most likely spend cash-at-hand 
on, the survey asked respondents to list 3 agricultural and 3 non-agricultural items or 
activities that they would spend on if they received an amount of GHȼ1,000 for each 
category.  
Module D and E asked about the maize and legume activities, respectively, of the 
respondent for the past agricultural year, 2016, from planting to harvest. Module D of the 
survey questionnaire first asks whether the respondent planted maize in 2016; if the 
response is yes, the survey proceeds to ask how many acres of maize was planted and how 
many person-days of family labor was used for land clearing, tilling, planting, weeding and 
harvesting the maize crop. It further asks whether any hired labor was used for the 
aforementioned farming activities, the number of person-days of hired labor used and how 
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much in total was paid for the hired labor. Module D subsequently asks whether the 
respondent used or applied certified seeds, fertilizer, weedicides and tractor services, and 
how much was paid in total for them. The average number of bags harvested from the 
maize farm, the number of bags harvested in 2016, how many bags were sold and how 
much was received from the sale was also asked. Finally module D asks about problems 
experienced with the 2016 maize crop, the type of storage used for the maize crop, the 
performance of the 2016 maize crop compared with previous years, and the distance of the 
maize farm to the nearest market, chief’s palace, district capital and to the respondent’s 
house. Module E asks a similar set of questions for legumes.  
The final module, Module F, incorporates a choice experiment eliciting respondent’s 
willingness to participate in contract farming with school feeding programs. The module 
first asked whether respondents had ever supplied food crops to caterers of a school feeding 
program, what crop was supplied and the last time they had supplied crops to the school 
caterer. Is also asked whether the respondent had been involved in contract farming with 
an individual or agency, what crop was supplied and the duration of the contract. The 
hypothetical contract for both maize and beans (legume) is then read to the respondents 
and their choices are indicated. The contract would require the respondent to supply a 100 
kg bag of maize or beans at an agreed period for an agreed price to school caterer. 
Table 1-3 Survey Modules 
Modules Description  
A Demographics  
B Modified WEAI  
C Respondent farming activities 
D Maize farming activities (2016/2017 agricultural season) 
E Legume farming activities (2016/2017 agricultural season) 
F Hypothetical maize and beans contract 
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1.5 Gender Differences  
The table below presents some summary statistics for gender differences in maize 
and legume farming. Maize is a staple crop in the Northern Region: male heads-of-
households typically cultivate maize to feed their households while females typically 
cultivate maize to supplement what is provided or to generate supplemental income. On 
average, 99% of males in the sample grow maize while about 63% of women grow maize. 
The 1% of males and 46% of females who do not grow maize either may cultivate different 
crops or may not be farmers. Legumes are typically cultivated as a cash crop. About 45% 
and 53% of males and females in the sample, respectively cultivate legumes.  The t-test 
indicates a statistically significant difference between male and female maize farmers but 
no difference between male and female legume farmers.  
Table 1-4 Gender Differences in Maize and Legume Farming 
 Full sample Male Female M-F 
 (N = 298) (N=150) (N=148)  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Diff. 
Grow maize 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0. 81 0.39 0.99 0.12 0.63 0.48 0.115* 
Grow legume 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.50 -0.08 
***,**, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% alpha level respectively   
 
The table below presents some summary statistics for gender differences between 
maize and non-maize farmers. On average, women who do not grow maize are older, have 
been married longer, are less educated and have fewer acres of agricultural land, compared 
to women who cultivate maize. Additionally, women who do not cultivate maize are more 
in peri-urban communities than in rural communities.  
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Table 1-5 Gender Differences between Maize and Non-maize Farmers 
  Men  Women   
 Grow maize Do not Grow maize Do not 
 N=148 N=2 N=93 N=55 
Variable Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Age 50.02 14.41 40.50 13.44 40.90 13.34 43.80 12.53 
Educated 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.71 0.18 0.39 0.09 0.29 
Marriage years 21.04 12.50 13.00 9.90 20.13 12.76 22.96 12.49 
Ag. land owned 6.34 4.59 5.00 4.24 1.89 1.34 1.35 1.34 
Access to credit 0.14 0.34 0.50 0.71 0.26 0.44 0.36 0.49 
Rural 0.48 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.56 0.50 0.42 0.50 
 
There is not as much differences among women who do and do not cultivate legumes 
as with maize cultivation. Table 1.6 below indicates that women who do not cultivate 
legumes are, on average, fairly younger and consequently have fewer years of marriage; 
they are also slightly more educated, have higher access to credit but own fewer acres of 
agricultural land. These women may be more engaged in non-farm employment activities 
in the rural and peri-urban communities. There is, however, an even distribution of women 
who do and who do not cultivate legumes in rural and peri-urban communities.  
Table 1-6 Gender Differences between Legume and Non-legume Farmers 
 Men  Women   
 Grow legume Do not Grow legume Do not 
 N=68 N=82 N=79 N=69 
Variable Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Age 47.62 14.16 51.78 14.40 42.51 13.48 41.38 12.67 
Educated 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 
Marriage years 20.22 12.28 21.52 12.69 21.82 12.61 20.45 12.84 
Ag. land owned 6.82 4.74 5.91 4.41 1.91 1.38 1.43 1.30 
Access to credit 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.38 0.49 
Rural 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 
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Male and female, maize and legume farmers in each household may have different 
capacities to supply food items to school lunch programs. Particularly, among women 
farmers, different characteristics may indicate their position of power in their households 
and their capacity to produce and supply food items. Women do not tend to be household 
heads, even if there are widowed. In such an instance, the woman eldest male son may be 
regarded as head of household.  However, the number of male son’s that the wife has and/or 
the number of wives in the household may indicate the woman’s power in the household.  
Table 1-7 below indicates the number of wives in the household, as well as male and 
female children that the wife in question has. Fewer wives in the household might indicate 
more power for the woman in question, while having more male sons might indicate the 
woman’s ability to command labor. In the study’s sample, the average number of wives in 
households where women grow maize is higher than in households where women do not 
grow maize. Additionally, the average number of male children and female children of 
women maize farmers is lower compared to women non-maize farmers. These 
characteristics might suggest that women maize farmers may have less power compared to 
women who do not cultivate maize.  
Table 1-7 Differences among Women Maize and Non-maize Farmers 
  Grow maize Do not grow maize 
 N=93 N=55 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of wives 1.38 0.62 0 3 1.25 0.55 0 3 
 Male chn (wife1) 2.47 1.75 0 9 2.98 1.60 0 7 
Female chn (wife1) 2.31 1.43 0 7 2.35 1.40 0 6 
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In Table 1-8, the average number of wives is lower among legume farmers than non-
legume farmers, which may indicate some power. Yet, the number of male children is 
lower for women legume farmers than non-farmers.  
Table 1-8 Differences among Women Legume and Non-legume Farmers 
  Grow legume Do not grow legume 
  N=79 N=69 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of wives 1.30 0.59 0 3 1.36 0.62 0 3 
 Male chn (wife1) 2.53 1.67 0 9 2.81 1.76 0 8 
Female chn (wife1) 2.35 1.29 0 5 2.29 1.55 0 7 
Although, the number of wives and male children for the women farmers do not 
provide strong evidence of the women’s power in the household, the indicators of women’s 
empowerment in the next section will shed some light on women with power who can be 
targeted and contracted with supplying food items to the school lunch program.  
1.6 Measures of Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture  
A woman’s access to farming resources, as well as her agency in managing farm and 
household affairs, are functions of her empowerment in her household and the community 
at large. Empowerment is a multidimensional concept that requires appropriate measures 
for diagnosis. (Akire et al., 2013; Malapit et al., 2015). The indicators of the Millennium 
Development Goals, which measure gender parity and women empowerment, are 
education, women’s share in paid employment, and women’s equal representation in 
national parliaments. Other approaches used to measure women empowerment and gender 
parity include using nationally representative data on women’s status (Smith et. al., 2003); 
agency - ability to exercise choices where none existed a priori, resources, and 
achievements (Kabeer, 2005); proxy measures of bargaining power such as income and 
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assets (Thomas, 1994); and direct measures of empowerment such as mobility and 
decision-making (Bhagowalia et al., 2012). More recently, studies have used a survey-
based index designed to measure women’s empowerment across five domains in 
agriculture, namely agricultural production, access to and control over productive 
resources, control over the use of income, leadership in the community and time allocation 
(Akire et al., 2013, Malapit et al. 2015). Data from these types of surveys are used to 
construct the WEAI, a widely-recognized metric of gender parity (or lack thereof) within 
households and communities (Akire et al., 2013). Here, too, we use select questions from 
the WEAI survey.  
Different domains and indicators of women’s empowerment are important in 
different social, cultural and economic settings (Akire et al., 2013; Malapit et al., 2015). 
Calculation of the WEAI in northern Ghana indicates that the resources and production 
domains contribute the most to women’s disempowerment in northern Ghana. (Malapit et 
al., 2015; Alkire et al., 2013). In other words, parity was lowest in terms of access to 
resources and agency in production. Access to and decisions about credit is the key 
indicator that contributes most to the resource domain while input into productive decisions 
contributes the most to disempowerment in the production domain (Malapit et al., 2015). 
Malapit et al. (2015) find that women’s empowerment is weakly associated with children’s 
nutrition outcomes and significantly correlated with women’s dietary diversity in northern 
Ghana. The results of the authors suggest that expanding women’s access to credit and 
participation in credit decisions is associated with improved outcomes for both women and 
girls in northern Ghana. 
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1.6.1 Modified Data Collection of WEAI  
This study uses a modified, simpler, version of the WEAI survey to collect 
empowerment (or disempowerment) indicators of women in the areas of agricultural 
production, resources and income. As described in Alkire et al. (2013) the WEAI is survey-
based index which directly measures women’s empowerment across five domains in 
agriculture using responses from self-identified primary male and female adult decision-
makers, aged 18 and over, in the same household. The women’s empowerment score 
reflects the extent to which women are empowered in these five domains; and comparing 
women’s and men’s empowerment scores yields the gender parity which assesses the 
inequality between the achievements of women relative to the men in their households. In 
the WEAI and sub-indices a woman is empowered if she achieves adequate achievements 
in 80 percent of the weighted indicators or her score is equal to the male respondent in her 
household. 
This study collects data on the three domains that were identified by the WEAI as 
contributing most to women’s disempowerment in northern Ghana: production, resources 
and income. 
Production: This dimension concerns sole or joint decision-making about 
agricultural production activities. The indicator, input in productive decisions, is 
constructed from answers regarding participation in (a) food crop farming, (b) cash crop 
farming, (c) livestock raising, (d) non-farm economic activities, (e) wage and salary work, 
(f) major household expenditures and (g) minor household expenditures. Respondents were 
asked whether they participated in the activities, who often pays for the activity, who 
normally takes the decisions, how much input they had in the decision making and to what 
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extent the respondent feels they can make their own decision regarding the activity. An 
individual has adequacy in this indicator if he or she participates and has at least some input 
in decisions or if someone else makes the decisions but the individual feels he or she could. 
The answer scale for the question regarding input in decisions is 1 = no input, 2 = 
input into some decisions, and 3 = input into most or all decisions. For each activity, a sub-
indicator was created that considers the individual adequate if he or she participates in that 
activity and has at least input into some decisions related to that activity.  The answer scale 
for questions regarding the extent to which the individual feels he or she can participate in 
decisions is 1 = not at all, 2 = small extent, 3 = medium extent, and 4 = to a high extent. 
For each type of decision a sub-indicator was created that considers the respondent 
adequate if he or she makes the decisions or if the respondent feels that he or she could 
participate in the decision-making  to at least a medium extent. 
Resources: This dimension concerns ownership of or access to productive capital 
such as land and assets (livestock, agricultural equipment and consumer durables). The 
indicator examines whether an individual reports having sole or joint ownership of 
agricultural land, livestock (cattle, goats, guinea fowl and chickens), agricultural 
equipment (knapsack sprayer, tractor, shea-butter processor and a shop) and 
communicative consumer durables (radio, TV, phone, bicycle and motorcycle). A person 
is considered to have adequate achievements if he or she reports having sole or joint 
ownership of at least one major asset. 
Income: This dimension concerns sole or joint control over the use of income and 
expenditures. The indicator for this dimension measures the degree of input into decisions 
about the use of income generated from (1) food crops, (2) cash crops, (3) livestock 
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production, (4) nonfarm activities, (5) wage and salary work as well as the extent to which 
the individual feels he or she can make his or her own personal decisions regarding wage 
or salary employment and major and minor household expenditures. A person is considered 
adequate on this indicator if he or she has input into decisions about income generated, 
conditional on participation in the activity.  
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CHAPTER 2. DOCUMENTING THE SCHOOL CATERER, SMALLHOLDER FARMER 
MISSING LINK           
2.1 Introduction           
This chapter documents constraints that have undermined that successful linkage 
of local farmers with school caterers in the food system of national school lunch programs.  
While the Ghana School Feeding Program aims to increase food purchase from local 
smallholders, regardless of gender, this study places special emphasis on women 
smallholder farmers. Women are the primary child caregivers and main actors in household 
food preparation in many communities; thus, policy interventions that reduce gender 
inequalities are thought to improve women and children’s nutrition (Malapit and 
Quisumbing, 2015), and reduce poverty and food insecurity. 
2.2 Research Questions 
The research questions examined in this chapter are as follows:  
1. What are the main constraints preventing caterers from sourcing food items from 
local farmers? 
2. What are the main constraints facing women smallholder farmers that prevent 
them from participating in the school lunch programs? 
2.3 Background of the Ghana School Lunch Program 
In 2005, the government of Ghana launched a HGSF as a strategy to reduce poverty 
and increase access to primary education. This initiative is in line with the Comprehensive 
Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) goals on hunger, poverty and 
nutrition. The GSFP was implemented to provide one hot, nutritious meal a day for students 
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in pilot kindergarten and primary schools, covering 64,775 beneficiary pupils in the ten 
regions of Ghana. 
Figure 1 shows the current actors in the provision of GSFP lunches. The Ghana 
School Feeding Secretariat has national, regional district and community level offices. The 
GSFP national secretariat collaborates with the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Protection to implement the feeding program. The district secretariat recruits school 
caterers, monitors their catering activities and requests payments to be released from the 
Ministry to the caterers. The payments are through banks to the caterer’s account or via 
mobile electronic financial systems, after they have prepared and served food to the 
schoolchildren.  
The three stated goals of the GSFP are to (1) reduce hunger and malnutrition, (2) 
increase school enrollment, attendance, performance and retention, and (3) boost local food 
production. This study focuses on the third goal. The GSFP mandates that 80% of school 
food purchases (typically made by the school caterers) be direct purchases from local 
farmers. Prior to the GSFP, school lunches, when provided, were based heavily on food 
aid and/or imported products. The rationale of including the ‘local-purchase quota’ was to 
induce the smallholder farmers to expand their farms and produce more to meet the 
increased demand of food by caterers to feed school children, thereby increasing the 
incomes of smallholder farmers and improving the nutritional status of both the school 
children and those of the smallholder farmers. According to Sulemana (2016), the success 
in linking the GSFP to local agricultural development requires active participation of 
school level governance structures such as Head teachers and Parent-Teacher associations, 
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school food caterers, smallholder farmers and local food traders, who are key players 
involved in procurement of food under the GSFP. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Diagrams Indicating Actors Involved in GSFP 
 
Presently, however, the local-purchase quota is rarely met; in practice, caterers 
purchase nearly all of their food items from the regional market. Caterers typically 
purchase imported and/or processed items (e.g., imported white rice and canned tomatoes) 
from the regional markets, thus defeating the local agricultural development objective. 
According to an inventory of the GSFP by the Dutch NGO SNV (Netherlands 
Development Organization) in 2008, only one out of the ten regions had caterers 
purchasing more than 20% of food from local farmers. Figure 2.1 shows the present flow 
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of funds in solid lines; the dashed line is the link between local smallholder farmers and 
school caterers that could potentially be facilitated by the farm-to-school-lunch contracts 
described herein. 
 
Figure 2-2 Flow of funds from GSFP Secretariat to Markets 
2.4 Data and Sources 
The documentation and discussion draws on data from three primary sources. The 
first data source is a survey of 30 school caterers in the Eastern and Northern Regions of 
Ghana interviewed in 2016. The caterer survey was administered by a team of faculty 
members from the University of Ghana and the University for Development Studies. The 
survey asked questions regarding the student enrollment in the schools the caterers 
provided food to, the typical weekly menu and the sources of food procured. The survey 
also asked questions about the caterers including how long they had been caterers at the 
respective schools, other employment that they have, and whether they were members of 
Financial Institutions 
Caterers 
Local 
farmers  
Regional 
Marketers 
GSFP Secretariat  
34 
 
the communities in which they prepared and served meals. The caterer survey further asked 
about frequency of food purchases, availability of storage facilities, regularity of payments, 
and what structures would facilitate their purchase and use more local food in their meal 
preparation.   
The second data source was obtained through a preliminary survey and focus group 
discussions with women farmers in two communities in the Eastern Region of Ghana in 
2017. The questions posed and discussed with the focus groups were aimed at finding out 
challenges that hinder them from supplying food items to school caterers. To get an in-
depth understanding about the women’s empowerment in agriculture, the preliminary 
survey asked questions about marital status, ownership and control of land, and the ability 
of the woman smallholder to take sole decisions on agricultural activities on the farm plot.   
The third data source was in-person interviews and case study of school caterers in 
the Eastern and Greater Accra Region in 2018.  This survey aimed at eliciting women 
caterers’ compensating variation for hypothetical policy mandates that require them to 
include a recommended portion of fruits, vegetables and protein in the meals prepared and 
served to school children. Thus, the survey asked the minimum compensation school 
caterers required to provide recommended servings of vegetables and protein in the lunch 
of schoolchildren as well as the minimum compensation required to include a snack of 
fruits for the schoolchildren. 
2.5 Caterer Constraints in Buying from Local Farmers 
This section documents, describes and discusses the constraints that school caterers 
reported that prevent them from purchasing from local farmers as the GSFP caterer contract 
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stipulates.  The documentation draws on a survey of thirty caterers who were interviewed 
in 2016; twenty caterers in the Eastern Region and ten caterers in the Northern Region.  
2.5.1 School Profiles 
Each caterer typically prepares food for and feeds schoolchildren in the two 
kindergarten levels (1-2) as well as the six primary school grades (1-6). The total number 
of children enrolled and fed daily in the sampled Eastern Regional schools ranged from 73 
to 370 with an average of 188 schoolchildren. The average number of schoolchildren 
enrolled and fed daily in the sampled Northern Regional schools was 260, with a minimum 
148 and maximum 335 schoolchildren.  
2.5.2 Caterer Profiles  
All the caterers obtained the job by applying to the district assembly, going through 
an interview process and later being offered the job. The main qualities for selecting the 
caterers included knowledge about preparing balanced meals, ability to cook for a large 
number of people, sense of dedication and hard work, experience, commitment and 
resourcefulness. One food buyer cited his position as an executive member of the 
community enabled him to secure the contract. The year of appointment of the caterers 
ranged from 2008 to 2012; and the length of service ranged from 4 to 8 years. The payment 
for services reported by caterers was the excess of money used to purchase and prepare 
meals, that is, savings from the school-feeding budget. 50% of the caterers in the Eastern 
Region reported having an alternative and/or previous job as a farmer. The remaining 50% 
were into trading, petty trading, fishing, teaching or owning a drug store. In the Northern 
region, none of the caterers reported being farmers but were teachers, petty traders and 
food vendors. 75% of the caterers in the Eastern Region reported that they were members 
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of the community within which they served as caterers to schools while none of the caterers 
in the Northern Region reported being community members. 
Table 2-1 Profile of Sample Caterers in Eastern and Northern Region 
Characteristic Eastern Region Northern Region 
Average schoolchildren served (number) 187.85 260.2 
Average length of service (years 4.95 4 
Alternative job:   
Farmer (%) 50 0 
Trader (%) 27 30 
Food vendor (%) 9 30 
Teacher (%) 9 20 
Other (%) 5 20 
Community member (%) 75 0 
Sample size 20 10 
 
 
2.5.3 Food Menu, Food Purchasing and Storage  
Among the sampled caterers, a typical weekly menu included a carbohydrate 
portion (rice, yam, plantain, banku, waakye) as well as a sauce/stew/soup with some protein 
(beans, fish, chicken). In the Eastern Region, 65% of the sampled caterers followed a self-
made menu. The remaining cases followed a menu that was determined by the principal of 
the school, or the district assembly. One caterer mentioned the time of the season 
determined what was prepared and served. In the Northern Region, 80% of the caterers 
reported that the district assembly determined the weekly menu, while 20% reported 
following a self-made menu. However, the food items that are purchased and served each 
day are determined by the caterers as well as the availability of food items. No fruit 
purchases were reported in either the Eastern or Northern Region. 
All the caterers in the Eastern Region and Northern reported purchasing food items 
from the central market. In the Eastern Region, 50% reported that sometimes they directly 
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purchase from the farmers. 10% reported that they used to, but no longer purchase from 
local farmers because farmers dislike purchase on credit basis. Buying on credit in this 
instance, refers to a verbal agreement between caterers and local farmers in which caterers 
obtain food items from farmers with the promise of paying later when they receive 
payments from the government. 10% of the caterers who were also farmers reported 
supplying some food items such as maize from their own farms. In the Northern Region, 
some caterers reported buying on credit from the Tamale Market. One caterer reported that 
she stopped purchasing from local farmers when she was supplied poor quality food items 
that perished faster and was not compensated for the loss.  
Most caterers reported purchasing food items regularly. In the Eastern Region 5% 
of the caterers purchased food items monthly, every six weeks and 4 times a term, 
respectively; 10% purchased food items every two weeks; 15% purchased food weekly; 
20% purchased food three times a term and 40% reported purchasing food twice a term. In 
the Northern Region 80% reported purchasing food items once a term, 20% reported twice 
a term and 10% reported they have no fixed schedule; they purchase as and when they run 
out of food items and need to restock.  
Among the Eastern Region caterers, 60% reported storing food items in their home, 
30% reported storing the food items in a storage facility provided by the school; 5% 
reported using both personal and school storage and 5% reported renting a storage facility. , 
In the Northern Region, 60% of the caterers reported an available onsite facility where they 
could store food items and 30% reported no availability of on-site storage facilities. 10% 
reported the available storage facility was infested with rodents; therefore, they had to 
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make other arrangements such at storing the food items in the house of one of the cooks 
who was a member of the community.  
 
Table 2-2 Caterer Menu, Purchasing and Storage Characteristics 
Characteristic Eastern Region Northern Region 
Weekly menu:   
Self-made (%) 65 20 
School or district assembly decides (%) 35 80 
Location of food purchases*:   
Central Market (%) 100 100 
Local farmer, occasionally (%) 50 0 
Self (%) 10 0 
Frequency of food purchases^ :   
Weekly (%) 15 - 
Bi-weekly (%) 10 - 
Monthly (%) 5 - 
Six-week intervals (%) 5 - 
Four times each term (%) 5 - 
Three times a term (%) 20 - 
Twice a term (%) 40 20 
Once a term (%) - 80 
As needed, no fixed schedule (%) - 10 
Storage    
Home (%) 60 30 
School storage facility (%) 30 60 
Home and school storage (%) 5 - 
Rent storage (%) 5 - 
Other (%) - 10 
*Food purchases were sometimes made from multiple sources 
^A school term spans fourteen weeks on average 
2.5.4 Facilitation of Use of Local Foods 
This section explores, from the perspective of the caterer, how the purchase and use 
of local foods from farmers could be facilitated. The research question asked was “What 
would you need to be able to buy and use more local foods?” 75% of caterers in the Eastern 
Region and 90% of the caterers in the Northern Region mentioned that to facilitate the 
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purchase of local foods from farmers in preparing meals the payments should be made 
regularly or on time to avoid going to farmers to purchase on credit, as farmers do not want 
to sell on credit. This is reflected in the comments of one cater; “Ready cash. If I have 
ready cash, I can buy from the farmers in the community. They do not want to sell on credit. 
So if you don’t have money, you cannot buy from them”. Another caterer reported, “I need 
ready cash because the payment is not regular. The farmers have food and I am free with 
them. I only buy from them when I have money. I have bought from them rice, beans, 
cassava and maize, but only with cash”. Yet another reported, “If we are paid monthly, we 
could afford to buy from local farmers in the communities in cash”. 
The capacity of local farmers to supply the quantities needed by caterers was cited 
as a hurdle to purchasing from local farmers.  A caterer in the Northern Region reported 
the need to be linked to farmers who would be able to supply the quantities she demands. 
Another caterer in the Eastern Region suggested that, the government should educate the 
farmers on how to improve production and encourage farmers to work hand in hand with 
caterers. An increase in the productivity of the local farmers would help them meet the 
capacity demand of the caterers at minimum cost. In the words of one caterer, “help farmers 
to increase their productivity, so they can produce more and reduce the prices of their 
produce”.  
The third factor that was identified by the caterers as a means to facilitate 
purchasing food from local farmers was easier access to credit facilities from rural banks. 
One caterer mentioned that, “rural banks can give loans to help support purchases”. 
Another suggested credit arrangements between the caterers, farmers and rural banks 
would facilitate purchases from local farmers. SNV had once linked the caterer to a farmers 
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group through a Bonzali Rural Bank loan. Under the arrangement, the bank provided loans 
to each caterer, 70% of which was used to buy food from the farmers’ group and 30% was 
given to the caterer to facilitate other purchases. The farmer then supplied the food items 
based on price agreed upon. To ensure repayment of the loans, a caterer explained, “the 
bank deducted the loan in six instalments every time I receive payment for school feeding 
on my account at the bank”. The caterer reported that, “the farmers’ group price was 
cheaper than I got from my supplier. This kind of arrangement will help us buy food from 
the farmers in the community”. 
Table 2-3 Caterer Responses to Facilitation of Purchases from Local Farmers 
Themes Identified Sample Responses 
Regular payments     “If we are paid monthly, we could afford to buy from local 
farmers in the communities in cash” 
 “Regular payment will help us to be able to buy from the 
farmers. Monthly payment will be good” 
 “Ready cash. If I have ready cash, I can buy from the 
farmers in the community. They do not want to sell on 
credit. So if you don’t have money, you cannot buy from 
them” 
 “I need ready cash because the payment is not regular. The 
farmers have food and I am free with them. I only buy from 
them when I have money. I have bought from them rice, 
beans, cassava and maize, but only with cash” 
Increase farmer’s capacity “help farmers to increase their productivity, so they can 
produce more and reduce the prices of their produce” 
 “I need to be linked to farmers who have the capacity to 
supply the quantities I demand” 
 “The government should educate the farmers on how to 
improve production and encourage farmers to work hand 
in hand with caterers” 
Access to favorable credit “rural banks can give loans to help support purchases” 
 “Financial support will aid me go to the farm gate to buy 
foodstuff at a cheaper price” 
 “government can help with acquiring of loans to help 
purchasing of food items” 
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2.6 Women Farmer Constraints in Supplying to School Caterers 
2.6.1 Women Smallholder Focus Group – Adjeikrom    
The questions presented and discussed with the focus groups were aimed at finding 
out women farmers’ input in productive decisions as well as their access to productive 
resources. To get an in-depth understanding about the autonomy of the woman smallholder 
to take sole decisions on agricultural activities on the farm plot, we asked about marital 
status; ownership and control of land; types of crops grown; decisions on what to grow 
each planting season; and the general challenges facing the women farmers. 
Out of the sample of 13 women holders who were part of the focus group, 4 
(approximately 30% of the total sample) were married, 1 was divorced, 3 were single and 
5 were widowed. The high single/divorced/widowed status among the participants 
indicated an unusually high level of autonomy with regards to decision making about 
farming activities. More specifically, 69% of the women farmers solely made farming 
decisions. Among the 4 women who were married, 2 held independent farm plots from 
their husbands while the other 2 helped on their husbands’ farms.  
With regards to ownership and control of land, 5 of the participants were engaged 
in share-cropping. Sharecropping is a land-sharing agreement where the owner of the land 
leases out a plot (s) of land to the farmer and receives either half or one-third of the farm 
produce or income generated from selling the farm produce. The owners of the land benefit 
greatly from such agreements without having to do any farm work and thus are not likely 
to sell the land outright. Under sharecropping agreements, the farmer solely makes decision 
about what to produce, how to produce and how much to produce but must share the harvest 
with the landowner.  The remaining participants either owned the land, shared with their 
spouse or cultivated on family land. 
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Table 2-4 Profile of Women Farmers in Adjeikrom 
Characteristic Adjeikrom 
Marital Status  
Married (%) 30.8 
Divorced (%) 7.7 
Widowed (%) 38.5 
Single (%) 23.1 
Ownership of farm plot  
Own (%) 7.7 
Share with spouse (%) 7.7 
Family-owned (%) 46.2 
Sharecropping (%) 38.5 
Decision making about farm activities  
Sole decision-making (%) 69.2 
Decision-making with spouse (%) 15.4 
Decision-making with other family (%) 15.4 
Sample size 13 
 
For a link to be established between women farmers and school caterers, the 
questions sought to find out if the women farmers grew crops that the caterers needed or if 
they could grow crops to meet the food menu demands of the caterers. To find out if the 
women farmers grew crops that the school caterers needed to prepare food for the 
schoolchildren, we asked about the types of crops commonly grown in the Adjeikrom 
village. The most commonly cultivated food crops in the village were maize, cassava, 
plantain and cocoyam. Among these crops, maize and cassava are regularly purchased for 
food preparation and served to the schoolchildren. When we asked why beans were not 
grown by the women farmers in the village, the women farmers gave a number of reasons. 
Their reasons included: “beans doesn't grow well in this area, the people in the next village 
are better suited to grow the crop; beans is more difficult to cultivate than maize; we 
(women farmers) need to employ ‘hired hands’  (also known as by-day-workers) to spray 
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the bean crop and it's too costly for us; beans is more easily attacked by pests and diseases 
and we can’t easily control the pests and diseases.”  
The final focus group question asked the women farmers about the main challenges 
they faced in their farming activities. The first challenge they mentioned was land 
infertility; they cited that the land is not as fertile as it used to be and so when crops are 
cultivated the yield is lower than expected. Their responses suggested that no agricultural 
practices were performed to maintain or improve soil fertility other than slash and burning 
of the original vegetation. The second challenge mentioned was the need for money to hire 
labor to clear the land, help with planting and weed the farm when it's overgrown. The 
women farmers mentioned that there was an abundance of young men to hire, however the 
money to hire these young men was the challenge. “It costs about 20 cedis a day for each 
male and you have to provide them with lunch. It costs 25 cedis each when you can't 
provide the hired labor with lunch. The hired laborers work from about 8am to 12pm or 
2pm and are done no matter how far they have gotten with the activity you hired them for. 
The other alternative is to give them a portion of land to clear and agree on a fixed price, 
say 200 cedis. They may take up to a week but the job will be done.” The women farmers 
emphasized that it was getting such a large sum of money to pay up-front that was the 
challenge; specifically because they pay the hired labor with some of proceeds obtained 
from selling the harvested crops.  
Transporting produce is one other challenge that the women farmers mentioned. 
According to one woman farmer “it is very easy to market (sell) the produce once we get 
it to the roadside or to the village, however it is difficult to carry the products on our heads 
from the farm to the village.’’ The common practice among the women farmers, once they 
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harvest their produce, is to carry the produce on their heads or hire labor to carry the 
produce to the roadside or to the village where they often market their produce. Revenue 
accrued in bits and pieces from the sale of the produce is also an issue. A woman farmer 
commented: “it's easy to sell but the payments are in bits and pieces, not lump sum, so we 
lose track of the payments received and expenditures made.” Repayment schedules offered 
by microfinance institutions was the last challenge cited by the women farmers. The 
microfinance institutions start demanding payment 3 weeks after they give loans to the 
farmers and the repayment periods last for about 6 months. The farmers are thus unable to 
invest the funds into their farms. They either have to sell their crops from the previous 
harvest (if they have any remaining) or borrow from neighbors to repay.  
We asked the participants of the focus group about practical solutions to mitigate 
the challenges of women farmers and successfully link them to the school feeding supply 
chain. The women farmers suggested that everyone (school leadership, farmers and 
caterers) should be made aware that the women farmers’ farm produce is intended to be 
supplied to school caterers. They recommended a mutual agreement between the women 
farmers and the school caterers so that the caterers would not by-pass the farmers to go buy 
from the central market. The women farmers also proposed that prices should be agreed 
upon but should be flexible to reflect prevailing market prices. On the production side, they 
requested for monetary assistance to purchase seedlings and to hire labor. The women 
farmers were willing to consider the monetary assistance as a loan and repay within a year.  
2.6.2 Women Smallholder Focus Group – Aseseeso    
The second focus group at Aseseeso was also aimed at finding out the women’s 
input in productive decision-making, constraints, as well as their willingness to accept a 
farm-to-school lunch contract with the school cooks. The questions posed in this session 
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examined land ownership, farm decision-making, crops grown, marketing, alternative jobs 
and the farm-to-school contract. A sample of 11 women farmers convened for the focus 
group discussion in Aseseeso. Among the sample of women farmers, 3 inherited their 
farmland, 3 farmed on family-owned land, 2 had share-cropping arrangements, 1 owned 
the land but shared with spouse and 2 had other arrangements. With regards to decision 
making, 7 reported sole decision-making, 2 decide with spouse and 2 decide with family. 
The commonly grown crops included maize, plantain, yam, cassava and vegetables. Most 
of the women reported farming on subsistence and only selling if there was excess; only 
one woman farmer reported marketing to school caterers. 
When asked if they were willing to have participate in contractual arrangements 
with school caterers, 9 out of 10 said ‘yes’ to 50% advance payment, 8 out of 10 said ‘yes’ 
to 25% advance payments and 7 out of 10 said ‘yes’ to no advance payment, with one 
giving no response.   
Table 2-5 Profile of Women Farmers in Aseeseso 
Characteristic Aseeseso 
Ownership of farm plot  
Own (%) - 
Share with spouse (%) 9.1 
Family-owned (%) 54.5 
Sharecropping (%) 18.2 
Other (%) 18.2 
Decision making about farm activities  
Sole decision-making (%) 63.6 
Decision-making with spouse (%) 18.2 
Decision-making with other family (%) 18.2 
Contract participation  
50% advance-payment (% yes) 72.7 
25% advance-payment (% yes) 63.6 
No advance-payment (% yes) 54.5 
Sample size 11 
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When asked about major constraints affecting their farm activities that could affect 
the farm-to-school contractual arrangements, 4 main constraints stood out. These were 
fluctuating prices, post-harvest losses, pest and diseases, and unfavorable loan facilities. 
The women explained that sometimes there was ‘good’ market for farm produce with good 
prices, and at other times – especially during bumper harvests – prices would decline. They 
were interested in the farm-to-school lunch arrangements but did not want to be stuck with 
prices that was lower than on the market.  
With regards to post-harvest losses, the vegetable farmers remarked that when they 
harvest their vegetables and are not able to sell them within a short period, the vegetables 
go bad. They expressed willingness to expand their farms to meet the food requirements of 
the schools but did not want to be left with unpurchased vegetables that would go bad and 
be an additional cost to them. Their comments suggested that there were no storage or 
processing facilities that could increase the shelf life of the food items.  
The women farmers mentioned that maize and mango pests were the main pests 
that infested their farms. The pests sometimes completely consume their crops and leave 
them with nothing to harvest. When asked about how they combat the pests and diseases, 
they remarked that they did not have any resources (financial or technical expertise) to 
eliminate the pests. They are often unable to afford pesticides to spray their farms. Thus, 
when their farm plots are infested they know that they will have very little or no harvests. 
This was a major concern because if they got involved in the contractual arrangements and 
lost their harvests to pests, they would not have food items to supply to the school caterers.  
Unfavorable loan facilities was the fourth constraint mentioned by the women 
farmers. A woman farmer remarked, ‘we need money and would like to take loans, however 
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the interest rates are about 30% and within 3 weeks we have to stat repaying the loans’. 
Another woman farmer remarked, ‘the high interest rates and short repayment periods (4 
to 6 months) prevent us from taking loans unless we are desperately in need.’ When asked 
about rural banks and microfinance institutions in neighboring communities, it became 
apparent that some rural banks refuse to give loans to farmers because of high risk and 
uncertainty of repayment associated with farming. The banks who gave loans to farmers 
did so with high interest rates and requirements to repay within the shortest possible time.  
The next phase of the focus group discussion asked women farmers about potential 
solutions that they envision would curtail their challenges in farming and enable them 
supply food crops to the women caterers. Borehole and irrigation, financial support, 
favorable loan facilities and storage facilities were the solutions proposed by the women 
farmers.  A woman farmer reported, ‘our vegetable farms need a constant supply of water, 
but sometimes the rains do not fall as expected.’ This was an indication that even vegetable 
farmers who needed regular supply of water heavily depended on rainfall to grow their 
crops. The women farmers felt that if they had boreholes or irrigation facilities they would 
be able to grow and supply enough crops for the school caterers.  
A consensus about curtailing the challenges that women farmers face in supplying 
food items to schools was financial support. A woman farmer emphasized, ‘we need money 
to buy inputs and to take care of problems when they arise’. Based on consensus for the 
need for financial support, a follow up question asked the women farmers what they would 
use the money for if they were give a grant of GH1000 cedis.  The items mentioned for the 
use of the money included paying for land preparation, hiring labor and tractors, and 
purchasing seedlings, pesticides and spraying machines. If however, they were not 
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restricted to farming with the grant allocation, some of the women mentioned that they 
would invest in their non-farm businesses or use it to pay debts.  
The women farmers also suggested that favorable loan terms with rural banks and 
micro finance institutions could facilitate the farm to school lunch arrangements. They 
suggested at least one-year loan repayment periods would enable them to invest the money 
in their farming activities; cultivate their crops, harvest, sell and have sufficient money to 
reinvest and repay their loans. They also commented that lower interest rates would make 
it easier to repay loans and would take some pressure off them.  
Storage was another potential solution highlighted that could facilitate farm-to-
school arrangements between farmers and school caterers. Due to insufficient storage 
facilities, some farmers wanted to supply all their maize produce to school caterer rather 
than to store and supply monthly or every 6 weeks. However, a few women farmers had 
non-farm businesses as maize aggregators. These women preferred to store their maize 
crop, aggregate the maize of other women farmers and supply to school caterers as and 
when they needed it. Alternatively, a common storage facility could be provided that would 
record and store the farm produce of the women farmers and be released to the school 
caterers when they needed it. 
2.7 Supplemental Vegetables, Protein and Fruits for Ghana School Lunch 
Programs: A Welfare Analysis 
2.7.1 Introduction           
Nutrition for young schoolchildren is a critical component of growth and learning. 
The food’s nutrition contributes to concentration, critical thinking and performance. 
Moreover, the Ghana School Lunch Program stipulates one hot, nutritious meal for each 
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child for each school day. In the previous section, the survey of food items that caterers 
procure for preparing meals for schoolchildren indicates that virtually no fruits and very 
little vegetables and protein are included in the meals.  
Given that caterers under the GSFP are currently being paid GH₵1 per child per 
day, requiring caterers to increase the portions of protein and vegetables or to include fruits 
would most likely lead to a loss of welfare for the school caterers. The study seeks to 
examine the increase in compensation for school caterers that will leave them at the same 
level of welfare if they are required to provide recommended portions of protein, 
vegetables and fruits for schoolchildren. The data was obtained by interviewing caterers 
from 7 schools in the Eastern Region and 3 schools in the Greater Accra Region.  
To begin the interviews, the caterers were asked whether with no additional money, 
they would be able to provide recommended levels of protein and vegetables, or include 
fruits as part of their meal service. The recommended protein included a whole egg, or 
meat, fish or chicken that was the size of a child’s fist. Their responses indicated that the 
present allocation of resources (GH₵1 per child per meal) was insufficient to cover the 
recommended protein of say one egg per schoolchild. They cited that food vendors 
typically sold an egg for GH₵1, chicken, meat and some varieties of fish were sold for 
GH₵2 or GH₵3. The caterers also cited that fruits on the market sold cost more than the 
allocated resources, thus they would not be able to cover costs of purchases and meal 
preparation. They mentioned that they were currently providing the best food services they 
could, given the resources, and would incur losses for the recommended portions of protein 
and vegetables without additional resources.  
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The study thus examines the minimum compensation required by school caterers 
to include firstly fruits, and secondly additional protein and vegetables in the meals of the 
schoolchildren. Compensation variation is used to measure the payment needed for these 
additional menu items. 
2.7.2 Compensating Variation Analysis of Supplemental Vegetables, Protein and 
Fruit              
 Hicks (1942) defines Compensating Variation in Income as “the loss (gain) 
in income that would just offset a fall (increase) in price, leaving the consumer no better 
off than before.” Compensating variation (CV) may be generalized to measure the amount 
of money needed to put a caterer back on their original utility, after price(s) change, change 
in product quality or the introduction of new products.  
In this study, rather than a direct increase in price, caterers are asked to provide a 
recommended serving of vegetables and protein as a snack, and a recommended serving of 
fruits. The recommended servings were a cup/bowl of fruits, a quarter plate of vegetables 
and a child’s fist-size of protein.  The fruits are analyzed separately from the vegetables 
and protein as the fruits constitute a snack (a new addition to their contract requirements) 
while the vegetables and protein constitute a part of the main meal prepared and served by 
the caterers. The introduction of the recommend fruits and vegetables and protein in the 
meals of schoolchildren would take caterers from an initial level of utility (well-being) to 
a lower level of utility. CV in this study measures the least amount of extra income that 
restores the caterer to her original utility level. 
Let x be food items for preparing the carbohydrate-based meals and vp be 
vegetables and protein included in the meals. Let 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥 be the price of goods for the 
carbohydrate-based meals, 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 be the price of vegetables and protein, and c be other costs 
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associated with the lunch preparation. Given that B is the budget of the caterer, the budget 
constraint is  
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐               (1) 
The objective of the caterer is to minimize the cost of purchasing, preparing and 
serving school meals while providing sufficient calories to satisfy the schoolchildren. As 
the caterer minimizes the cost of meal preparation, she is able to maximize her profit given 
the budget constraint. This means that the caterer will choose a cost effective bundle that 
will allow her to provide sufficient calories for the schoolchildren.  Due to the high cost of 
vegetables and protein, most caterers choose a bundle of food items that largely consists of 
carbohydrate-based portions that are sufficient to satisfy the schoolchildren. Moreover, due 
to the payment structure, caterers typically choose the cheapest ingredients, which are 
neither local nor nutritious.  
2.7.2.1 Increasing Vegetables and Protein to Recommended Levels 
Asking caterers to increase vegetables and protein to recommended levels is 
equivalent to an increase in the cost of food served to the schoolchildren by school caterers. 
It is not possible to increase the quantities of vegetables and protein without a 
corresponding increase in the budget allocation or a fall in the price or quantity of x. In 
essence, it becomes more expensive for the caterer to provide the recommended portions 
without overcompensating on the quantity and quality of x and vp used in the lunch 
preparation. The CV is the minimum the caterer needs in order to accept the change in 
recommend vegetable and protein portions. 
2.7.2.2 Introducing Fruits as a Snack 
Asking the caterers to include fruits as a snack served to the schoolchildren is 
equivalent to the introduction of a new good.  Let f be the fruit portion to be introduced, 
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and y be the school lunch composed of recommended carbohydrate, vegetable and protein 
portions. The caterer’s budget constraint now becomes 
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝑐𝑐                                                                      (4)  
Again, it is likely that caterers would be unable to comply with an introduction of 
fruits in the school lunch program without a corresponding increase in the compensation 
provided them. The caterer would initially chose a bundle y that minimizes that cost of 
producing the school lunch, thus her minimum willingness to accept for including fruits is 
the CV for introducing fruits as part of the school lunch program.  
 
2.7.3 Data on Caterer Compensating Variation        
The mandate of the Ghana school lunch program is to provide one nutritious meal 
a day for school going children. A survey of food items used in the meal preparation 
indicates that portions of vegetables and protein are minimal and no fruits are included in 
the meals. This section examines the effect of a hypothetical policy on recommended 
portions of vegetables, proteins and fruits to the school lunch program. Caterers from 7 
school in the Eastern Region and 3 schools in the Greater Accra Region were interviewed 
to find out the monetary measure of compensation they would require if the hypothetical 
policy is implemented.  
The caterers were randomly picked from GSFP beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
schools. In our sample, 50% of the caterers were from beneficiary schools. All GSFP 
beneficiary schools are public schools. However, some public school are not yet 
beneficiaries as the GSFP was first implemented in schools that had lower school 
enrollment and attendance, with the goal to extend to all public schools. The caterers in the 
public non-beneficiary schools collected daily, monthly or termly levies (as and when 
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parents could pay) which was used to prepare food for the schoolchildren. Other caterers 
in public non-beneficiary schools operate a canteen-like meal service, where they prepare 
and serve meals to the schoolchildren based on what the kids want and how much money 
they have in hand.    
The interviews with the caterers in the Eastern Region and Greater Accra region 
indicated that, given the payment structure, the caterers were choosing quantities of food 
items that would provide sufficient calories for the schoolchildren at the minimum cost. 
When asked what amount of money they would require to provide the recommended 
portions of vegetables and protein, most of the caterers indicated that they would need at 
least twice as much as they were currently receiving, because vegetables and protein 
portions are more expensive to purchase and use in meals. Similarly, for including fruits, 
the caterers reported that they would require an additional GH₵0.5 or GH₵1. The table 
below gives the assumed compensating variation amounts elicited from the school caterers 
in the Eastern and Greater Accra Regions. 
The elicited compensating variation amounts are a close approximation to CV but 
may not exactly reflect the loss in income due to price increases in food items needed to 
prepare the school lunch. Moreover, these amounts were elicited directly from caterers 
based on a hypothetical scenario rather than computed from direct changes in prices, as the 
definition of compensating variation would suggest. Thus, one need be cautious when 
interpreting the elicited amounts as compensating variation measures.  Future studies may 
collect data on actual prices of food items used to prepare the school lunch and increases 
in prices over times, in order to compute an actual measure of CV.  
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Table 2-6 Compensating Amounts of Interviewed Caterers 
School Lunch 
Cost 
(GH₵) 
Recommended 
Vegetable & Protein 
(GH₵) 
Recommended 
Fruit (GH₵) 
GSFP 
Beneficiary 
School 
Type 
Eastern Region 
A 1 1 1 Yes Public 
B 1 1 1 No Private 
C 1 0.5 0.5 No Private 
D 0.7 1 0.5 No Public 
F 1 1 1 Yes Public 
G 1 0.5 0.5 No Public 
H 1 1 1 Yes Public 
Greater Accra Region 
I 1 1.5 1 Yes Public 
J 3 0.5 0.5 No Private 
K 1 1 1 Yes Public 
 
2.8 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation  
This chapter employs descriptive analysis to document constraints that have 
undermined school caterer purchases of food items from local farmers as mandated by the 
government of Ghana. The chapter draws on three sources of data; 1) a survey of  school 
caterers in the Northern and Eastern Regions of Ghana 2) a survey and focus group 
discussion with women farmers in the Eastern Region of Ghana and 3) a survey of caterers 
in the Eastern and Greater Accra Regions of Ghana. 
The research questions seeks to identify the constraints that have minimized school 
caterers from making purchases from local farmers, first from the perspective of the school 
caterers, then, from the perspective of women smallholder farmers. The caterer data 
revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing from local farmers is the time and 
frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration to the school caterers, and storage 
facilities. The caterers receive payments three to six months after they have prepared and 
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served meals to the schoolchildren. This requires that caterers have sufficient funds to self-
finance feeding the schoolchildren for at least one academic term. Without sufficient funds, 
the caterers make purchases from market women who are able to give food items ‘on-
credit’ but not from local farmers who do not like, or rather, cannot afford to give out their 
food crops ‘on-credit’. This might be because selling on credit basis may cause the local 
farmers to forfeit their farm profits and have little or nothing to invest during the next 
planting season, leaving them with no crops to sell to school caterers during harvest time. 
This could inadvertently defeat the goal of ‘buying local’ for the Ghana School Feeding 
Program as farmers may have little or no food crops to sell without their previous profits. 
Having more regular payments, for example monthly payments to caterers, may facilitate 
purchases from local farmers as required by the policy mandate of the Ghana government.  
The current remuneration school caterers receive is GH1 per child per school day. 
The lump sum amount is further subjected to taxes, levies and additional fees. This leaves 
the caterers with a lower amount of money to spend on food items even without taking into 
consideration transportation, payments to cooks they hire to assist them, or their time and 
catering services rendered. Given the amount of money the caterers have available to 
spend, they often optimize by choosing, for example, canned tomatoes and canned fish 
over fresh tomatoes and fresh fish. The canned food items are arguably more affordable 
but are imported, thus defeating the home-grown framework mandated by the government. 
A slight increase in the remuneration provided to school caterers may facilitate purchases 
of fresh but more costly food items from local farmers.  
Most of caterers surveyed mentioned that they stored the food items in a room at 
their residence or in a room provided by the school. The caterers typically store the food 
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items on the floor or in shelves in these rooms. The storage facilities may or may not have 
refrigerators to extend the lifespan of the food items. With such storage facilities, school 
caterers may be inclined to purchase non-perishable items to avoid spoilage. The food 
items provided by local farmers are not processed and easily perishable.  Caterers may 
again chose canned food items over fresh food items from local farmers to minimize food 
losses. The government may consider investing in storage facilities for the schools or 
assisting local farmers with processing their food items to extend its life span and make it 
a viable option for school caterers.   
Among the women farmers surveyed, the major constraints appeared to be land 
infertility and access to credit. Although the women mentioned land infertility, the land 
appears to be infertile because they rely on traditional methods of farming such as 
dependence of fallow periods to put nutrients back in the soil and the dependence on rain 
to water their farms. In the face of a growing population and climate change, these 
traditional farming techniques are not as effective as they used to be because land is not 
readily available for long fallow periods, nor are rains as predictable as they used to be. 
The government can provide education and training for the women farmers on more 
effective farming techniques with extension agents targeted at women farmers.  
Concerning access to credit, the government can instruct micro-finance institutions to make 
loan packages available for women farmers as well as to provide lower interest rates and 
better terms of repayment for the women farmers.  
The Ghana School Feeding Program is a nationwide policy meant to provide a 
reliable source of nutritious for young schoolchildren. Due to budget constraints, school 
caterers often provide the most cost effective meals, which is typified by a largely 
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carbohydrate base, with little or no vegetables and/or protein. To increase the effectiveness 
of the nutritious clause in the policy, the government can include recommended portions 
of vegetables and protein. However, recommendation would not suffice without a 
corresponding increase in the budget allocations of school caterers. Additionally, the 
payment structure incentivizes caterers to use the cheapest ingredients, which typically is 
not local or nutritious. Thus, a restructuring of the payment system to from a 6-month basis 
(or more) to a monthly basis may enable caterers purchase and use more local and nutritious 
food items in the school lunch.  
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CHAPTER 3. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: 
THE CASE OF IMPROVED MAIZE AND LEGUME TECHNOLOGY IN NORTHERN 
GHANA  
3.1 Introduction  
The study seeks to analyze the differences in male-female adoption of multiple 
agricultural technologies. Adopting improved technologies can help increase the 
productivity of smallholder farmers and ensure a constant supply of food items from farm 
to school-plate, to facilitate the policy goals of the Ghana School Lunch Program. In recent 
years, there has been increasing evidence of differential adoption rates of agricultural 
technology adoption by male and female smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Peterman et al., 2014). Peterman et al., 2014 present a review microeconomic empirical 
literature on gender differences in use, access, and adoption of non-land agricultural inputs 
in developing countries. Their findings highlight attention to gender-disaggregated analysis 
and several indicators of gender (e.g. female-owned assets) to build a more robust of work 
identifying gender differences in access to agricultural inputs.  
Males and females in households may make joint or independent decisions on 
whether to adopt any bundle of improved agricultural technology. When female farmers 
have limited decision-making power in agricultural production, they may not use improved 
technology on the farms they manage (Lambrecht et al., 2016). Even when female 
smallholder farmers have sufficient decision-making power, they may face more 
constraints to cash and/or labor inputs, which may limit their adoption of agricultural 
technologies (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011). Thus, the study models technology adoption 
taking into consideration the constraints to decision-making and access to productive 
resources that women farmers face. 
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Several gaps exist in the agricultural technology adoption literature. Firstly, there is 
a paucity of technology adoption literature that examines gender differences among 
smallholder farmers’ adoption rates and their patterns of agricultural technology adoption.  
Secondly, most examine adoption at the household level (using the data on household head 
or combined household assets) ignoring individual production decisions of males and 
females as well as individual ownership and control over assets. Thirdly, most adoption 
studies have considered adoption of single innovations in isolation, disregarding the 
adoption of other agricultural technologies. These are limited in their use of univariate 
analysis to assess inherently multivariate adoption decisions. 
This chapter addresses the gaps in the literature by examining gender differences in 
the adoption of multiple agricultural technologies, while accounting for mutual correlation 
among the technologies adopted. A conceptual framework that takes into consideration 
gender roles and decision-making within the farm households; access to, ownership and 
control over productive resources; and how these may influence technology adoption is 
presented.  A multivariate probit model is used to estimate the determinants of technology 
adoption.   
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors that influence gender gaps in 
technology adoption. The proposed gender-focused hypothesis in the study are that, (1) 
female farmers who have lower access to productive resources may be less likely to adopt 
improved agricultural technology (2) female farmers who have input into most decisions 
regarding cash crop farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop 
farming may be more likely to adopt agricultural technology and (3) female farmers who 
have positional security may be more likely to adopt improved agricultural technology. 
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The chapter begins with an overview of gender differences in improved agricultural 
technology adoption. The literature provides the foundation for the conceptual and 
empirical framework.  In section 4.3 and 4.4, the conceptual and empirical methods are 
outlined. A brief description of the intra-household survey and summary statistics are 
provided in section 4.5. The empirical results are presented in section 4.6. 
3.2 Review of the Literature  
3.2.1  Importance of Agricultural Technology Adoption     
  
Adopting improved agricultural technology can help developing economies 
stimulate growth and development through increased productivity; increased incomes and 
expenditures; food security; and sustained poverty reduction (Ainembabazi et al., 2018; 
Khonje, Manda, Alene, & Kassie, 2015; Mathenge, Smale & Olwande, 2014; Shiferaw, 
Kassie, Jaleta & Yirga, 2014; Wossen, et al., 2017). The strong evidence for the positive 
impact of adoption of modern agricultural technologies for staple crops in several African 
countries may inform strategies to achieve the smallholder engagement and poverty 
reduction goals of Home Grown Feeding Programs such as the Ghana School Feeding 
Program. For instance, Ainembabazi et al., 2018 find that adopting agricultural 
technologies in Central Africa reduced the probability of being poor by 13 percentage 
points with 32% of the share of poverty reduction causally attributable to adoption of 
improved crop varieties. Kotu et al. (2017) also find that using integrated agricultural 
technologies rather than adopting a single technology significantly increases farm 
productivity and household farm income in Ghana. 
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Systematic differences among smallholder farmers influence their rates of modern 
agricultural technology adoption. Relatively less poor farmers tend to adopt improved 
technology more intensely compared to relatively poor farmers (Khonje et al., 2015). Thus, 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach to technology adoption may not be suitable for all smallholder 
farmers (Wossen et al., 2017). Nonetheless, studies have shown that relatively poor farmers 
stand to benefit more from adopting new crop varieties, while the relatively wealthy 
farmers benefit more from adopting post-harvest technologies (Ainembabazi et al., 2018). 
Studies that find significant advantages of agricultural technology adoption have called for 
continued public and private investments in agricultural technology development 
(Mathenge et al., 2014),  improved access of modern varieties of major food staples and 
complimentary inputs to smallholder farmers (Shiferaw et al., 2014) and expansion of rural 
financial markets and schools (Wossen et al., 2017). However, agricultural technology 
research often does not take into consideration gender-specific needs, preferences, and 
resources of female farmers in developing countries (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010).  
Ndiritu, Kassie & Shiferaw (2014) note that designing and disseminating agricultural 
technologies that recognize the gender differentials within the heterogeneous families 
managing different farm plots would contribute significantly towards closing the gender-
technology gaps, yet very few studies exist that explore gender differences in technology 
adoption. Few studies may have focused on women farmers especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa because women generally cultivate crops on small plots of land and often farm to 
generate supplemental food and income, in addition to what the male breadwinners 
provide. Recent research in developing economies have identified women smallholder 
farmers as potential mediums to facilitate global food security and poverty reduction.  This 
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study contributes to the adoption literature by examining the underlying factors that 
influence gender differentials in improved technology adoption. Knowing the source of 
these technology adoption differences is important for informing for policy interventions 
aimed at increasing technology adoption to improve productivity and ensure food security 
within developing economies.   
3.2.2  Constraints to Agricultural Technology Adoption by Women     
A key challenge to accelerated technology adoption is the unequal access to, and use 
of new technologies by male and female smallholder farmers in developing economies 
(Ndiritu et al., 2014). Most of the agricultural adoption literature has emphasized green-
revolution technologies, soil and water conservation technologies and the factors which 
broadly influence adoption of these technologies. A paucity exists on gender differences in 
agricultural technology adoption; the few exceptions include Doss and Morris (2001), 
Ndiritu et al. (2014) and Theriault, Smale & Haider (2017). Three themes that stand out in 
the existing gender and technology adoption literature are: (1) Gender in itself does not 
influence agricultural technology adoption but rather differences in women access to 
complimentary inputs affect technology adoption, (2) household structures and bargaining 
within households affect women’s ability to adopt technology and (3) cultural norms 
influence women’s technology adoption.  
Understanding whether men and women have different technology preferences when 
faced with similar constraints, or whether men and women face different constraints that 
cause them to adopt agricultural technologies at different rates can help provide research 
strategies that facilitate equitable adoption of improved technology in developing countries 
(Doss and Morris, 2001).  Doss and Morris (2001) investigate the factors that influence 
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different gender adoption rates of improved maize varieties and chemical fertilizers in 
Ghana. The authors find that different technology adoption rates of improved maize and 
fertilizer is not dependent on the gender of the smallholder farmer, rather the differences 
in women’s access to and ownership of land, access to labor, education and extension 
contacts account for the gap. The conclusion of their study suggests that ensuring better 
access to land, labor and extension services for women farmers may result in more 
equitable adoption of improved technologies.    
Similarly, Ndiritu et al. (2014) use sex-disaggregated survey data to test for 
systematic gender differences in the adoption of multiple sustainable technologies in 
Kenya. These authors find mixed results for gender differences in multiple technology 
adoption patterns; some technologies have gender differences in the rates of adoption while 
other technologies have no gender differences. They find that compared to male plot 
managers, women managers are less likely to adopt minimum tillage and organic manure 
for soil fertility management, which may suggest some socio-economic inequalities and 
constraints for women farmers. However, they find no gender differences in the adoption 
of improved seed varieties, maize-legume rotations, maize-legume intercrop and chemical 
fertilizer. Theriault et al. (2017) examine gender differences in adoption rates, likelihood 
and determinants of sustainable technologies that enhance yields, protect crops and restore 
soils. They find that adoption rates remain higher for men compared to women for the 
yield-enhancing, yield-protecting and soil-restoring technologies. The authors find that 
females are less likely to adopt either the yield-enhancing or the soil-restoring technologies 
but no gender differentials in the probability of adopting yield-protecting technologies. 
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They conclude that the gender of the farmer and the sociocultural farming context 
combined with the economic attributes of technology affect adoption. 
Women farmers’ disempowerment in productive assets may be a contributing factor 
to lower observed adoption of improved technologies. The number or value of women’s 
assets in sub-Saharan Africa rarely reaches half that of men and even in situations when 
men and women jointly own assets, men tend to have stronger rights than women (Johnson 
et al., 2016). Women in rural sub-Saharan Africa often have lower levels of education, 
smaller plots and fewer productive assets compared to their male counter parts (Doss & 
Morris, 2001; Johnson et al., 2016; Ndiritu et al., 2014). Johnson et al. (2016) examine 
eight projects in Africa and South Asia within which the use, control and ownership of 
assets affect how men and women benefit from agricultural interventions. Some of the 
projects directly increased women’s assets and took steps to ensure women maintained 
control of the asset (by putting women’s name on the title, supporting women to reclaim 
lost assets and influencing gender norms about asset ownership). The authors find that 
agricultural interventions that target the distribution of productive assets such as livestock 
and machinery to women lead to greater empowerment of women and can facilitate uptake 
of agricultural technologies (Johnson et al., 2016).  
Access to productive assets such as land and tenure security has been examined in 
the development literature as an asset that contributes to smallholder farmers’ technology 
adoption and productivity. Santos et al., (2014) evaluate the impact of a land-allocation 
and registration program on perceptions of tenure security, use of credit for agricultural 
production, investments in agricultural production and women’s participation in decision-
making in India. Under the program, the government purchased tracts of land and provided 
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micro-plots to landless rural families who could use it to build a homestead, cultivate 
vegetable gardens, plant fruit and wood trees or raise livestock. The land-allocation and 
registration program targeted poor populations and promoted the inclusion of women’s 
names on the land titles.  The authors find that for the allotted plots women report 
significantly higher levels of tenure security, were more likely to access credit for 
agriculture and to invest in agricultural improvements, and were more likely to participate 
in food and agricultural decisions. More specifically, women were 8% less likely to report 
being concerned about having to vacate their allotted land and 18% more likely to report 
retaining access and control over the allotted plot. Beneficiary households reported being 
12% more likely to report taking out a loan from a formal bank and 88% more likely to use 
a loan for agricultural purposes. Additionally, the households with the allocated plots were 
more likely to invest in agriculture. In particular, these households were 11% more likely 
to use fertilize or pesticides; 11% more likely to use seedlings, seeds or stems; and 7% 
more likely to rent agricultural equipment compared to non-beneficiary households. 
Women’s lower ownership and control of productive assets may also explain their 
lower investments in agricultural technology. Santos et al. (2014) note that when women’s 
names were included on the titles of allotted land, there was a significant increase in 
women’s involvement in food and agriculture decision making. Including women’s names 
on the titles significantly increased their perception of tenure security by about 10%. 
Women with land documents under their name have a greater say in decisions on how to 
use the land, what to grow on it and whether to sell the produce from that plot. Moreover, 
women are 14%, 15%, and 13% more likely to participate in decisions about taking loans, 
purchasing productive assets, and food purchasing and consumption, respectively, when 
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their names are on land titles.  Not only does tenure security increase agricultural 
technology adoption, the size of land further increases the use of fertilizer, pesticides and 
seeds, seedlings or stems by beneficiary households (Santos et al., 2014).   
3.2.3  Determinants of Agricultural Technology Adoption     
Khonje et al. (2015) examine significant differences in the characteristics of adopters 
and non-adopters of improved agricultural technologies in Zambia. The authors find that 
education of the household head, household size, distance to extension office, capital 
assets, access to information about improved technology, market information and group 
membership were significant in explaining adoption of improved maize. Similarly, Ndititu 
et al. (2014) and Theriault et al. (2017)  find that credit constrained households are less 
likely to adopt improved seeds and suggest that improving the effectiveness of rural 
financial institutions can speed up the adoption of these technologies. 
Ndititu et al. (2014) find that older farmers are less likely to adopt improved seeds 
and chemical fertilizer. Conversely, Theriault et al. (2017) find that age of plot manager 
positively influences the probability of adopting a soil-restoring strategy set for both males 
and females. Moreover, the authors find that marital status influences the probability of 
adopting the yield-enhancing set for both males and females but only the soil-restoring set 
for males.  
Plot characteristics such as size, and location from residence influence the adoption 
of intensification strategy sets (Theriault et al., 2017). These authors find that larger plot 
size have a higher probability of adopting modern technologies for both male and female 
plot managers. Plots that are far from the residence, for both males and females, have a 
lower probability of adoption due to larger requirements of time, labor, and energy in 
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transport. Female plot managers in households that have secure rights on a greater share of 
their plots are more likely to adopt modern technologies as they may feel less threatened 
to lose their land. 
3.2.4 Methodology Used for Agricultural Technology Adoption Studies  
  
A number of different methodologies have been used to examine determinants of 
agricultural technology adoption. Doss et al., (2001) use a two-stage probit approach to 
investigate gender differences in improved maize and chemical fertilizer adoption in 
Ghana. The authors model the decision to adopt maize adoption, fertilizer or both. Since 
the decision to adopt the improved technologies are linked, the authors model a first stage 
of fertilizer or improved maize adoption. In the second stage, the predicted values for 
improved maize and fertilizer are included as independent variables. Lambrecht et al. 
(2014) use a three-step approach of farmer’s awareness, tryout and sustained adoption to 
model the decision to adopt agricultural technology. Additionally, the authors use 
univariate probit models, Heckman selection probit models and bivariate probit models to 
explain and control for selection bias and possible endogeneity bias.   
The smallholder farmer’s decision to adopt one technology may be dependent on 
other technologies she may have adopted or may desire to adopt as a complement or 
substitute to deal with agricultural production constraints such as low productivity or 
weeds. The nature of interrelationships that exists among different agricultural technology 
inputs may influence farmers’ joint or individual use of improved technology. Univariate 
methods examining only one technology may exclude vital economic information about 
interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996). Identifying the 
nature of these interrelationships may inform whether farmers adopt technologies in 
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piecemeal or bundles; and would help policy makers define strategies for promoting 
technology adoption (Teklewold et al., 2013). 
A number of studies have explored farmers’ adoption of multiple sustainable 
intensification technologies (Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold, Kassie & Shiferaw, 2013; 
Theriault et al., 2017). Ndiritu et al., 2014 use multivariate probit models to examine 
differential technology adoption patterns of male-female plot managers across diverse 
farming systems in Kenya. The authors extend the study of the gender-technology adoption 
gap beyond a single input such as fertilizer to include multiple sustainable intensification 
of production such as maize-legume intercropping, maize-legume rotation, manure 
application and minimum tillage. Their approach is an improvement over previous studies 
that analyzed adoption of a single agricultural technology. In a related study, Theriault et 
al. (2017) use multivariate probit models to test for gender differentials in adoption rates, 
the likelihood of adoption and the determinants of adoption in Burkina Faso. The authors 
model the decision to adopt technology within a complex household in the face of 
imperfect or missing markets. The authors explore the use of numerous inputs grouped in 
terms of strategies (yield-enhancing, yield-protecting, soil restoring sets), and their 
interrelationships, while controlling for major cereal crops (sorghum, maize, millet) in 
Burkina Faso. Teklewold et al. (2013) also use multivariate and ordered probit models to 
analyze the probability and level of adopting multiple technologies. The authors find strong 
complementarities and substitutability between multiple technologies, providing support 
for the analysis of multiple technology in this study. 
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3.3 Conceptual Technology Adoption Model 
The conceptual model of this study closely follows the Gender, Assets and 
Agricultural (GAAP) framework developed by Meinzen-Dick et al. (2011), which shows 
gendered links between assets, livelihood strategies and well-being. Similar to the GAAP 
framework, each component of conceptual model in Figure 4.1 is gendered to indicate that 
men and women living in the same household often have some joint and some separate 
productive assets, production activities and technology adoption strategies. The legend in 
Figure 4.1 reflects the gendered conceptual framework.  
The first element of the conceptual framework is the context (Figure 4.1). The 
physical, social and institutional context with which technology is implemented can predict 
whether women will adopt it as successfully as men (Doss et al., 2001). The context of this 
study is the socio-economic and cultural underpinnings of rural and peri-urban farm 
households in Northern Ghana. Households in Northern Ghana typically contain a husband, 
one or more wives, some children, parents and some married and unmarried siblings. A 
male adult is typically the head of household and breadwinner while the primary female 
adult is the caregiver. In these households, the male would be expected to farm to meet the 
dietary needs of the family while the female would be expected to farm to provide 
supplementary ingredients. The male and female’s farm responsibilities often overlap and 
they may share a common plot or farm on separate plots.  Very few female-headed 
households exist and are mostly formed upon widowhood. The ownership decision-making 
and management of different plots often vary within each household.  The males and 
females within each household make some joint and some independent plot level decisions. 
Thus, the unitary model that characterizes the household as a single production and 
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consumption unit does not adequately represent the realities of households in Northern 
Ghana. 
The next item after the context in Figure 4.1 is assets. Access to and control over 
productive assets is a key determinant of individual agency. Assets may be in the form of 
natural resource capital such as land; physical resource such as agricultural equipment, 
consumer durables, vehicles and transportation, communication infrastructure (phone, TV, 
radio); human capital such as education and literacy; and financial capital such as savings, 
credit and inflows (remittances). Within each household some assets may be owned by 
men, some may be held by women and others may be jointly owned (as indicated by the 
shading in the legend of Figure 4.1).  
Intra-household decision-making power indicates agency and may provide insights 
into technology adoption patterns of males and females within a household. The extent to 
which males and females in a household can contribute to production decision-making 
jointly or independently make decisions may inform the likelihood and extent to which 
they adopt improved agricultural technology. For example, a woman may desire to use 
herbicide on her plot to reduce weed infestation, however if she has little or no input into 
decision-making she may resort to using her own labor to uproot weeds. Additionally if 
she has little say on income decision-making she may be less inclined to invest, adopt or 
even use improved agricultural technology. Thus, a woman’s involvement in decision-
making indicates agency and empowerment and is likely to influence her technology 
adoption decisions.  
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Figure 3-1 Conceptual Framework of Gendered Technology adoption 
Improved seed varieties may be characterized by high yielding ability, increased 
resistance to diseases and insect pests, enhanced drought tolerance and/or improved grain 
quality. The improved seed varieties are also relatively inexpensive and require little 
technical expertise to adopt. Fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides1 on the other hand are 
relatively more expensive and require a higher level of technical expertise to be able follow 
correct application rates, optimal application schedules and efficient application methods. 
In making the adoption decision, the benefits of adopting multiple agricultural technologies 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
1 The use of pests in this study is in relation to insect pests and diseases, but excludes weeds. The use of 
pesticides here thus refers to insecticides and fungicides (for management of insects and diseases).  
Well-being
Consumption
ProductionTechnology adoption
Assets
Production 
decision-making
Income decision-
making
Savings/ 
Investment
Legend:  
 Men Women Joint 
Context: Socio-economic/cultural norms of rural farm households in 
Northern Ghana 
72 
 
may exceed the benefits from adopting only one due to interactions between the 
technologies. Thus, the decision to adopt one agricultural technology can be expected to 
affect the decision to adopt the other.  
Following Ndiritu et al. (2014) this study models the adoption patterns for a 
combination of improved agricultural technologies adopted by male and female 
smallholder farmers in Ghana. Smallholder farmers consider a set of possible technologies 
and choose a particular agricultural technology bundle that maximizes their expected utility 
(Dorfamn, 1996; Kassie et al., 2013; Teklewold et al., 2013). The smallholder farmer may 
choose to adopt multiple agricultural technologies as complements or substitutes to meet 
their production constraints of weeds, pests, diseases or low productivity. The adoption 
decision is multivariate, as there exists potential correlations among the individual 
agricultural technology choices. Moreover, the same unobserved characteristics of the 
smallholder farmer may influence the adoption of any given set of agricultural 
technologies. The decision to adopt an agricultural technology may also be conditional on 
the adoption of a complementary or substitutable technology. Ignoring the interdependence 
of adoption decisions may lead to biased, inefficient estimates and misleading results 
(Greene, 2008).  
3.4 Research Questions 
The objective of this essay is to examine the underlying factors that may facilitate or 
impede the probability and level of the different technology adoption decisions by women 
and men smallholder farmers. The research question asks whether the empowerment of 
women smallholder farmers, with regards to access to productive assets and agricultural 
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decision making, influences their technology adoption decisions. The hypothesis are as 
follows: 
H1a: Smallholder farmers who have lower access to productive resources including 
education, credit, land, radios, bicycles and TVs are less likely to adopt improved 
agricultural technology.  
 H1b: Female farmers who have lower access to productive resources including 
education, credit, land, radios, bicycles and TVs are less likely to adopt improved 
agricultural technology.  
H2a: Smallholder farmers who have input into most decisions regarding cash crop 
farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more 
likely to adopt agricultural technology. 
H2b: Female farmers who have input into most decisions regarding cash crop 
farming and decisions on the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more 
likely to adopt agricultural technology. 
H3: Female farmers who have positional security are more likely to adopt improved 
agricultural technology.  
Women might be making sub-optimal technology adoption decisions based on their 
position of importance in the family, which gives them a sense of security. The measure of 
security is indexed by the number of male head’s wives and number of woman’s sons. In 
a household where the male household head has only one wife, the woman is likely to feel 
more secure compared to a household with four or more wives. Moreover, male children 
are considered an honor and an asset in rural farm households, thus the number of sons a 
woman has might give her some sense of security.  The security index may give an 
indication of how powerful a woman feels in the household and may thus reflect in her 
technology adoption decisions. 
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3.5 Empirical Model of Technology Adoption 
This study uses a multivariate model to estimate differences in men and women’s 
adoption of technology. Consistent with the theory of decision-making within a complex 
household, the empirical model recognizes that the individual male or female farmer’s 
decision to adopt agricultural technology is conditioned on individual and household 
characteristics. Moreover, differences in input use could result from plot-specific variable 
features of each farmer’s agricultural land; thus, the model also accounts for plot 
characteristics. 
The multivariate probit model (MVP) is appropriate for modeling a multivariate 
adoption decision in the presence of interdependence among the technologies to be adopted 
(Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold et al., 2013) because it recognizes the correlation in the 
error terms of individual adoption equations. A single-equation model of technology 
adoption would assume that a farmer’s adoption of one agricultural technology is unrelated 
to the likelihood of adopting another. The MVP simultaneously models the influence of a 
set of explanatory variables on each of the different technology options and is more 
efficient than univariate probit methods analyzing each agricultural technology separately. 
The general multivariate probit model takes the form, 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗ =  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘                   (3.1) 
Where is  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗  denotes the latent dependent variable, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 denotes the explanatory 
variables and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, the multivariate normally distributed stochastic terms.    
For our purposes, we express it as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗ =  𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘     𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 ,    𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎    𝑘𝑘 = 𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹,𝑊𝑊,𝑃𝑃     (3.2) 
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where,  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is a set of observable individual characteristics, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is observed household 
characteristics, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 includes plot characteristics and k denotes the particular technology 
adopted. 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 each represent estimates and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is the normally distributed error term 
independent of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 and  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. For each male or female smallholder farmer (i) in the 
sample, we observe a binary adoption variable 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗  for each of the four agricultural 
technologies. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗  denotes the latent dependent variable, which can be represented by the 
expected utility derived from the adoption of improved seeds (S), fertilizer (F), herbicides 
(H) and pesticides (P). Although perceived benefits derived from the technology set are 
unobservable (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗ ), the decision to adopt is observable (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘) and is expressed as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 1 if 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘∗ > 0   
       = 0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                                       (3.3)     
The decision to adopt 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is a limited dependent variable, which takes a value of 1 if 
the farmer (i) makes the observable decision of adopting any of the improved technology 
sets and 0 otherwise.   As specified 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 are unknown parameters to be estimated by 
the probability model: 
Prob(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘,𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ) = 𝐹𝐹( 𝜶𝜶𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜷𝜷𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜸𝜸𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘)              (3.4) 
where F( ) is the probability distribution function. The multivariate regression models 
the relationship between the decision to adopt improved seeds (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), fertilizer (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 
herbicides (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and pesticides (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖); and a set of predictor variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 and  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘. The 
system of equations in the multivariate model is expressed as: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼11𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽21𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾31𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼12𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾32𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
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𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼13𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾33𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼14𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽24𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾34𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                               (3.5) 
The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘′ = [ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] has E(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘) = 0 and Var(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘) = Σ. The error 
terms associated with the different responses on the same sample may have different 
variances and may be correlated.  
The multivariate probit model is estimated by the simulated maximum likelihood 
estimation method (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). For each observation, a likelihood 
contribution is calculated for each replication, and the simulated likelihood contribution is 
the average of the values derived from all the replications. The simulated likelihood 
function for the sample as a whole is then maximized using maximum likelihood methods. 
The most common simulation method for evaluating multivariate normal distribution 
functions is the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning 
simulator. The GHK uses the fact that a multivariate normal distribution function can be 
expressed as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distribution 
functions, which can easily and accurately be evaluated (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). 
3.5.1  Empirical Estimation        
The explanatory variables are drawn from the literature review and the conceptual 
methods discussed in previous sections. The analysis begins with a basic regression of 
technology adoption on gender.  In the empirical literature, it is common practice either to 
simply include a gender dummy as an explanatory variable to account for potential gender 
differences in technology adoption. The ‘naïve’ model (equation 3.6) assumes that the 
technology adoption decision is solely a function of the gender dummy (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖). In equation 
3.6, the gender dummy may capture the gender-specific roles conferred by socio-cultural 
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norms on households in the Northern region of Ghana rather than the biological sex of each 
smallholder farmer. Based on observed socio-cultural norms, which dictate that women as 
caregivers should focus on home-care activities, one might expect the parameter estimate 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 to be negative.  The lower likelihood for women farmers to adopt agricultural 
technology might be because their primary role is generate supplemental food or income, 
rather than to provide enough to feed their family. Dropping the technology (k) subscript 
for brevity, we have, 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                       (3.6) 
In the ‘naïve’ model above, we omit relevant explanatory variables and assume that 
only the gender of a farmer can explain their likelihood of adopting agricultural technology. 
This would lead to omitted variable bias and  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 will be overestimated. In equation 3.7 
below, we include individual characteristics, assets and decision-making power for two 
reasons: to observe the effect of individual characteristics on technology adoption and to 
observe any changes in the coefficient on the gender dummy, which may arise from 
including relevant explanatory variables. 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +   𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
                       𝛼𝛼5𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  +  𝛼𝛼6𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
                        𝛼𝛼10𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼11𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 +  𝛼𝛼12𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 +
                         𝛼𝛼13𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                     (3.7) 
In equation 3.7 above, the individual characteristics and assets include age, 
education, and years of marriage for each smallholder farmer; whether the farmer had 
access to credit over the past two years, ownership of assets, and the quantity owned of 
agricultural land, radios, TVs, phones and bicycles. Equation 3.7 also includes variables 
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measuring decision-making power in cash crop production over the past agricultural year. 
The dummy variable ‘all input decision’ captures whether each male or female had input 
into most or all decisions regarding cash crop production. The variable ‘high extent 
decision’ captures whether each farmer feels they can make personal decisions regarding 
cash crop production at a high level and variable ‘all income decision’ measures whether 
each farmer contributes to most or all decision making regarding use of income generated 
from cash crops. 
We progressively include household characteristics to the technology adoption 
model, after including individual characteristics, assets and decision-making power 
(equation 3.8). This controls for household observables which might affect technology 
adoption and allows household characteristics to influence the gender dummy’s effect on 
technology adoption. The model is expressed as follows.  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +
                     𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +
                     𝛽𝛽7𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                                                                         (3.8) 
Equation 3.8 includes household size, the number of male and female adults actively 
involved in farming, the number of rooms in the households dwelling, a dummy for the 
type of roofing material in the household’s dwelling, a dummy for whether the household 
lives in a rural area and a dummy for whether the household is Muslim.  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖  +
                     𝛾𝛾3𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                 (3.9) 
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The plot level characteristics included in the equation (3.9) above are number of acres 
of maize/beans cultivated, distance of maize/beans farm from residence; and distance of 
maize/beans farm from nearest market.  
In the above models, it is possible to test for gender differences with only the 
inclusion of a gender dummy. However, the drawback is the implicit assumption that 
gender has a similar impact holding all individual characteristics, decision making power, 
and household and plot characteristics constant. The second commonly used approach to 
test for gender differences is to estimate the model separately for men and women. The 
drawback here is that one cannot test whether the differences observed are significant or 
not. In this study, further tests on gender differences are based on estimations which 
include, in addition to the explanatory variables, further dummies constructed by 
interacting the relevant explanatory variables with a gender dummy variable.  
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∗
                      𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                                                      (3.10) 
Instead of two separate models, there is a combined model for both the sample of 
male and female smallholder farmers. with a test of gender differences in asset ownership, 
for example. A properly formulated unified model that permits different intercepts and 
slopes in the two groups produces the same fit to the data as separate regressions. For 
women model (3.10) becomes, 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(1) + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∗ 1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖       
      = (𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) + (𝛼𝛼 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖    + (𝛾𝛾 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖    (3.11)        
And for men, 
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𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(0) + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) +  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∗ 0) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖      
     = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖    + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖            (3.12) 
In equation (3.12) 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 gives the difference in intercept between male and female 
groups and 𝛿𝛿,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 gives the differences in slopes between the two groups.  
3.6 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.6.1  Description of Household Survey      
This study uses sex-disaggregated survey data to test for gender differences in 
improved technology adoption. The survey instrument was implemented in 6 communities; 
3 rural and 3 peri-urban communities within 2 districts in the Northern region of Ghana. A 
total sample of 150 households were randomly selected. In each household, responses were 
elicited from both the primary and secondary respondent, who were adults above the age 
of 18 years. The primary respondent was typically the male head-of-household and the 
secondary respondent was typically the first wife. In households where the man or woman 
was widowed, any other adult significantly involved in farming activities with the 
smallholder farmer was interviewed. The survey yielded 298 individual responses.  
3.6.2 Descriptive Statistics         
3.6.2.1 Dependent Variables                                          
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. Out of the 
sample of 298 smallholder farmers interviewed in Northern Ghana, 81% grow maize and 
49% grow legumes. Maize is a staple in the Northern Region of Ghana, thus almost all 
male farmers cultivate maize; 99% of males grow maize while 63% of females grow maize. 
Female farmers tend to cultivate legumes to generate supplemental income, thus we 
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observe that 53% of women farmers cultivate legumes while 45% of males engage in 
legume production.  
3.6.2.1.1 Maize Farmers’ Technology Adoption 
Among the sample maize farmers, 17% use improved seeds and pesticides, while 
76% and 89% use fertilizer and herbicides, respectively (Table 3.1). Taking a look at 
gender differences we find that 17% of male maize farmers use improved seeds and 
pesticides while 18% of female maize farmers use these same technologies. Herbicides 
appear to be the most commonly adopted technology by maize farmers; 89% of male and 
female maize farmers use herbicides on their maize plots. There is however, no statistically 
significant difference between male and female use of improved seed, herbicides and 
pesticides. For fertilizer, 81% of male maize farmers are adopters while 68% of female 
farmers apply it to their maize farms. We find a statistically significant difference between 
male and female adoption of fertilizer on maize farms.  
Table 3-1 Technology Adoption for Sample of Maize Farmers on Maize Plots 
  Full sample Male Female M-F 
 (N = 241) (N=148) (N=93) 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Improved seed 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.174 0.380 0.169 0.376 0.183 0.389 -0.014 
Fertilizer 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.759 0.428 0.811 0.393 0.677 0.470 0.133** 
Herbicide 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.892 0.311 0.892 0.312 0.892 0.311 -0.0006 
Pesticide 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.174 0.380 0.169 0.376 0.183 0.389 -0.014 
** statistically significant at the 5% alpha level 
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Table 3.2 presents correlations between the inputs adopted by smallholder maize 
farmers. The correlations measure the strength and direction of the linear relationship. We 
find positive correlation among all the possible technology adoption sets for maize farmers. 
The strongest correlations appear to be for fertilizer and herbicides/pesticides and the 
weakest correlation is between herbicides and improved seeds. The positive correlations 
might suggest that maize farmers consider these inputs as complements.  
Table 3-2 Technology Adoption Correlations for Sample of Maize Farmers on Maize 
Plots 
  Improved seed Fertilizer Herbicide Pesticide 
Improved seed 1    
Fertilizer 0.156 1   
Herbicide 0.054 0.1797 1  
Pesticide 0.077 0.1819 0.125 1 
 
3.6.2.1.2 Legume Farmers’ Technology Adoption   
Among the sample of legume farmers 22% use improved seeds, 8% use fertilizer, 
76% use herbicides and 41% use pesticides. Herbicides appear to the most adopted 
agricultural technology among legume farmers, with fertilizer being the least adopted. On 
average, a higher percentage of male legume farmers use improved seeds (29%) and 
pesticides (56%) compared to female legume farmers (17% and 28%, respectively). 
Conversely, on average, a higher percentage of female legume farmers adopt fertilizer (8%) 
and herbicides (76%) compared to male legume farmers (7% and 74%, respectively). Table 
3.3 indicates statistically significant differences between male and female legume farmers’ 
adoption of improved seeds and pesticides.  
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Table 3-3 Technology Adoption for Sample of Legume Farmers on Legume Plots 
 Full sample Male Female M-F 
 (N = 147) (N=68) (N=79)  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Diff. 
Improved seed 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.218 0.414 0.279 0.452 0.165 0.373 0.115* 
Fertilizer 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.075 0.264 0.074 0.263 0.076 0.267 -0.002 
Herbicide 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.755 0.431 0.750 0.436 0.759 0.430 -0.009 
Pesticide 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 0.408 0.493 0.559 0.500 0.278 0.451 0.28*** 
***,**, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% alpha level respectively   
 
Correlations between the technology adoption sets for legume farmers are presented 
in Table 3.4 below. We observe a positive correlation for improved seed with fertilizer and 
improved seed with herbicide, but a negative correlation for improved seed with herbicide. 
This might suggest that legume farmers who adopt improved seeds may also adopt fertilizer 
and pesticide but not herbicide. In other words, for legume farmers, fertilizer and pesticide 
may be complementary inputs to improved seeds. We also observe positive correlations 
between fertilizer with herbicide and fertilizer with pesticide adoption. This may suggest 
that legume farmers who adopt fertilizer may also adopt herbicide and pesticide. Finally, 
we observe a negative correlation between pesticide and herbicide, suggesting that legume 
farmers who adopt one may not adopt the other as they may view the inputs as substitutes. 
In other words, legume farmers may choose to either control for pests or for weeds but not 
both.  
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Table 3-4 Technology Adoption Correlations for Legume Farmers on Legume Plots 
  Improved seed Fertilizer Herbicide Pesticide 
Improved seed 1    
Fertilizer 0.226 1   
Herbicide -0.045 0.042 1  
Pesticide 0.266 0.079 -0.042 1 
3.6.2.2  Independent Variables 
The choice of independent variables included in the empirical analysis are based on 
the theoretical and empirical literature on adoption of agricultural technology in developing 
countries. Table 3.5 presents plot level descriptive statistics of maize and legume farmers 
by gender. We observe, on average, a lower acreage of cultivated maize (less than half) for 
females. The legume farm acres cultivated for male and female, on average, is almost equal 
in size. On average, the yield (bags harvested) on male legume farms is higher while the 
total sale of legume crops is slightly higher for female farmers.  
Table 3-5 Plot Level Characteristics of Maize and Legume Farmers 
  Male Female 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Maize     
Acres of farmland cultivated (acres) 3.36 2.33 1.42 0.84 
Previous year harvest (bags) 11.00 10.14 4.66 3.66 
Previous year sale (bags) 3.37 6.18 1.96 2.57 
Distance to market (miles) 6.75 3.82 6.61 4.00 
Distance to house (miles) 2.93 3.82 2.76 3.19 
Legumes     
Acres of farmland cultivated (acres) 1.42 0.92 1.23 0.44 
Previous year harvest  3.27 4.28 2.74 2.34 
Previous year sale (bags) 1.67 2.94 1.79 1.89 
Distance to market (miles) 5.86 2.78 6.01 2.88 
Distance to house (miles) 2.21 2.54 2.25 1.68 
Table 3.6 below presents the demographic characteristics and assets of the sample 
smallholder farmers in the Northern Region of Ghana. On average, the women smallholder 
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farmers are younger than the male farmers. This is not unexpected as the survey 
interviewed men and their wives and men tend to marry women who are younger than they 
are. The descriptive statistics further indicate that fewer smallholder women farmers have 
received any education and they own less land, radios, TVs, phones or bicycles compared 
to the male farmers. On average, the women farmers own more phones compared to radios, 
TVs or bicycles while male farmers own more bicycles (and phones) compared to radio’s 
and TV. One surprising observation is that, on average, more women farmers have had 
access to credit to finance their farm activities compared to men. This might be because of 
the recent prevalence in women’s local, informal financial associations that encourage 
collectively saving and rotating which women farmer receives the collective savings.   
Table 3-6 Demographic Characteristics and Asset of Male and Female Farmers 
  Male Female  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age (year) 49.89 14.39 41.98 13.08 
Ever attended school (No=0, Yes=1) 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.36 
Marriage (years) 20.93 12.48 21.18 12.69 
Credit access (No=0, Yes=1) 0.14 0.35 0.30 0.46 
Farm land owned (acres) 6.33 4.57 1.69 1.36 
Radio owned (number) 0.56 0.55 0.18 0.38 
TV owned (number) 0.39 0.49 0.06 0.24 
Phone owned (number) 0.85 0.41 0.46 0.50 
Bicycle owned (number) 0.87 0.62 0.04 0.20 
As discussed in the conceptual framework section, households jointly or 
independently make agricultural production decisions.  The extent to which an individual 
contributes to these decisions might indicate agency or bargaining power. Respondents 
were asked about their participation and the extent of their input in agricultural decisions 
over the past 12 months. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 depicts how much input male and female 
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farmers reported that they have in cash crop production decisions, and into input of the use 
of income generated from cash crops respectively. A high frequency of males report that 
they have input into most or all cash crop production decisions, while just about half of 
female farmers report likewise. A dummy variable was generated to indicate male and 
female respondents who reported input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop 
production.  
 
Figure 3-2 Extent of Personal Decision into Cash Crop Production 
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Figure 3-3 Input into Use of Income Generated from Cash Crop Production 
 
Table 3.7 presents some household level descriptive statistics of the sampled 
smallholder farmers. The average number of people in each of the farm households ranges 
from two to thirty. Larger households typically have more labor available for farm 
activities. Agricultural inputs like fertilizer or pesticides may not always be available in 
small quantities. One might expect that larger households would imply available labor to 
help purchase inputs, help transport them to the farm and help apply the technology on the 
farm. On average, the farm households have three male adults and two female adults 
actively engaged in farm activities. One would expect that more male adults would be 
associated with a higher likelihood of adoption while more females might be associated 
with a lower likelihood of technology adoption.  
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Households have an average of six rooms (excluding bathrooms and corridors) in 
their dwelling with an average of four rooms for sleeping. The sleeping rooms often double 
as storage room for crops cultivated in households without traditional storage facilities. For 
maize and beans, the farmers often store them in bags and place them in their rooms. The 
more rooms available to a household might indicate wealth and thus a higher likelihood to 
adopt agricultural technology. 
Households in the northern region typically have polygamous marriages and multiple 
children by each wife. However, within our sample, male farmers had an average of one 
wife and four children. On average, the women have three male children and two female 
children. The fewer the number of wives a man has, the more authority the wife is likely 
to have. Additionally, the more male children a woman has, the more likely she is to receive 
favor from her spouse. We construct a new variable, positional security for the female 
subsample. A woman is considered to have positional security if the number of wives in 
the household is one or less and the woman has at least one male child.   
The sampling framework selected an equal number of respondents from rural and 
peri-urban communities. Rural households may be poorer than peri-urban households and 
thus less likely to adopt improved agricultural technology. The northern region is 
predominantly Muslim, as expected 94% of the households are practicing Muslims. 
Muslim households in the Northern Region tend to be polygamous, larger, wealthier  and 
thus may be more likely to adopt improved agricultural technology.  
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Table 3-7 Household Characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household size (number) 11.04 5.49 2 30 
Male adults in farming (number) 2.92 2.14 0 11 
Female adults in farming (number) 2.56 2.14 0 11 
Total rooms in dwelling (number) 6.41 3.61 2 20 
Total rooms for sleeping (number) 4.35 2.42 1 15 
Husband's wives (number) 1.33 0.60 0 3 
Wife's male children (number) 2.68 1.72 0 9 
Rural (No=0, Yes=1) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Religion:  
Christian 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Muslim 0.94 0.24 0 1 
In rural and peri-urban communities, some household are more endowed than other 
households and may thus be able to adopt improved technologies more easily. However, 
an ‘income’ variable would not adequately capture the wealth of these farm households. 
Assets capture wealth to an extent but living conditions may also shed light on how wealthy 
a farm household might be. Table 3.8 presents household roofing material used in the rural 
and peri-urban communities interviewed. In general, wealthier farm households may tend 
to use aluminum as roofing material. On the other hand, relatively poor households tend to 
use thatch as roofing material. Approximately, 35% of households in the sample use 
aluminum roofing. Not surprisingly, a greater proportion of these relatively wealthy 
households live in peri-urban communities.  
Table 3-8 Household Roofing Materials 
Roofing material Rural (%) Peri-urban (%) Total (%) 
Thatch 54.7 22.7 38.6 
Both 16.2 37.3 26.9 
Aluminium 29.1 40.0 34.6 
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3.7 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The results are presented in the subsequent sections. The likelihood ratio test leads 
us to reject the null hypothesis of independent error terms overall and across the adoption 
of improved seed, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). This 
indicates correlation between the use of agricultural technology adoption options and 
supports the choice of the multivariate probit model for this data. Thus, the multivariate 
probit is preferred statistically to the univariate probit regressions, indicating that the 
probability of adopting one agricultural technology is interdependent on the decision of 
whether or not to adopt another agricultural technology.  
The regression coefficients can be interpreted in terms of sign but not as marginal 
effects. Estimating marginal effects and their standard errors in multivariate probit models 
is extremely tedious and can be computationally unworkable (Greene, 2012; Theriault et 
al., 2017). For that matter, published papers that use the multivariate probit model often 
interpret only the signs of the coefficients (Ndiritu et al., 2014; Teklewold, et al., 2013). 
This study follows that approach. 
3.7.1 Agricultural Technology Adoption by Maize Farmers   
The key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how the 
gender affects maize farmers’ adoption of agricultural technology controlling for other 
individual assets and decision-making power, household characteristics and farm 
characteristics. Table 3.9 presents the results for the estimation of the factors influencing 
smallholder maize farmers’ adoption of improved seeds. Under the ‘naïve’ model (1), we 
observe that being male or female does not affect the likelihood of adopting of improved 
seeds. Model 2 accounts for individual level characteristics, asset ownership and decision 
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making power; model 3 accounts for household level characteristics; and model 4 accounts 
for plot level characteristics. In all the specifications of the models for improved seed 
adoption, we find no statistically significant difference between male and female adoption 
of improved maize seeds. This result might be due to the lower adoption rates of improved 
seeds presented in the descriptive statistics section, which indicated that, on average, only 
about 18% of maize farmers adopt improved seeds. Most smallholder farmers tend to save 
some of the harvested maize and plant that during the successive planting season.  
In addition to the key gender coefficients, the study hypothesized that having access 
to or owning fewer productive resources might make farmers less likely to adopt improved 
technology. In models 2, 3 and 4, consistent with our hypothesis, we find that ceteris 
paribus, on average, owning one additional mobile phone or radio increases the likelihood 
of adopting improved maize seeds. Surprisingly, the results reveal that all things equal, 
smallholders who own one additional bicycle are, on average, less likely to adopt improved 
maize seeds. Consistent with theory and expectations, smallholders who have access to 
financial resources are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds. In model 3 and 4, 
farmers who have been able to access credit (a loan) within the past two years are more 
likely to adopt improved maize seeds.  
The household coefficients are consistent with theory, which suggest that wealthier 
households are more likely to adopt agricultural technology.  In model 3 and 4, the results 
indicate that households with only thatch roofs are less likely to adopt maize seeds 
compared to households that have both thatch and aluminum or only aluminum roofs.  
Quite unexpectedly, the results indicate that, on average, households living in rural 
communities are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds compared to households living 
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in peri-urban areas. This result might be a reflection of agricultural support programs, for 
example subsidized improved seeds that are targeted towards rural communities.  
Model 5 presents the results of interacting the gender variable with access to and 
ownership of assets as well as decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis, the results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into most or all 
decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds. 
 In Model 5, the signs on some of the variables flip. This may be due to the large 
number of predictor variables and interaction terms included in the regression analysis as 
well as the complicated nature of the multivariate model. The large number predictors and 
interactions may be resulting in multicollinearity.  A remedy would be to identify and 
include those interactions that most likely influence the response. Several variations of the 
model, with fewer interactions, corrected the change in the sign of the affected variables. 
These variations are however, not included here.  
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Table 3-9 Maize Farmers’ Adoption of Improved Seed 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0755 0.132 0.142 0.174 -0.786 
 (0.193) (0.345) (0.366) (0.380) (0.820) 
Age  -0.0462 -0.0298 -0.0312 -0.0604 
  (0.0518) (0.0550) (0.0557) (0.0626) 
Age squared  0.000480 0.000344 0.000349 0.000619 
  (0.000497) (0.000521) (0.000532) (0.000593) 
Educated (No=1)  -0.347 -0.483 -0.476 0.512 
  (0.280) (0.298) (0.310) (0.359) 
Years of marriage_  0.0234 0.0240 0.0235 0.0205 
  (0.0168) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0218) 
Credit access  0.354 0.524* 0.540* 0.298 
  (0.269) (0.285) (0.288) (0.464) 
Agricultural land owned   0.0363 0.0318 -0.00163 -0.0110 
  (0.0286) (0.0323) (0.0437) (0.0482) 
Radio   0.528** 0.484** 0.447* 0.479 
  (0.214) (0.225) (0.228) (0.309) 
TV  0.180 0.154 0.175 0.0926 
  (0.262) (0.276) (0.284) (0.312) 
Phone  0.657** 0.676** 0.676** 0.313 
  (0.258) (0.265) (0.267) (0.455) 
Bicycle  -0.603** -0.554** -0.536** - 
  (0.264) (0.268) (0.271) - 
All input decision   0.0516 0.0860 0.132 0.290 
  (0.358) (0.377) (0.380) (0.812) 
High decision  -0.453 -0.489 -0.454 -0.439 
  (0.433) (0.452) (0.451) (0.669) 
All income decision  0.00379 -0.0285 -0.120 0.904 
  (0.457) (0.483) (0.488) (1.129) 
Household size   -0.00857 -0.0147 -0.0302 
   (0.0317) (0.0324) (0.0360) 
Household farming male   -0.0635 -0.0509 -0.0617 
   (0.0887) (0.0898) (0.0981) 
Household farming 
female 
  
-0.0550 -0.0364 -0.0153 
   (0.0893) (0.0911) (0.0993) 
Rooms   0.00341 0.00401 0.00353 
   (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0336) 
Thatch roof   -0.699** -0.779** -0.917*** 
   (0.308) (0.318) (0.336) 
Rural   0.524** 0.657** 0.765*** 
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Table 3-9 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Adoption of Improved Seed 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
   (0.242) (0.259) (0.275) 
Muslim   4.427 4.382 5.115 
   (122.3) (125.5) (231.6) 
Maize acres    0.0884 0.0801 
    (0.0869) (0.0887) 
Maize_distance_mkt    -0.0363 -0.0508 
    (0.0384) (0.0394) 
Maize_distance_house    0.0545 0.0581 
    (0.0396) (0.0392) 
Positional_security     -0.522 
     (0.421) 
Female*education      -0.295 
     (0.618) 
Female*agland     0.261 
     (0.160) 
Female*credit     0.192 
     (0.650) 
Female*radio1     0.249 
     (0.574) 
Female*phone1     0.709 
     (0.638) 
Female*tv     0.189 
     (0.749) 
Female*allinput     -0.0154 
     (0.941) 
Female*highextent     -0.281 
     (0.967) 
Female*allincome     0.904 
     (1.129) 
Constant -0.962*** -0.718 -4.843 -4.780 -4.556 
  (0.122) (1.251) (122.4) (125.6) (231.6) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.10 presents the multivariate model with the specifications of fertilizer 
adoption. The initial results indicates a statistically significant difference between male and 
female adoption of fertilizer. In our ‘naïve’ specification (model 1), female farmers are less 
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likely to adopt fertilizer compared to male farmers. This difference may not be attributable 
to the biological ‘sex’ of the farmer but to the socio-cultural gender norms prevalent in the 
Northern Region of Ghana. Models 2, 3 and 4 account for individual characteristics, assets 
and decision-making power and household and plot characteristics, respectively. We 
observe that after accounting for relevant explanatory variables, the coefficient for female 
is no longer statistically significant indicating no difference between males and females 
when it comes to fertilizer adoption. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the results find that smallholder farmers with access 
to financial and human resources (education) are more likely to adopt fertilizer. In models 
2, 3 and 4, the results indicate that maize farmers who had access to credit within the past 
two years were more likely to adopt fertilizer on their maize plots. Additionally, 
smallholder farmers with no formal or informal education are less likely to adopt fertilizer. 
For smallholder farmers to adopt fertilizer, they might need a basic level of understanding 
of the fertilizer application processes, the doses to be applied, the times of application and 
other complementary agricultural processes association with adopting fertilizer.  
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Table 3-10 Maize Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.44** -0.248 -0.216 -0.141 -0.699 
 (0.178) (0.331) (0.337) (0.347) (0.717) 
Age  0.0409 0.0458 0.0504 0.0521 
  (0.0475) (0.0483) (0.0493) (0.0527) 
Age2  -0.000390 -0.000398 -0.000431 -0.000462 
  (0.00046) (0.00046) (0.00047) (0.00050) 
Attended school 
(No=1)  -1.041*** -1.056*** -1.031*** 0.869** 
  (0.313) (0.320) (0.327) (0.424) 
Marriage_years  0.0120 0.00449 0.000703 -0.00106 
  (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0173) 
Credit access  0.692** 0.649** 0.670** 0.951* 
  (0.292) (0.297) (0.299) (0.537) 
Agland_own_qty  -0.00784 -0.00587 -0.0169 -0.0144 
  (0.0283) (0.0310) (0.0358) (0.0384) 
Radio_own_qty  0.186 0.275 0.260 0.265 
  (0.216) (0.226) (0.233) (0.286) 
TV_own_qty  0.0615 0.0449 0.0603 0.0310 
  (0.266) (0.268) (0.269) (0.302) 
Phone_own_qty  -0.221 -0.315 -0.311 -0.377 
  (0.222) (0.236) (0.240) (0.390) 
Bicycle_own_qty  0.0163 -0.0185 -0.00657 - 
  (0.207) (0.212) (0.216) - 
All_input_decision  0.0568 -0.0295 0.00921 0.214 
  (0.354) (0.351) (0.353) (0.652) 
High_extent_decision  0.327 0.445 0.460 0.173 
  (0.416) (0.416) (0.420) (0.616) 
All_income_decision  0.177 0.0795 0.0273 -0.269 
  (0.441) (0.439) (0.442) (0.723) 
Hh_size   -0.0108 -0.0184 -0.0214 
   (0.0234) (0.0246) (0.0256) 
Hhfarming_male   0.0825 0.0875 0.0877 
   (0.0691) (0.0697) (0.0711) 
HHfarming_female   -0.0197 0.00891 0.0219 
   (0.0811) (0.0868) (0.0898) 
Rooms   0.0413 0.0406 0.0517 
   (0.0338) (0.0340) (0.0360) 
Thatch_roof   -0.0738 -0.0859 -0.104 
   (0.283) (0.286) (0.290) 
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Table 3-10 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Rural   -0.320 -0.321 -0.296 
   (0.224) (0.235) (0.244) 
Muslim   0.164 0.139 0.212 
   (0.471) (0.473) (0.493) 
Maize_acres    0.0581 0.0655 
    (0.0846) (0.0872) 
Maize_distance_mkt    -0.0374 -0.0408 
    (0.0369) (0.0372) 
Maize_distance_house    0.0154 0.00910 
    (0.0412) (0.0400) 
Positional_security     0.130 
     (0.321) 
Female*education      0.290 
     (0.621) 
Female*agland     0.0343 
     (0.150) 
Female*credit     -0.510 
     (0.677) 
Female*radio1     -0.0390 
     (0.555) 
Female*phone1     -0.0734 
     (0.529) 
Female*tv     0.357 
     (0.805) 
Female*allinput     -0.219 
     (0.786) 
Female*highextent     0.531 
     (0.870) 
Female*allincome     0.379 
     (0.945) 
Constant 0.890*** 0.0676 -0.142 -0.106 -0.848 
 (0.119) (1.136) (1.261) (1.300) (1.479) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.11 presents the results for factors influencing herbicide adoption among 
smallholder farmers. The results indicate no statistical difference in the coefficients for 
male and female maize farmers in all 4 specifications when it comes to herbicide adoption. 
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Models 3 and 4 suggest that Muslim households are more likely to adopt herbicides, 
consistent with the study’s hypothesis.  
In the specification that accounts for female ownership of assets and decision-
making, we find surprising results. The results suggest that females who have access to 
credit and who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides. This result might 
suggest that when female maize farmers have access to credit and information, they may 
tend to invest in other non-agricultural and off-farm activities, which may have higher 
returns.  
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Table 3-11 Maize Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.0546 0.496 0.409 0.443 0.510 
 (0.219) (0.397) (0.417) (0.437) (0.951) 
Age  0.0478 0.0703 0.0755 0.0929 
  (0.0547) (0.0580) (0.0589) (0.0644) 
Age2  -0.000393 -0.000516 -0.000598 -0.000653 
  (0.00052) (0.00055) (0.00056) (0.00061) 
Attended school (No=1)  -0.196 -0.293 -0.329 0.375 
  (0.326) (0.353) (0.362) (0.471) 
Marriage_years  -0.00997 -0.0162 -0.0146 -0.0306 
  (0.0182) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0225) 
Credit access  -0.0125 0.0236 0.0669 0.938 
  (0.300) (0.322) (0.326) (0.585) 
Agland_own_qty  0.0671 0.0755 0.0479 0.0164 
  (0.0459) (0.0539) (0.0593) (0.0565) 
Radio_own_qty  -0.0996 -0.197 -0.191 0.115 
  (0.246) (0.268) (0.275) (0.355) 
TV_own_qty  0.287 0.359 0.393 0.202 
  (0.328) (0.358) (0.370) (0.394) 
Phone_own_qty  0.117 0.0473 0.00715 -0.360 
  (0.265) (0.286) (0.290) (0.467) 
Bicycle_own_qty  -0.0838 -0.160 -0.168  
  (0.231) (0.235) (0.231)  
All_input_decision  0.607 0.559 0.529 0.0310 
  (0.423) (0.441) (0.444) (0.852) 
High_extent_decision  0.520 0.505 0.471 0.986 
  (0.495) (0.518) (0.533) (0.874) 
All_income_decision  -0.816 -0.802 -0.799 -0.643 
  (0.507) (0.539) (0.550) (0.945) 
Hh_size   0.0128 0.00784 0.0129 
   (0.0314) (0.0338) (0.0380) 
Hhfarming_male   -0.0841 -0.0715 -0.0389 
   (0.0831) (0.0837) (0.0950) 
HHfarming_female   0.0896 0.0741 0.138 
   (0.111) (0.114) (0.133) 
Rooms   -0.0171 -0.00895 -0.0253 
   (0.0365) (0.0380) (0.0417) 
Thatch_roof   -0.0835 -0.0402 0.105 
   (0.355) (0.363) (0.392) 
Rural   -0.0602 -0.0301 -0.128 
   (0.275) (0.278) (0.295) 
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Table 3-11 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Muslim   0.997** 1.007** 1.177** 
   (0.469) (0.473) (0.513) 
Maize_acres    0.108 0.176 
    (0.129) (0.132) 
Maize_distance_mkt    0.0307 0.0132 
    (0.0498) (0.0582) 
Maize_distance_house    0.00803 0.0277 
    (0.0528) (0.0724) 
Positional_security     -0.403 
     (0.464) 
Female*education      -0.640 
     (0.726) 
Female*agland     0.375 
     (0.248) 
Female*credit     -2.136** 
     (0.855) 
Female*radio1     -1.473** 
     (0.667) 
Female*phone1     0.936 
     (0.688) 
Female*tv     5.581 
     (376.2) 
Female*allinput     1.584 
     (1.112) 
Female*highextent     -1.164 
     (1.347) 
Female*allincome     0.260 
     (1.390) 
Constant 1.259*** -0.353 -1.573 -1.993 -3.274* 
  (0.139) (1.334) (1.528) (1.617) (1.928) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.12 below presents the results for pesticide adoption among smallholder 
maize farmers. We account for individual, household characteristics and plot 
characteristics, respectively, in models 2, 3 and 4.  The gender coefficient in all 
specifications of the pesticide adoption model is not statistically significant. In model 2, 
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the results suggest that households with no education are less likely to adopt pesticides, but 
this result is not present in model 3 and 4. In models 2, 3 and 4, consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis, we find that small farmers with less access to human, financial and productive 
assets are less likely to adopt pesticides. In particular, ceteris paribus smallholder farmers 
with no education are less likely to adopt pesticides. All things equal, smallholder farmers 
who have been able to access a loan within the past two years are more likely to adopt 
pesticides. On average, farmers with one additional bicycle are more likely to adopt 
pesticides. Quite surprisingly, farmers with one additional radio are, on average, less likely 
to adopt pesticides.  
The study further hypothesized that smallholder farmers who highly participate in 
decision making about cash crop farming are more likely to adopt agricultural technology. 
All things equal, farmers who reported that they had input into most or all decisions 
regarding cash crop production in the past agricultural year are more likely to adopt 
pesticides, compared to farmers who had none, little or some input in cash crop decision 
making. Quite unexpectedly, the results indicate that farmers who reported that they felt 
they could take personal decisions about cash crop farming to a high extent are less likely 
to adopt pesticides, compared to farmers felt they could not take any personal decisions or 
could take personal decisions to a small or medium extent.  
The results indicate that some household characteristics influence pesticide adoption. 
On average, households with one additional female involved in farming activities are more 
likely to adopt pesticides. Ceteris paribus, on average, consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis rural households less likely are less likely to adopt pesticides.  
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Model 5 presents the results of interacting the gender variable with access to and 
ownership of assets as well as decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis, the results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into most or all 
decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt pesticides.  
Table 3-12 Maize Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0749 0.146 0.110 0.139 -1.200 
 (0.194) (0.360) (0.386) (0.391) (0.787) 
Age  0.0157 0.0199 0.0142 0.0205 
  (0.0531) (0.0549) (0.0554) (0.0648) 
Age2  -0.000248 -0.000316 -0.000216 -0.000368 
  (0.00051) (0.00054) (0.00055) (0.00064) 
Attended school (No=1)  -0.611** -0.418 -0.388 0.0552 
  (0.283) (0.304) (0.307) (0.375) 
Marriage_years  0.0206 0.0242 0.0200 0.0316 
  (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0196) 
Credit access  0.906*** 0.847*** 0.860*** 0.847** 
  (0.252) (0.269) (0.271) (0.369) 
Agland_own_qty  -0.0104 0.00274 0.00963 0.00533 
  (0.0327) (0.0363) (0.0467) (0.0491) 
Radio_own_qty  -0.515** -0.587** -0.655** -0.701** 
  (0.241) (0.252) (0.262) (0.306) 
TV_own_qty  -0.391 -0.324 -0.332 0.0120 
  (0.285) (0.291) (0.297) (0.318) 
Phone_own_qty  -0.0687 -0.101 -0.0946 -0.325 
  (0.234) (0.256) (0.257) (0.388) 
Bicycle_own_qty  0.655*** 0.632*** 0.647*** - 
  (0.213) (0.220) (0.222) - 
All_input_decision  0.869** 0.818* 0.832* -0.712 
  (0.420) (0.450) (0.445) (0.692) 
High_extent_decision  -0.704 -1.000* -0.904* -0.497 
  (0.504) (0.561) (0.549) (0.665) 
All_income_decision  -0.427 -0.171 -0.261 0.560 
  (0.494) (0.523) (0.522) (0.680) 
Hh_size   -0.00321 -0.00520 -0.0212 
   (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0276) 
Hhfarming_male   -0.0694 -0.0651 -0.114 
   (0.0806) (0.0807) (0.0897) 
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Table 3-12 (continued) Maize Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
HHfarming_female   0.160* 0.176** 0.285*** 
   (0.0840) (0.0845) (0.0929) 
Rooms   0.0223 0.0234 0.0294 
   (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0343) 
Thatch_roof   0.422 0.342 0.349 
   (0.310) (0.315) (0.325) 
Rural   -0.889*** -0.858*** -0.972*** 
   (0.259) (0.265) (0.284) 
Muslim   0.343 0.329 0.419 
   (0.610) (0.624) (0.603) 
Maize_acres    -0.0191 -0.00341 
    (0.0923) (0.0966) 
Maize_distance_mkt    -0.0455 -0.0240 
    (0.0376) (0.0376) 
Maize_distance_house    0.0520 0.0415 
    (0.0384) (0.0346) 
Positional_security     -0.488 
     (0.388) 
Female*education      0.665 
     (0.622) 
Female*agland     0.157 
     (0.181) 
Female*credit     0.0301 
     (0.590) 
Female*radio1     0.692 
     (0.694) 
Female*phone1     0.469 
     (0.582) 
Female*tv     -5.819 
     (231.0) 
Female*allinput     2.020** 
     (0.891) 
Female*highextent     0.235 
     (1.120) 
Female*allincome     -1.688 
     (1.199) 
Constant -0.966*** -1.137 -1.920 -1.656 -1.359 
  (0.122) (1.272) (1.384) (1.418) (1.623) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.7.2 Agricultural Technology Adoption by Legume Farmers   
Again, the key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how 
the gender variable would affect legume farmers’ adoption of agricultural technology 
controlling for necessary covariates. Table 3.13 presents the results of the estimation of the 
factors influencing smallholder legume farmers’ adoption of improved seeds. In the ‘naïve’ 
model and the model controlling for individual characteristics, the gender coefficient is not 
statistically significant. However, in model 3 and 4, which control for household and plot 
level characteristics, the results indicate that women farmers are less likely to adopt 
improved seeds compared to male farmers.  
The table shows conflicting results for the hypothesis that farmers with access to 
resources may be more likely adopt improved seeds. In models 2, 3 and 4, legume farmers 
who have been able to access a loan within the past two years for farm activities are more 
likely to adopt improved seeds. In model 3, the results suggests that on average, legume 
farmers who have one additional bicycle are less likely to adopt improved seeds. However, 
this result is not present in model 2 or model 4. In model 2, households who reported 
participating in cash crop production decisions to a high extent are more likely to adopt 
improved seeds, compared to households who reported a small or medium extent of 
participation. This result is not present in models 3 and 4, which account for household and 
plot level characteristics.  
Again, the table presents unexpected results on the factors affecting improved seed 
adoption. On average, ceteris paribus, households with one additional male actively 
involved in farming activities are more likely to adopt improved seeds. Households with 
an additional room in their dwelling place are less likely to adopt improve seeds. Rural 
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households are also less likely to adopt improved seeds. Moreover, consistent with the 
study’s hypothesis, legume farmers with more acres of land are more likely to adopt 
improved seeds. 
Table 3-13 Legume Farmers’ Improved Seed Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.361 -0.606 -1.392** -1.369** -1.446 
 (0.234) (0.420) (0.541) (0.555) (0.917) 
Age  0.0645 0.0431 0.0109 0.0297 
  (0.0771) (0.0891) (0.0915) (0.0820) 
Age2  -0.000822 -0.000677 -0.000410 -0.000539 
  (0.000762) (0.000852) (0.000870) (0.000792) 
Attended school (No=1)  -0.408 -0.247 -0.326 0.403 
  (0.366) (0.475) (0.485) (0.489) 
Marriage_years  0.0278 0.0355 0.0404 0.0300 
  (0.0233) (0.0321) (0.0337) (0.0296) 
Credit access  0.710** 0.625* 0.669* 0.435 
  (0.305) (0.357) (0.359) (0.519) 
Agland_own_qty  0.0494 0.0409 0.0271 - 
  (0.0394) (0.0478) (0.0489) - 
Radio_own_qty  0.0633 0.0434 -0.0673 0.0749 
  (0.274) (0.326) (0.338) (0.347) 
TV_own_qty  -0.456 -0.141 -0.260 -0.522 
  (0.454) (0.554) (0.566) (0.467) 
Phone_own_qty  -0.0540 0.0572 -0.00219 0.0660 
  (0.296) (0.350) (0.362) (0.555) 
Bicycle_own_qty  -0.276 -0.730* -0.506 - 
  (0.264) (0.398) (0.401) - 
All_input_decision  -0.594 -0.758 -0.691 0.782 
  (0.481) (0.593) (0.603) (1.379) 
High_extent_decision  1.117* 1.025 0.823 0.276 
  (0.580) (0.699) (0.720) (0.958) 
All_income_decision  -0.471 -0.906 -0.842 -1.883 
  (0.559) (0.708) (0.717) (1.435) 
Hh_size   0.0569 0.0531 0.0426 
   (0.0390) (0.0410) (0.0337) 
Hhfarming_male   0.246** 0.280** 0.235** 
   (0.111) (0.119) (0.0957) 
HHfarming_female   -0.120 -0.150 -0.150 
   (0.134) (0.142) (0.111) 
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Table 3-13 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Improved Seed Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Rooms   -0.165** -0.167** -0.0846 
   (0.0716) (0.0753) (0.0632) 
Thatch_roof   -0.469 -0.596 -0.506 
   (0.412) (0.427) (0.346) 
Rural   -0.657** -0.714** -0.544 
   (0.335) (0.353) (0.360) 
Legume_acres    0.390* 1.043*** 
    (0.223) (0.164) 
Positional_security     0.374 
     (0.425) 
Female*educ     -0.173 
     (0.884) 
Female*credit     0.255 
     (0.673) 
Female*radio1     -0.0499 
     (0.617) 
Female*phone1     -0.0167 
     (0.715) 
Female*tv     -3.255 
     (947.5) 
Female*allinput     -1.889 
     (1.524) 
Female*highextent     1.234 
     (1.290) 
Female*allincome     1.264 
     (1.624) 
Constant -0.592*** -2.102 -0.252 0.257 -2.166 
  (0.163) (1.831) (2.313) (2.368) (2.080) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 298 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.14 presents the multivariate model with the specifications of fertilizer 
adoption for legume farmers. In all four specifications the results indicates no difference 
between male and female adoption of fertilizer. Model 3 even suggests that ceteris paribus, 
households with one additional female actively involved in farming are less likely to adopt 
fertilizer. However, the hypothesis that access to financial resources makes farmers more 
107 
 
likely to adopt fertilizer is supported in model 3 and 4. In particular, legume farmers who 
have been able to access a loan in the past two years for farming activities are more likely 
to adopt fertilizer.  
Model 5 includes interactions between the gender variables with access to productive 
resources and decision-making power. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis, the results 
indicate that female legume farmers with education and access to credit are more likely to 
adopt fertilizer.  
Table 3-14 Legume Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0803 0.318 0.285 0.355 1.754 
 (0.308) (0.608) (0.653) (0.620) (86.29) 
Age  0.0974 0.101 0.113 0.139 
  (0.108) (0.130) (0.126) (0.133) 
Age2  -0.000881 -0.00101 -0.00111 -0.00135 
  (0.00107) (0.00128) (0.00124) (0.00131) 
Attended school (No=1)  -0.454 -0.753 -0.686 -0.0312 
  (0.476) (0.634) (0.658) (0.674) 
Marriage_years  0.00858 0.0217 0.0147 0.0219 
  (0.0342) (0.0356) (0.0362) (0.0414) 
Credit access   0.664 0.996** 0.995** -0.191 
  (0.406) (0.445) (0.442) (0.707) 
Agland_own_qty  0.0472 0.0437 0.0289  
  (0.0531) (0.0615) (0.0610)  
Radio_own_qty  -0.386 -0.457 -0.428 -0.165 
  (0.419) (0.535) (0.542) (0.516) 
TV_own_qty  -0.138 0.0649 -0.0774 0.471 
  (0.635) (0.699) (0.691) (0.627) 
Phone_own_qty  -0.176 -0.331 -0.221 3.825 
  (0.412) (0.535) (0.501) (86.27) 
Bicycle_own_qty  0.236 0.693 0.580  
  (0.359) (0.469) (0.374)  
All_input_decision  0.0221 0.00970 0.109 1.051 
  (0.669) (0.837) (0.739) (3.049) 
High_extent_decision  0.707 0.919 0.763 1.578 
  (0.721) (0.723) (0.693) (1.878) 
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Table 3-14 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Fertilizer Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
All_income_decision  -0.660 -1.156 -1.113 -4.118 
  (0.747) (0.926) (0.887) (3.212) 
Hh_size   0.0158 0.00236 -0.0732 
   (0.0655) (0.0638) (0.0450) 
Hhfarming_male   0.0334 0.0603 -0.0655 
   (0.151) (0.158) (0.184) 
HHfarming_female   -0.429* -0.333 -0.345 
   (0.248) (0.253) (0.240) 
Rooms   0.00945 0.0333 0.142** 
   (0.0517) (0.0523) (0.0603) 
Thatch_roof   -0.962 -0.841 -0.791 
   (0.585) (0.570) (0.554) 
Rural   0.582 0.542 -0.315 
   (0.497) (0.493) (0.503) 
Legume_acres   - 0.302 0.719*** 
   - (0.255) (0.253) 
Positional_security     0.323 
     (0.589) 
Female*educ     1.936* 
     (1.094) 
Female*credit     1.922* 
     (1.057) 
Female*radio1     -0.733 
     (1.061) 
Female*phone1     -5.543 
     (86.27) 
Female*tv     -4.228 
     (270.7) 
Female*allinput     -0.863 
     (3.381) 
Female*highextent     -1.941 
     (2.749) 
Female*allincome     5.506 
     (3.576) 
Constant -1.479*** -4.207 -3.244 -4.138 -7.916 
  (0.227) (2.569) (3.129) (3.083) (86.32) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 298 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.15 presents the results for factors influencing herbicide adoption among 
smallholder legume farmers. The results indicate no statistical difference between males 
and females in all specifications when it comes to herbicide adoption. 
The table further presents unexpected results about the factors that influence legume 
farmers’ adoption of herbicides. In models 2, 3, and 4, legume farmers who have been 
married longer are less likely to adopt herbicides. Similarly, legume farmers who own more 
acres of agricultural land are less likely to adopt herbicides. In models 3 and 4, legume 
farmers who own one additional radio are less likely to adopt herbicides but the legume 
farmers who own one additional television set are more likely to adopt herbicides. 
Additionally households with one additional male actively involved in farming are less 
likely to adopt herbicides while rural households are more likely to adopt herbicides. 
In model 5, which includes interactions between female with access to productive 
capital and decision-making power, the results indicate that female legume farmers who 
own at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides. 
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Table 3-15 Legume Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female 0.0478 -0.448 -0.133 -0.163 1.396 
 (0.228) (0.427) (0.528) (0.534) (0.883) 
Age  0.0581 0.100 0.0901 0.0208 
  (0.0708) (0.0815) (0.0853) (0.0624) 
Age2  -0.000244 -0.000492 -0.000386 -6.85e-05 
  (0.000686) (0.000774) (0.000811) (0.000616) 
Attended school (No=1)  -0.400 -0.820 -0.817 0.729* 
  (0.381) (0.513) (0.517) (0.406) 
Marriage_years  -0.0546** -0.0628* -0.0650* -0.0207 
  (0.0237) (0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0203) 
Credit access  0.532 0.672 0.685 0.616 
  (0.361) (0.437) (0.435) (0.478) 
Agland_own_qty  -0.0861** -0.0891* -0.0949*  
  (0.0382) (0.0479) (0.0516)  
Radio_own_qty  -0.248 -0.854** -0.855** 0.0673 
  (0.278) (0.357) (0.368) (0.311) 
TV_own_qty  0.562 0.875* 0.974* 0.213 
  (0.441) (0.524) (0.529) (0.359) 
Phone_own_qty  -0.299 -0.208 -0.205 -0.694* 
  (0.280) (0.334) (0.337) (0.410) 
Bicycle_own_qty  -0.198 0.0209 -0.0312  
  (0.234) (0.277) (0.280)  
All_input_decision  -0.512 -0.227 -0.217 -0.540 
  (0.405) (0.464) (0.464) (2.031) 
High_extent_decision  0.308 0.0414 0.145 2.430 
  (0.527) (0.671) (0.692) (2.045) 
All_income_decision  0.0579 0.863 0.786 -0.546 
  (0.527) (0.607) (0.627) (1.518) 
Hh_size   -0.00501 -0.00595 -0.0276 
   (0.0369) (0.0372) (0.0267) 
Hhfarming_male   -0.406*** -0.396*** -0.177** 
   (0.118) (0.121) (0.0841) 
HHfarming_female   0.130 0.129 -0.0109 
   (0.131) (0.131) (0.0877) 
Rooms   -0.0482 -0.0479 0.0223 
   (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0333) 
Thatch_roof   0.289 0.280 0.0103 
   (0.384) (0.389) (0.282) 
111 
 
Table 3-15 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Herbicide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Rural   0.889*** 0.897*** 0.508** 
   (0.341) (0.344) (0.239) 
Legume_acres    0.0203 1.711*** 
    (0.236) (0.210) 
Positional_security     0.169 
     (0.292) 
Female*educ     -0.320 
     (0.623) 
Female*credit     -0.356 
     (0.615) 
Female*radio1     -1.289** 
     (0.540) 
Female*phone1     0.387 
     (0.520) 
Female*tv     -0.180 
     (0.917) 
Female*allinput     0.211 
     (2.066) 
Female*highextent     -2.530 
     (2.110) 
Female*allincome     0.850 
     (1.617) 
Constant 0.669*** 1.046 0.306 0.567 -2.733 
  (0.166) (1.655) (1.972) (2.089) (1.708) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 298 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.16 presents the results for pesticide adoption among smallholder legume 
farmers. We account for individual, household characteristics and plot characteristics, 
respectively, in models 2, 3 and 4.  The gender coefficients in all four specifications of the 
pesticide adoption models are statistically significant. The results indicate that after 
accounting for individual, household and plot level characteristics, female legume farmers 
are less likely to adopt pesticides compared to male legume farmers.  
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Additionally, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that farmers who have 
access to financial resources are more likely to adopt agricultural technology. For all three 
specifications, the results indicate that legume farmers who have been able to access a loan 
for their farming activities within the past two year are more likely to adopt pesticides. The 
results further suggest that households with one additional male actively involved in 
farming are more likely to adopt pesticides. A surprising result in the specification that 
accounts for plot level characteristics indicates that having more acres of legume crop 
decreases the likelihood of adopting pesticides.  
In model 5, which includes interactions between female with access to productive 
capital and decision-making power, the results indicate that female legume farmers who 
have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more likely to 
adopt pesticides. However, inconsistent with the study’s hypothesis, female legume 
farmers who have input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming are less 
likely to adopt pesticides.  
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Table 3-16 Legume Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.738*** -0.926** -1.228*** -1.205*** 0.0946 
 (0.214) (0.390) (0.420) (0.426) (0.701) 
Age  -0.0719 -0.0665 -0.0523 -0.0732 
  (0.0633) (0.0667) (0.0684) (0.0505) 
Age2  0.000504 0.000462 0.000331 0.000581 
  (0.000618) (0.000651) (0.000663) (0.000480) 
Attended school (No=1)  0.193 0.368 0.411 0.00253 
  (0.330) (0.363) (0.372) (0.331) 
Marriage_years  0.0201 0.0118 0.00862 0.0173 
  (0.0197) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0169) 
Credit access  0.525* 0.504* 0.576* 0.384 
  (0.288) (0.305) (0.306) (0.383) 
Agland_own_qty  -0.00405 -0.0302 -0.0112  
  (0.0339) (0.0375) (0.0399)  
Radio_own_qty  -0.0474 0.0132 0.169 0.00341 
  (0.250) (0.262) (0.277) (0.250) 
TV_own_qty  -0.0294 -0.0607 -0.101 -0.526* 
  (0.370) (0.390) (0.397) (0.294) 
Phone_own_qty  0.178 0.0675 0.114 0.348 
  (0.249) (0.278) (0.274) (0.361) 
Bicycle_own_qty  0.137 0.103 0.0294  
  (0.210) (0.238) (0.228)  
All_input_decision  -0.244 -0.343 -0.474 1.325 
  (0.391) (0.419) (0.421) (0.911) 
High_extent_decision  -0.435 -0.321 -0.127 0.618 
  (0.493) (0.519) (0.542) (0.874) 
All_income_decision  0.613 0.300 0.240 -1.379 
  (0.505) (0.543) (0.559) (0.993) 
Hh_size   -0.00269 0.00158 -0.0110 
   (0.0322) (0.0332) (0.0236) 
Hhfarming_male   0.149* 0.142* 0.127** 
   (0.0808) (0.0814) (0.0602) 
HHfarming_female   0.0682 0.0757 -0.00232 
   (0.0988) (0.0994) (0.0710) 
Rooms   -0.0183 -0.0172 0.0231 
   (0.0365) (0.0367) (0.0319) 
Thatch_roof   0.142 0.337 -0.106 
   (0.346) (0.358) (0.249) 
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Table 3-16 (continued) Legume Farmers’ Pesticide Adoption 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Rural   -0.339 -0.337 -0.344* 
   (0.241) (0.243) (0.209) 
Legume_acres    -0.371** 0.738*** 
    (0.186) (0.122) 
Positional_security     0.0761 
     (0.292) 
Female*educ     -0.735 
     (0.641) 
Female*credit     -0.0210 
     (0.509) 
Female*radio1     -0.560 
     (0.473) 
Female*phone1     -0.194 
     (0.463) 
Female*tv     0.622 
     (0.764) 
Female*allinput     -1.843* 
     (0.993) 
Female*highextent     -1.313 
     (1.018) 
Female*allincome     2.290** 
     (1.091) 
Constant 0.155 1.594 1.643 1.460 -0.359 
  (0.153) (1.504) (1.675) (1.734) (1.349) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 298 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion  
Gender differences in agricultural technology matter because gendered ownership, 
access to and control over productive resources, and gendered decision-making in rural and 
peri-urban farm households can translate into increased productivity, poverty reduction, 
higher food security and improved nutritional outcomes, and thus facilitate achievement of 
development objectives through such programs as the Ghana School Lunch Program and 
the Millennium Development Goals. However, there remains a dearth of research related 
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to gender adoption of agricultural technology, especially adoption of interdependent 
technologies in sub-Saharan Africa.     
This study contributes to the emerging literature on gender gaps in technology 
adoption as well as the effects of access to productive resources, decision-making power, 
and household and plot characteristics on the adoption of multiple agricultural 
technologies. The study investigates differential adoption rates and factors affecting 
adoption of agricultural technology by male and female maize and legume farmers in the 
Northern Region of Ghana. We use gender-disaggregated data from rural and peri-urban 
communities in Northern Ghana. Maize production in Northern Ghana appears to be male 
dominated as ninety-nine percent of males in the sample grow maize while about sixty-
three percent of females cultivate the maize crop. The reverse is observed for legume 
cultivation: more than fifty percent of females cultivate legumes while less than fifty 
percent of male cultivate legumes. Legumes might not necessarily be a woman’s crop but 
more women tend to cultivate legumes to generate supplemental income.  
A key difference to note in maize versus cowpea cultivation is that cowpea is a 
legume and so converts atmospheric nitrogen into a usable form for the legume plant. 
Legumes generally require less fertilizer (especially nitrogen), compared with maize. There 
would thus be differences between the crops in regards to fertility needs and pest 
management.  The descriptive results suggest that adoption rates among maize farmers are 
highest for herbicide and fertilizer (a more than seventy percent rate of adoption). The rate 
of adoption of herbicides is almost equal among male and female maize farmers but a 
higher rate of fertilizer adoption exists among male maize farmers compared to female 
maize farmers. Among legume farmers, the highest adoption rates for agricultural 
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technology exists for herbicides and pesticides. Male legume farmers have higher adoption 
rates for pesticides while female legume farmers have a higher adoption rate for herbicides.  
The results from the multivariate probit estimation indicate no gender gap among 
male and female maize farmers with regards to the likelihood of improved seed adoption. 
These findings are consistent with some previous studies regarding gender differences in 
fertilizer use (Doss and Morris, 2001; Ndiritu et al., 2014; Theriault et al., 2017). Consistent 
with our hypothesis, access to or ownership of assets such as phones, radios and credit 
increases the likelihood of improved seed adoption among maize farmers. Moreover, 
female maize farmers who have input into most or all decisions concerning cash crop 
production are more likely to adopt improved maize seeds. 
The multivariate results further suggest that fertilizer adoption rates are statistically 
significantly higher among male maize farmers than among female farmers in the gender-
only model. However, after controlling for the male and female maize farmer’s access to 
and ownership of assets, decision-making power, household and plot characteristics, the 
fertilizer gender gap is no longer significant. Financial and human capital are necessary 
factors for fertilizer adoption. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis, male and female 
maize farmers with access to credit and education are more likely to adopt fertilizer.    
Similar to the gender results for improved seeds, the multivariate model indicates no 
gender differences in the likelihood of herbicides among male and female maize farmers. 
The results that males and females in Muslim households are more likely to adopt 
herbicides is consistent with the hypothesis of the study; Muslim households in the North 
tend to be polygamous, larger and wealthier, explaining the higher likelihood of adoption. 
The result that female maize farmers who have access to credit and female maize farmers 
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who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicide is unexpected. This may 
however be an indication that female maize farmers with access to credit and information 
may diversify into other productive on-farm or off-farm ventures in order to generate 
higher incomes.  
The multivariate results for pesticide adoption indicate no gender differences in the 
likelihood of adoption among male and female maize farmers. Consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis on access to resources, we find that male and female maize farmers who have 
access to credit and who have one additional bicycle are more likely to adopt pesticides 
while farmers without education are less likely to adopt pesticides. Consistent with the 
study’s hypothesis on decision-making the results indicate that farmers who had input into 
most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming in the past agricultural year have a higher 
likelihood of adopting pesticides. However, unexpectedly, the results suggest that maize 
farmers who can make decisions to a high extent about cash crop farming are less likely to 
adopt pesticides. This might be an indication that the ability to make decisions without 
expertise (education) or access to resources may constrain farmers from adopting 
agricultural technology. This might also indicate that they choose alternative technologies 
given their constraints. The results further indicates, consistent with our hypothesis, that 
female maize farmers with input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop production 
are more likely to adopt pesticides.   
We now look at factors affecting the likelihood of agricultural technology adoption 
among smallholder legume farmers. After controlling for individual level assets and 
decision-making as well as household and plot characteristics, the multivariate results 
indicate a significant gender gap in the likelihood of adopting improved seeds. The 
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multivariate model present conflicting results for the hypothesis on access to productive 
assets; male and female legume farmers who have had access to credit in the past two years 
are more likely to adopt improved seed. However, smallholder farmers with one additional 
bicycles are less likely to adopt improved seeds.  
The results indicate that there is no gender gap in the likelihood of fertilizer adoption 
among legume farmers. Consistent with the hypothesis on access to productive resources, 
the results show that legume farmers who have been able to access credit within the past 
two years are more likely to adopt fertilizer. Moreover, consistent with the study’s 
hypothesis, the results indicate that female legume farmers with education and access to 
credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer. 
Similar to the gender results for fertilizer adoption among legume farmers, the results 
indicate no gender gap in the likelihood of herbicide adoption. The multivariate model 
presents unexpected and conflicting results for the hypothesis related to individual access 
to assets and plot characteristics. The results indicate legume farmers who own one 
additional radio are less likely to adopt herbicides but the legume farmers who own one 
additional television set are more likely to adopt herbicides. Moreover, legume farmers 
who own more acres of agricultural land are less likely to adopt herbicides. Additionally, 
female legume farmers who own at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides.  
Similar to the gender results for improved seed adoption among legume farmers, the 
results indicate a gender gap in the likelihood of pesticide adoption. The results indicate 
that after accounting for individual assets and decision-making power, and household and 
plot level characteristics, female legume farmers are less likely to adopt pesticides 
compared to male legume farmers. Consistent with the study’s hypothesis on access to 
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productive assets, the results indicate that legume farmers who have access to financial 
resources are more likely to adopt pesticides. The multivariate model provides conflicting 
results for the hypothesis related to gendered decision making. Female legume farmers who 
have a say in what the use of income generated from cash crop farming are more likely to 
adopt pesticides, however, female legume farmers who have input into most or all decisions 
regarding cash crop farming are less likely to adopt pesticides.  
In summary, the study examines the gender gaps in technology adoption as well as 
the factors influencing or limiting the adoption of multiple improved agricultural 
technology. The key coefficient of interest in relation to the objective of the study is how 
the gender variable would affect maize and legume farmers’ adoption of agricultural 
technology controlling for relevant covariates. Among maize farmers the results indicates 
a gender gap for fertilizer adoption when individual level, household level and plot level 
characteristics are not considered. When we account for asset ownership, decision-making 
power, household and plot characteristics, the gender gap for fertilizer adoption is no longer 
significant. Among legume farmers, a gender gap is observed for improved seed adoption 
and pesticide adoption after controlling for individual, household and plot characteristics.  
Our results are somewhat consistent with Ndiritu et al. (2014) and Doss and Morris 
(2001) who find no gender differences in technology adoption rates of improved maize and 
fertilizer. They attribute differences in agricultural technology adoption not on the gender 
of the smallholder farmer, rather the differences in women’s access to and ownership of 
land. The measure for positional security, which is constructed as a female in a 
monogamous household with at least one son, has no effect on agricultural technology 
adoption. The study further explores whether gendered access to productive assets and 
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gendered decision-making power affect the likelihood that female farmers adopt 
agricultural technology. The results indicate that female maize farmers who have input into 
all cash crop production decisions are more likely to adopt improved seeds and pesticides. 
The result that female maize farmers who have access to credit and female maize farmers 
who have at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicide is unexpected and not 
consistent with the study’s hypothesis. Among legume farmers, the results indicate that 
female farmers who have education and access to credit are more likely to adopt fertilizer. 
However, female farmers with at least one radio are less likely to adopt herbicides. Quite 
surprisingly, female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income generated 
from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides, while female legume farmers 
who have input into most or all decisions regarding cash crop farming are less likely to 
adopt pesticides.  
We conclude that governments and non-governmental organizations that want to 
encourage adoption of agricultural technology among rural and peri-urban households 
must design and implement agricultural policies that recognize gender differences within 
heterogeneous families. From a policy standpoint, this study contributes to the debate on 
best-practices that can facilitate closing gender-technology gaps. Improving and ensuring 
equitable access to productive resources that differ between men and women, particularly 
to credit, education and radios, may facilitate a higher uptake of agricultural technology by 
female maize and legume farmers. Direct targeting of female farmers within rural and peri-
urban farm households to receive input subsidies could help close the gender technology 
gaps observed within the various agricultural technologies.  
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The correlation among the improved technologies examined confirms the policy 
importance of designing mechanisms that encourage farmers to adopt flexible 
combinations of the improved technologies in order to take advantage of the benefits from 
agronomic and economic complementarities. For example, a bundle of improved 
technology can include varying proportions of improved seed, fertilizer, herbicide and 
pesticide to meet the small farm needs of rural and peri-urban farmers. Agricultural 
technology bundles that fit the farmer’s farm size might be more easily adopted rather than 
large bags of each agricultural technology, which the farmer may find too expensive or too 
extraneous to purchase. The combinations of the bundles can also take the current patterns 
of farmer technology adoption into consideration. Moreover, the variations in technology 
adoption confirms that smallholder farmers maybe more likely to adopt flexible 
agricultural technology bundles given their land, labor and credit constraints. For example, 
a farmer who is cash constrained but not labor constrained may choose to adopt a bundle 
of improved seed, fertilizer and pesticide, then use available labor for weeding.  
Future studies can examine the factors that affect smallholder farmers’ adoption of 
various combinations of sustainable agricultural technology with mechanized agriculture 
as well as the factors influencing the number of these agricultural technologies adopted. 
Additional research is needed to examine the productivity, risk and welfare implications of 
adopting individual as well as combinations of agricultural technology to inform 
agricultural policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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3.9 Policy Recommendation  
To help increase female farmers’ adoption of improved agricultural technologies, the 
following policy recommendations are proposed. The recommendations can also be 
utilized within the framework of the Ghana School Feeding Program.  
3.9.1 Access to Credit for Women Farmers      
The results suggest that access to credit increases technology adoption, particularly 
for legume farmers. Although no gender differences were identified among legume 
farmers, the literature review suggests lower access to credit by women farmers. To address 
the problem of access to credit by women farmers, the government can encourage the 
Agricultural Development Bank and Rural Banks in Ghana to make credit facilities 
available to women farmers at lower interest rates. Current interest rates of more than fifty 
percent charged by rural banks to farmers, because the farmers lack collateral and have no 
monthly stream of income paid through the banking system, deters local farmers from 
taking loans although they have much need for credit.  
3.9.2  Access to Agricultural Inputs for Women Farmers    
Government can liaise with micro businesses in rural and peri-urban communities to 
subsidize radios, phones, and other agricultural productive assets such as backpack 
sprayers to women farmers. Additionally, government can liaise with agro-chemical sellers 
in rural and peri-urban areas to subsidize and target women farmers with improved 
agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. These agro-
products should be marketed in smaller packages with the option for bundling different 
inputs.    
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3.9.3 Customized Education, Training and Targeted Extension Services 
The government can liaise with local development agencies and schools in rural and 
peri-urban communities to establish training programs with flexible timing to meet the 
schedules of the majority of women farmers. The training programs can be organized 
monthly within the community center or in a classroom of the local school. These training 
programs can focus on providing agricultural education for the women farmers on best 
agricultural practices and agricultural technology adoption. These sessions could serve as 
a platform for the women farmers to share information on what works best for them in 
dealing with the agricultural problems they face on their farms. Such training programs 
will serve to close the gap generated by the lack of women extension agents allocated to 
rural and peri-urban areas in Northern Ghana.  
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CHAPTER 4. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SMALLHOLDER FARMERS’ MINIMUM 
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT FARM-TO-SCHOOL-LUNCH CONTRACTS 
4.1 Introduction and Background 
Access to credit is essential for growth and expansion in small-scale enterprises and 
for subsistence farmers. Moreover, ensuring that women farmers have access to financial 
resources is a key factor of successful rural development strategies (Fletschner & Kenney, 
2014). Without access to adequate capital for investments, women farmers tend to operate 
their farms at sub-optimal levels. Thus, in the context of school lunch programs, they may 
not be able to expand their farms to be able to provide adequate food items to school 
caterers and the local market.  
Asiedu et al. et al. (2013) examine the importance of the gender of a firm owner as a 
determinant of firms’ access to finance in developing countries. In particular, they 
investigate whether women-owned firms are more financially constrained than male-
owned. Their results suggest that female-owned firms are more likely to be financially 
constrained than male-owned firms in sub-Saharan Africa, with no evidence of a gender 
gap in other developing regions. Similarly, Akudugu et al. (2009) examine women farmers’ 
access to credit from rural banks in Ghana. The authors examine the nature of credit supply 
by rural banks to agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as well as the proportion of credit 
that went to women over a ten-year period 1998 to 2002. Their results indicated increasing 
credit supply in favor of the non-agricultural sector. Additionally, the distribution of credit 
appeared to favor men over women.  
This chapter examines credit access strategies that can promote the successful 
linkage of local farmers with school caterers. In particular, the study examines whether the 
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use of farming contracts can facilitate the engagement of local farmers in the food system 
of national school lunch programs. While the mandate of the Ghana School Lunch Program 
aims to increase foodstuff purchases from local smallholders, regardless of gender, this 
study places special emphasis on women smallholders as their access to credit has been 
shown to result in higher investments in human capital with a stronger impact on children’s 
health, nutrition and education with important long-term implications for families and 
societies (Fletschner & Kenney, 2014).  
This chapter uses hypothetical contract scenarios to investigate the role that farm-to-
school lunch contract attributes can have on male and female farmers’ participation 
decisions. The voluntary nature of contract schemes means that the decision of farmers to 
participate is central to achieving policy objectives. Contract farming can provide new 
marketing opportunities for smallholder farmers in developing economies, however, 
relatively little research exists about smallholder farmer’s preferences for contracts and for 
specific attributes within a contract design (Ochieng et al., 2017). Smallholder farmers’ 
willingness to participate in contract farming is influenced by the utility they derive from 
the contract attributes (Abebe et al., 2013). Thus, a better understanding and adjusting of 
contract attributes to meet smallholder farmers’ preferences and constraints can help make 
contract schemes viable, sustainable and beneficial to smallholder farmers (Ochieng et al., 
2017).   
Very few studies have examined the factors that encourage or limit smallholder 
farmers’ participation in contract farming, or gender differences in smallholder farmers’ 
willingness to participate in contracts. While a number of studies have focused on 
smallholder contracts with supermarkets (Michelson, 2013), processing, export and 
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agribusiness firms, no known study has examined contracts within the context of school 
lunch programs and how they may provide access to credit and can be harnessed to link 
smallholder farmers to school lunch programs.  At the time of the survey (August 2017), 
virtually no formal contracts existed between schools and smallholder farmers in the survey 
regions.  
The main objective of the study is to examine the factors influencing male and female 
smallholder farmers’ willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for 
maize and cowpea beans. The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate 
as well as the minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The 
study hypothesizes that  farmers’ WTA  is not  only  influenced  by  farmer  and farm  
characteristics,  but  also  by  the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining 
farmers’ minimum willingness to accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design. 
In particular the study uses a Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and 
the ‘time of delivery and payment’ differentially influences WTA for male and female 
smallholder farmers.  
Responses to stated preference valuation studies are often associated with 
hypothetical bias (Loomis, 2014). Loomis (2014) defines hypothetical bias as the 
difference between what a person indicates in a survey or interview that they would 
pay/accept and what they would actually pay/accept. With hypothetical bias, individuals 
tend to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a factor of two or three (Loomis, 
2011; Murphy et al., 2005). Murphy et al. (2005), for example, conducted a meta-analysis 
of hypothetical bias in 28 stated preference valuation studies that report money willingness-
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to-pay and found a median value of the ratio of hypothetical to actual value of 1.35, from 
83 observations.    
 Ex ante survey design strategies and ex poste calibration techniques can be used to 
minimize or eliminate hypothetical bias (Loomis, 2014). Carson and Groves (2007) suggest 
including three features in a survey in order for a hypothetical experiment to be truth 
revealing. Following Carson and Groves (2007), this study includes three ex ante features 
of minimizing the hypothetical bias by increasing the level of realism in the experiment.  
First, the survey must be consequential to the respondent, in that, it must have some 
potential effect on their future utility such as increased probability of the good being 
supplied. To this effect, the study oversamples smallholder farmers cultivate maize and/or 
legume. Maize and legume farmers make decisions growing and selling maize and legumes 
each agricultural season, thus the farm-to-school lunch experiment would be potentially 
incentive-compatible with them.  
As another feature of consequential survey designs, the questionnaire mentions the 
Ghana School Lunch Program and asks in a prior section of the survey whether any 
children in the respondents’ household benefits from the free lunch program and whether 
the respondent has ever supplied food items to caterers of the lunch program. Being aware 
of the school lunch program and existing arrangements between school caterers and some 
local farmers potentially results in responses being closer to actual valuation. Mentioning 
the school lunch program further evokes a sense of realism in the hypothetical experiment. 
Thirdly, binary, dichotomous or trichotomous choice question formats are potentially 
demand revealing, as against a valuation question in which the respondent chooses one 
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from among several product profiles (Loomis et al., 1999; Loomis, 2014). Loomis et al. 
(1999) find that the trichotomous choice question formats produce a statistically significant 
lower mean WTP. The experiment thus, includes a trichotomous choice situation, which 
allows the respondent to opt for the contract at three differing sequential bid amounts.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 a  conceptual  model  is presented  
to  put  the  factors  influencing  the  participation  decision  in  a  coherent framework. A 
utility model is adapted to understand the economic theory behind participation decisions. 
In  section 4.3, a  number  of  basic  hypotheses  about farm  and  farmer  characteristics  
influencing  participation  is  derived  on  the  basis of  the  literature. It  is  hypothesized  
that  farmers’  decision  behavior or WTA is  not  only based  on  profit  maximization,  but  
is  also  influenced  by a  range  of  contract design attributes and socio-economic variables, 
particularly access to credit. A description of the field experiment and descriptive statistics 
are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents empirical evidence from a hypothetical 
contract experiment. To test the hypothesis, a Tobit model is used to determine the 
underlying factors explaining farmers’ WTA the farm-to-school-lunch contract. The study 
concludes with a discussion of the results section 4.6.   
4.2 Modelling Smallholder Farmers’ Minimum WTA  
4.2.1  Conceptual Model         
The conceptual model for analyzing male and female farmers’ decision making 
towards farm-to-school-lunch contracts is presented in Figure 4.1. The model incorporates 
multiple factors that may affect farmer’s decision to participate and minimum WTA. The 
frame is adapted from a model described by Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) to analyze 
farmers’ participation in agri-environmental schemes. We hypothesize that farmers’ WTA 
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is influenced by both contract attributes and decision maker characteristics of each male or 
female farmer. The sex-disaggregated decision  maker  characteristics can  be  split  further  
into  farmer characteristics;  access to and ownership of assets; and  farm  characteristics.  
 
Figure 4-1 Conceptual Model of Contract Participation 
 
The study presents two models to examine the willingness to accept a farm-to-
school-lunch contract by smallholder farmers. The two models are the Cash-in-advance 
model and the Delivery-and-savings model. The models  are  based  on  the  assumption  
that  the  utility  a  male (𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚 )   or female  (𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓) farmer  is maximizing  depends  both  on  
the  production  of  private  goods (𝑄𝑄𝑣𝑣) and contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) resulting  in  farm income 
(𝜋𝜋).  The models further assume that the smallholder farmers make production decisions 
subject to binding budget constraints. As subsistence farmers, the private goods (𝑄𝑄𝑣𝑣) are 
either used for private consumption, sold to neighbors, sold to aggregators who come 
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directly to the rural areas, or sold on the central market. The contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) are the 
maize/legume production required by the farm-to-school-lunch contract.  
4.2.1.1 Cash-in-Advance Model  
In the cash-in-advance model, the male or female smallholder farmer is faced with 
producing the private goods (𝑄𝑄𝑣𝑣) and the contract goods (𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) subject to cash constraints. 
Production decisions are generally made before the commencement of the agricultural 
season; however, the smallholder farmer may be faced with an agricultural shock such as 
a drought or pest infestation. The cash-advance model spans thus from land-preparation 
until harvest time, to cover cash requirements for production decisions. The cash constraint 
facing the smallholder farmer is in the form of money needed to rent land if they do not 
own their farmland, to till the land before planting, to control weeds during the planting 
season and to secure other production inputs.  
The optimization problem for the male and female farmers is to choose a cash-in-
advance option (or not) that maximizes the utility from producing the contract and private 
goods.  
A smallholder farmer may not prefer a cash-in-advance option if she is engaged in 
off-farm employment activities, has large assets, which can easily be liquidated or has 
existing credit arrangements. These alternative activities would suggest that the individual 
is not cash constrained. On the other hand, a smallholder farmer with little or no assets or 
no access to credit may favor the cash-in-advance option.  
4.2.1.2 Delivery-and-Storage Model  
Smallholder farmers’ delivery decisions about harvested food crops usually extends 
over a period not longer than one year and may be divided into unequal periods, starting 
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from harvest and continuing till the next planting season. The delivery-and-storage model 
for this study is a two-period model. The first period spans the time during and right after 
harvest time. In the first period, the smallholder farmer may choose to supply the contracted 
quantity of food crops right after harvesting her crops. The second period spans from about 
a month after harvest until the next planting season. In the second period, the smallholder 
farmers is faced with the decision of whether to sell the crops immediately to obtain income 
needed to meet household needs or to store the crop, delay sales and receive a higher price 
further away from harvest during the leaner season.  
The optimization problem for the smallholder farmer is to choose to a delivery date 
at harvest (or later) that maximizes the utility from producing and supplying the contract 
and private goods.   
Smallholder farmers who have adequate storage facilities or a large number of rooms 
in their dwelling, which can be used for storage, may prefer to store the food crops until a 
later date for sale. Moreover, smallholder farmers who are wealthier and can afford to take 
risk may not value the delivery-at-harvest option.  
4.3 Research Questions 
The research question asks about the factors influencing smallholder farmers’ 
minimum WTA when deciding to participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract.  The 
minimum WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the 
minimum price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study examines 
the decision to participate in a farm-to-school lunch contract based on contract design 
attributes and farmer characteristics. In particular, the study hypothesizes that: 
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H1a: Advance payment options make smallholder farmers more likely to participate in 
the farm-to-school contract at a lower minimum WTA. 
H1b: Advance payment options make female farmers compared to male farmers more 
likely to participate in the farm-to-school contract at a lower minimum WTA. 
H2a: Delivery-at-harvest options make smallholder farmers more likely to participate 
in the farm-to-school-lunch contract at a lower minimum WTA. 
H2b: Delivery-at-harvest options male female farmers compared to male farmers more 
likely to participate in the farm-to-school-lunch contract lower minimum WTA. 
H3a: Smallholder farmers who have fewer assets (land, credit access, non-farm 
business) are more likely to participate at a higher minimum WTA. 
H3b: Female farmers compared to male farmers who have fewer assets (land, credit 
access, non-farm business) are more likely to participate at a higher minimum WTA. 
4.4 Description of Experiment and Descriptive Statistics 
4.4.1 Willingness-to-Accept Experiment 
The respondents are presented with four hypothetical contracts for maize and beans. 
Table 4.1 is a sample maize contract orally administered to the respondents by enumerators. 
In the first contract, the respondent would receive no advance payment but receives full 
payment when the bag of maize or beans is delivered at harvest. In the second contract, 
there would be no advance payment to the smallholder farmer. They would store the crop, 
deliver it to the caterer right before the next planting season and receive full payment at 
delivery of the bag of maize or beans. The third and fourth contracts offer half payment for 
the crop at the start of the contract and the remaining half payment at the time of delivery 
of the crop. The third contact requires delivery at harvest time while the fourth segment 
requires storage of the crop for delivery right before the next planting season. 
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Table 4-1 Sample Survey Maize Contract  
Contract 
Type 
Advance 
Payment 
Delivery Times 
Price (GH¢)                
(ask sequentially) 
If no what 
price will you 
accept? 
No to ALL 
contracts 
Contract  1.A 0% At harvest 60          80       100   
Contract  2.A 0% Before next planting 80         100      120   
Contract  3.A 50% At harvest 60          80       100   
Contract  4.A 50% Before next planting 80         100      120   
The times of delivery and payment were varied to reflect the times that smallholders 
sell their crops. Based on the findings of the pre-test instrument, some smallholder farmers 
sell their crops immediately at harvest if they are cash-constrained, while others store the 
crop and sell when they have large expenditures such as school fees or investments for the 
next planting season.  
The prices were sequentially asked for each contract. Depending on the response to 
the first amount, two subsequent prices were offered to the respondent. A higher amount 
was offered to respondents who refused the first amount. An alternate price was asked of 
the respondent who refused all three prices given and a ‘no’ was recorded for farmers who 
were unwilling to participate in the contract. For example, with Contract 1.A, the 
respondent would first be asked whether he/she would enter the contract if he/she were 
paid a price of 60 GH. If so, a ‘yes’ was recorded for 60GH, and—implicitly—80GH and 
100GH as well. If the respondent refused at 60GH, he/she would be asked the same 
question, but at 80GH, and so on. Thus, a minimum willingness to accept was observed on 
the four contracts for each respondent. Thus, each contract is designed as a triple-bounded 
dichotomous choice. The advantages of such a design have been shown in past studies 
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(Kanninen, 1993; Langford, Bateman & Langford, 1996; Bateman, Langford, Jones & 
Kerr, 2001). 
 
Figure 4-2 The Structure of the Contract Game Used in the Survey 
 
4.4.2 Dependent Variable: WTA  
The outcome variable for the study is the minimum price at which the smallholder 
farmers are willing to accept the farm-to-school lunch contract. This is denoted as 
minimum WTA (willingness-to-accept) in the rest of the chapter. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below 
illustrate the minimum WTA for maize and beans, respectively, by gender.  The red line in 
the figures denote the lower bound of prices offered to the smallholder farmers for the 
maize and beans contracts. A minimum price of GHȼ 60 per 100kg bag was offered for 
maize and if the initial price was rejected a higher price of GHȼ 80 and then GHȼ 100 were 
offered. Similarly, a minimum price of GHȼ 280 per 100kg bag of beans was offered and 
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increased sequentially if the farmer refused the initial amount. Smallholders who rejected 
the prices offered were subsequently asked at what price they would accept the farm-to-
school contract. WTA below the minimum price offered was not observed. However, some 
farmers may have been willing to accept a lower price if, for example, they have two or 
three children benefitting from the GSFP. For that matter, the dependent variable, 
minimum WTA, is left-censored (censored-from-below). 
 
Figure 4-3 Minimum WTA for Maize Contract by Gender 
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Figure 4-4 Minimum WTA for Beans Contract by Gender 
 
Table 4.2 below presents minimum WTA by contract type by gender. The table 
indicates that for the maize contract, on average, females have a higher minimum WTA 
while for the beans contract, males have a higher minimum WTA.   
Table 4-2 Minimum WTA by contract by gender 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Maize Contract:      
min WTA 1157 93.28 21.62 60 400 
Male min WTA  575 92.49 19.95 60 200 
Female min WTA 582 94.07 23.15 60 400 
Beans Contract:      
min WTA 1157 346.24 44.66 280 600 
Male min WTA 575 348.02 42.06 280 400 
Female min WTA 582 344.48 47.07 280 600 
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4.4.3 Independent Variables 
4.4.3.1 Contract Attributes 
The contract attributes include whether there is an (1) advance payment option or 
none and (2) the time of delivery is at harvest time or after harvest but before the next 
planting season. In table 4.3 below, we observe that on average, the respondents prefer a 
slightly higher price for contracts with no advance payment compared to contracts that 
have some advance payment. In other words, respondents are willing to accept a lower 
price for contracts that would give them part payment before they cultivate and supply the 
bag of maize or beans. 
The average price that respondents are willing to accept for receiving payment for 
the bag of maize at the start of the next planting season is about GHȼ20 more that the price 
they are willing to accept for payments received right at harvest time. Similarly, the average 
price the farmers are willing to accept at harvest for beans is GHȼ50 less than at the next 
planting season. This might be because farmers who sell their farm produce during the next 
planning season arbitrage (they store the produce and sell at a higher price later in the 
agricultural season). Moreover, the smallholder farmers sell the produce at a time when 
money is needed to pay school fees or hospital bills for a sick family member. Thus storing 
the farm produce serves as a form of savings for the smallholder farmers.  
 
 
 
 
138 
 
Table 4-3 Contract Attributes and Average WTA 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Maize Contract:      
Advance pay (No = 0) 579 93.83 22.73 60 400 
Advance pay (Yes = 1) 578 92.73 20.46 60 120 
Delivery (Harvest = 0) 578 83.15 20.91 60 400 
Delivery (Next planting = 1) 579 103.40 17.13 80 200 
Beans Contract:      
Advance pay (No = 0) 579 346.67 42.23 280 600 
Advance pay (Yes = 1) 578 345.81 47.01 280 600 
Delivery (Harvest = 0) 578 321.19 39.67 280 600 
Delivery (Next planting = 1) 579 371.24 34.14 330 600 
 
4.4.3.2 Individual Farmer Characteristics  
Table 4.4 presents individual level characteristics of the sampled smallholder farmers 
by gender. On average 26% of males have received some level of education while 15% of 
women. A farmer who has received some level of education might be more willing to 
participate compared to a farmer with no education at all. However, a woman farmer who 
is educated beyond high school level might be less likely to participate as she may have 
other non-farm income generating activities. Whether a woman participates in wage work 
and earns income might also be linked to the decision to participate in the farm to school 
lunch contract. Women engaged in some non-farm economic activity such as trading or 
shea-butter processing may be earning higher incomes than they would earn from an 
agricultural activity and may have less time available to invest in farm work. Thus, women 
engaged in non-farm economic activities may be less willing to participate in the contract 
or have a higher WTA. A greater percentage of women have taken a loan in the past two 
years and own a non-farm business compared to men.  
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4.4.3.2.1 Productive Assets  
A greater percentage of men own land and other productive assets such knapsack 
sprayers, radios and phones. Individual level characteristics such as access to, ownership 
of, or control over assets could influence smallholder farmers’ WTA. Land ownership in 
rural and peri-urban areas of developing countries may not indicate legal rights, as the land 
is not formally titled and owned by individuals but owned by Chiefs who allot the land as 
they deem fit. Following Peterman et al.  (2014), the study defines the ownership/use of 
inputs as the application of that resource in a productive activity at the individual or 
household level, whether the input was obtained through family inheritance, purchase, or 
barter. 
4.4.3.2.2 Decision-Making Power  
The question of who typically makes decisions; the ability to make personal 
decisions regarding food crop farming and cash crop farming; how much input is 
contributed to decision making; and the extent of input on the use of income generated 
from food crops and cash crops may influence farmers’ WTA. Additionally woman 
smallholder farmers who actively participate in cash crop farming, partake in production 
decisions largely and have some input into the use of income generated from farming may 
be more likely to participate in the contract. Almost all the sampled men grow maize (on 
an average of 3 acres of land) while about 60% of women grow maize (on an average of 
1.4 acres of land). On average, about 90% of male have higher input into decisions 
regarding cash crop and food crop production as well as high input into the use of income 
generated from these activities. On the other hand, an average of 50% of females have high 
input into these decision-making processes.  
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Table 4-4 Individual Level Characteristics 
  Male  Female  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age (years) 49.63 14.23 41.78 12.96 
Ever attended school (No=0,Yes=1) 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.36 
Credit access (No=0,Yes=1) 0.14 0.35 0.30 0.46 
Non-farm business (No=0,Yes=1) 0.65 0.48 0.77 0.42 
Agricultural land (acres) 6.21 4.48 1.71 1.36 
Knapsack (number) 0.48 0.71 0.04 0.35 
Radio (number) 0.56 0.55 0.18 0.38 
Phone (number) 0.85 0.41 0.46 0.50 
Bicycle (number) 0.86 0.63 0.04 0.20 
Grow maize (No=0,Yes=1) 0.99 0.08 0.64 0.48 
Maize acres (acres) 3.32 2.33 1.41 0.85 
Maize farm distance to house (miles) 2.95 3.88 2.77 3.18 
Grow legume (No=0,Yes=1) 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Legume acres (acres) 1.43 0.92 1.24 0.44 
Legume farm distance to house (miles) 2.23 2.56 2.26 1.68 
High food crop input (No=0,Yes=1) 0.88 0.32 0.50 0.50 
High food crop extent (No=0,Yes=1) 0.94 0.24 0.48 0.50 
High food crop income  decision (No=0,Yes=1) 0.94 0.23 0.55 0.50 
High cash crop input (No=0,Yes=1) 0.83 0.37 0.48 0.50 
High cash crop extent (No=0,Yes=1) 0.86 0.35 0.49 0.50 
High cash crop income decision (No=0,Yes=1) 0.86 0.35 0.51 0.50 
 
4.4.3.3 Household Level Characteristics 
Summary statistics of household level characteristics are in presented in Table 4.5 
below. The average household size was 11 members.  Each households had an average of 
3.2 schoolchildren benefitting from an existing free school lunch program in their 
communities, with an average of 1.6 male and female schoolchildren, respectively. Having 
at least one child in the household who benefits from the school lunch program could 
influence the smallholder farmers’ decision to participate in the farm to school lunch 
contract, making them more likely to participate.  
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Table 4-5 Household Level Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household size (number) 11.06 5.51 2 30 
Kids benefitting from GSFP (number) 3.20 2.71 0 16 
Male kids in GSFP (number) 1.60 1.56 0 8 
Female kids in GSFP (number) 1.61 1.65 0 10 
Rural 0.49 0.50 0 1 
 
4.5 Tobit Model of Farm-to-School-Lunch Participation 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this section is to model and estimate the price for which smallholder 
farmers are willing to participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract conditional upon 
contract attributes as well as specific farm and farmer characteristics. Two reasons motivate 
the choice and design of the outcome variable, which is the minimum willingness to accept. 
The first is to identify an optimal price for the successful implementation of farm-to-
school-lunch contracts. The current compensation paid to a school caterer to feed 
schoolchildren per day is GHȼ1 per schoolchild per meal. This must include cost of 
foodstuff purchases, preparation, transportation and serving of the food to the 
schoolchildren by the caterer. On one hand, a contract price that is too low will deter 
smallholder farmers from participating. On the other hand, a contract price that is too high 
will make it infeasible for caterer to purchase from local farmers or for the government to 
sustain the feeding program. Secondly, it reflects the realistic bidding process that 
smallholder farmers face when marketing their farm produce.   
The study employs a Tobit model, also called a censored regression model devised 
by Tobin (1958), for the analysis of the price for which smallholder farmers are willing to 
participate in a farm-to-school-lunch contract. The tobit model is designed to estimate 
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linear relationships between variables when there is either left-censoring (from below) or 
right-censoring (from above) in the dependent variable. Censoring from above takes place 
when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of that threshold 
so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be higher. In the 
case of censoring from below, values that fall at or below some threshold are censored. 
Thus for a censored Y, we observe all the X but know the true value of Y for a restricted 
range of observations. In our case, data are censored from below because we observe the 
minimum price of 60 and 280 GH cedis for bag of maize and beans, respectively, in the 
questionnaire. However, there may be some farmers who are willing to accept an even 
lower price. The data are not censored from above because even though there was an upper 
bound on the price levels, the option was given for farmers who did not accept the prices 
in the questionnaire to state the prices at which they would be willing to participate in the 
farm-to-lunch contract.  
For this study, the Tobit model is used rather than the ordered logit/probit model 
although the study’s dependent variable is somewhat ordered and categorical. The ordered 
logit/probit is best used to estimate relationships between an ordinal dependent variable 
and a set of independent variables. In this study, the minimum WTA dependent variable 
for maize, for example, has ordered categories at GHȼ60, 80, 100 and 120. The ordered 
logit/probit model however assumes that the actual values are irrelevant, except that larger 
values correspond to higher outcomes. The study is interested in estimating minimum 
willingness to accept prices, thus the actual values are of importance and hence the choice 
of the Tobit model.  
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4.5.2 Tobit Model Specification  
Specifically, we adopt the Tobit model to examine the attributes of a farm-to-lunch 
contract and farmer characteristics that explains the maize and beans contract price level 
accepted by smallholder farmers. The Tobit model has an underlying latent variable, y*, of 
which y is the realized observation. The latent dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗, which is only 
partially observed, may be expressed as follows: 
𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊∗ =  𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊                                           (4.1) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2), 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous and fully observed regressors and β  
is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The maize and beans equations are estimated 
separately, thus the maize regression is expressed as: 
𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊∗ =  𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊                            (4.2) 
And for beans: 
𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊∗ =  𝒙𝒙′𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃 + 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊                                      (4.3) 
From (5.10) we observe  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗   if    𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0                               
    = 𝑦𝑦0   if    𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0                        (4.4)    
 where 𝑦𝑦0 is the minimum price. 
The Tobit model is a combination of two models, the probit model which determines 
whether y = 0 or y > 0 and a truncated regression model for y>0.  The coefficients from 
Tobit estimation are used to determine both changes in the probability of being above the 
limit and changes in the value of the dependent variable if it is already above the limit 
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the 
regression coefficients (β) and the standard errors (𝜇𝜇), given 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) and 
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𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗| 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖β,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2). The goal of maximum likelihood is to find the set of parameters that 
would have generated the observed sample most often, if the parameters are true of the 
population. Maximum likelihood is applicable in both the discrete and continuous case.  
The censoring indicator is 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0  otherwise 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 0.   
The likelihood is: 
 𝐿𝐿(β,𝜎𝜎) = ∏ Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0)1−𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖{Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0)𝑓𝑓((𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0)}𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1                          (4.5) 
The probability of an observation being censored for the maize or beans contract is   
Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑦𝑦0) = Pr �
𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖β+𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
 < 𝑦𝑦0
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
 � = Φ�𝑦𝑦0−𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖β
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
�                                                   (4.6) 
 where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
𝑓𝑓(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗| 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0) =     
1
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                                                                                           (4.7) 
where ∅(. ) is the standard normal density.   
Substituting (5.15) and (5.15) into (5.14), the likelihood function can be written as  
𝐿𝐿(β,𝜎𝜎) = ∏ Φ�𝑦𝑦0−𝑥𝑥′𝑖𝑖β
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
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11                     (4.8) 
In (5.17) the first two products provide an estimate on whether the smallholder is 
willing to participate in the farm-to-lunch contract (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑦𝑦0). The additional information 
on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ provides a more efficient estimate of β/𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢.and an estimate of 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢. 
4.5.3  Empirical Specification 
In a sample of N respondents with 𝑖𝑖 farm-to-school-lunch contract options, the 
minimum willingness to accept (WTA) of respondent 𝑛𝑛 for contract 𝑖𝑖 is expressed as a 
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function of contract attributes (A), individual farmer characteristics(X) and household 
characteristics (H). 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖                                (4.9) 
𝐴𝐴1 = advance payment =1; otherwise = 0 
𝐴𝐴2 = delivery harvest = 1; otherwise = 0 
𝑋𝑋1 = female =1; otherwise = 0 
𝑋𝑋2 = age of smallholder farmer (years) 
𝑋𝑋3 = educated = 1; otherwise = 0 
𝑋𝑋4 = if smallholder farmer has had access to credit in the past two years =1; 
otherwise=0 
𝑋𝑋5 = if smallholder farmer has non-farm business =1; otherwise = 0 
𝑋𝑋6 = agricultural land jointly or individually owned by smallholder farmer (acres) 
𝑋𝑋7 = if smallholder farmer cultivates maize/legume, yes = 1; no = 0 
𝑋𝑋8 = acres of maize/legume cultivated by smallholder farmer (acres) 
𝑋𝑋9 = if smallholder can make personal decisions about cash/food crop to a high 
extent=1; otherwise=0 
𝐻𝐻1 = household size (persons) 
𝐻𝐻2 = number of children in household benefitting from the GSFP (persons) 
𝐻𝐻3 = rural = 1; otherwise = 0 
In further specifications, the model is extended with sets of interaction variables to 
learn more about minimum WTA heterogeneity among farmers. To examine the possible 
effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and individual characteristics on 
minimum WTA, we estimate the following model: 
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𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝜏𝜏𝑫𝑫𝑓𝑓 + 𝜌𝜌(𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 × 𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛) + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝜑𝜑(𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 × 𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛) + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 
(4.10) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 is a dummy variable for female=1; otherwise= 0 and X represents a vector 
farmer characteristics (as indicated above) excluding gender.   
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual 
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as 
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. This is analyzed with the 
following model: 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛 + 𝜔𝜔(𝑨𝑨𝑛𝑛 × 𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛) + 𝛿𝛿𝑯𝑯𝑛𝑛 + ε𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖   (4.11) 
where 𝑿𝑿 is a vector of respondents assets including education, access to credit, 
ownership of non-farm business, acres of land owned by the respondent as well as decision-
making power (as indicated in equation 4.9 above). 
4.6 Empirical Results and Discussion  
The results for smallholder farmers’ minimum WTA for maize and beans are 
presented in in the subsequent sub-sections. The p-value of 0.000 for the Tobit variations 
indicates that the Tobit models are suitable for the analysis of minimum WTA. 
The coefficients represent the changes in the mean of the latent minimum WTA 
dependent variable. WTA values are expressed in Ghanaian cedis (GHȼ) and can be 
interpreted as the minimum price farmers are willing to accept in order to participate in the 
farm-to-school lunch contract.  
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4.6.1 Minimum WTA for Maize Contract  
Table 4.6 presents the results of the minimum WTA analysis for the maize contract. 
The pooled model has 156 left-censored observations and 1001 uncensored observations; 
the male-sample model has 80 left-censored observations and 495 uncensored 
observations; and the female-sample model has 76 left-censored observations and 506 
uncensored observations. 
The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum 
WTA value of smallholder farmers. In the pooled and male-sample maize contract 
estimations, the results indicate that all things being equal, having advance pay option 
compared to no advance pay option has no statistically significant effect on minimum 
WTA, on average. However, in the female-only sample, the results indicate that, ceteris 
paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA by GHȼ3.  
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest compared to later, would 
lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, 
the results in Table 4.6 indicate that respondents have a higher minimum WTA for maize 
contracts that stipulate delivery harvest compared to delivery later. The pooled-, male- and 
female-sample results respectively indicate, on average, a GHȼ23.39, GHȼ22.86 and 
GHȼ23.73 higher minimum WTA for delivery at harvest option compared to delivery later.  
The coefficient on gender in the pooled model indicates that, ceteris paribus, on 
average, females have a GHȼ4.5 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, compared 
to males.  
The study hypothesized that smallholder farmers with fewer assets are more likely 
to have a higher minimum WTA for the farm-to-school-lunch contract. The results in Table 
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4.6 indicate that have access to credit lowered minimum WTA in the pooled and female 
sub-sample by GHȼ7 on average. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate 
that having a non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract. The 
increase in minimum WTA was on average GHȼ10.8, GHȼ16.8 and GHȼ5.5 respectively 
in the pooled-, male- and female samples.  
Males who grow maize have on average, a GHȼ18.5 lower minimum WTA 
compared to males who do not grow maize. However, ceteris paribus, females who 
cultivate maize have a GHȼ6.7 higher minimum WTA compared to females who do not 
cultivate maize, on average.  
For all the estimated models, smallholder farmers in rural communities on average 
have a higher minimum WTA compared to smallholder farmers in peri-urban communities, 
ceteris paribus.  
Table 4-6 Minimum WTA for Maize Contract 
  Tobit Model 
 VARIABLES  (1) Basic (2) Pooled (3) Male (4) Female 
Advance pay -1.651 -1.553 -0.0287 -3.124* 
 (1.008) (1.011) (1.037) (1.751) 
Delivery at harvest 23.39*** 23.39*** 22.86*** 23.73*** 
 (0.975) (0.979) (1.323) (1.455) 
Female  4.856* - - 
  (2.674)   
Age  0.0799 0.170* 0.0329 
  (0.0756) (0.0963) (0.110) 
Educated  3.891* 3.627 2.082 
  (2.152) (2.956) (3.457) 
Access to credit  -7.088*** -4.176 -7.640** 
  (2.328) (2.836) (3.712) 
Nonfarm business  10.75*** 16.78*** 5.454* 
  (1.969) (2.376) (3.043) 
Agricultural land  0.199 -0.00708 0.507 
  (0.320) (0.367) (1.242) 
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Table 4-6 (continued) Minimum WTA for Maize Contract 
 VARIABLES  (1) Basic (2) Pooled (3) Male (4) Female 
Grow maize  0.941 -18.54*** 6.683* 
  (3.221) (5.791) (4.009) 
Maize acres  -0.299 -0.0223 -3.271* 
  (0.595) (0.603) (1.869) 
High food crop decision making  4.045 -3.775 6.646** 
  (2.621) (5.053) (3.104) 
Household size  -0.503** -0.617** -0.473 
  (0.221) (0.252) (0.327) 
Kids in school lunch program  0.338 0.582 0.455 
  (0.417) (0.570) (0.625) 
Rural  10.91*** 13.08*** 6.397** 
  (1.617) (2.083) (2.605) 
Constant 80.83*** 63.18*** 80.74*** 73.65*** 
 (1.309) (6.000) (6.267) (7.519) 
Sigma 21.52*** 19.85*** 16.01*** 22.37*** 
 (2.525) (2.672) (0.933) (4.578) 
Observations 1,157 1,157 575 582 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by ID) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.6.1.1 Gender Interactions in Maize Contract  
In further specifications, the model is extended with sets of interaction variables to 
learn more about minimum WTA heterogeneity among smallholder farmers. To examine 
the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and individual 
characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with contract attributes 
and individual characteristics.  
Table 4.7 presents the results of the gender interactions. The results indicate that, 
ceteris paribus, a female with a non-farm business has a GHȼ11.1 lower minimum WTA 
for maize the contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business.  
Ceteris paribus, compared to a male who cultivates maize, a female who cultivates 
maize has a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract by GHȼ26.5 on average. 
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Additionally, a female who can make personal decisions regarding food crop production 
has a GHȼ10.8 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, ceteris paribus, compared to 
a male who can make personal decisions concerning food crop production.  
Table 4-7 Maize Contract with Gender Interactions 
VARIABLES Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Female -9.447 (9.625) 
Advance pay -0.112 (1.070) 
Delivery at harvest 23.58*** (1.455) 
Age 0.186* (0.101) 
Educated 4.097 (3.081) 
Access to credit -4.851 (3.015) 
Nonfarm business 17.02*** (2.499) 
Agricultural land 0.0642 (0.352) 
Grow maize -21.45*** (5.904) 
Maize acres -0.171 (0.636) 
High food crop decision making -3.663 (5.118) 
Interacting female with:   
Advance pay -2.844 (1.923) 
Delivery at harvest -0.393 (2.139) 
Age -0.159 (0.148) 
Educated -2.060 (4.649) 
Access to credit -2.966 (4.625) 
Nonfarm business -11.05*** (3.865) 
Agricultural land 0.167 (1.251) 
Grow maize 26.48*** (7.076) 
Maize acres -2.276 (1.818) 
High cash food decision making 10.75* (5.981) 
Household size -0.553** (0.218) 
Kids in school lunch program 0.498 (0.432) 
Rural 10.10*** (1.666) 
Constant 82.91*** (6.562) 
Sigma  19.57*** (2.686) 
Observations 1,157   
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4.6.1.2 Interactions with Contract Attributes  
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual 
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as 
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. 
Table 4.8 below presents the results of the advance pay contract attribute interactions.  
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay 
and delivery at harvest contract attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA 
for the maize contract by GHȼ 7.2, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance 
pay but not delivery at harvest. 
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Table 4-8 Maize Contract with Advance Pay Interactions 
VARIABLES Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Advance pay -6.466 (6.187) 
Delivery at harvest 19.77*** (1.312) 
Female 6.373** (2.828) 
Age 0.0570 (0.0793) 
Educated 4.523** (2.294) 
Access to credit -6.795** (2.736) 
Nonfarm business 10.28*** (2.036) 
Agricultural land 0.328 (0.329) 
Grow crop -0.920 (4.312) 
Crop acres -0.509 (0.646) 
High crop decision making 5.843* (3.144) 
Interacting advance pay with:   
Delivery 7.234*** (1.746) 
Female -3.069 (2.449) 
Age 0.0467 (0.0660) 
Educated -1.252 (1.934) 
Access to credit -0.608 (2.253) 
Nonfarm business 0.930 (1.875) 
Agricultural land -0.258 (0.370) 
Grow crop 3.727 (4.013) 
Crop acres 0.428 (0.548) 
High crop decision making -3.654 (2.875) 
Household size -0.505** (0.221) 
Kids in school lunch program 0.339 (0.417) 
Rural 10.88*** (1.619) 
Constant 65.66*** (6.854) 
Sigma  19.72*** (2.619) 
Observations 1,157  
 
Table 4.9 below presents the results of the delivery contract attribute interactions.  
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at harvest 
option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract 
by GHȼ5.6, on average, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest 
but has no access to credit. 
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Table 4-9 Maize Contract with Delivery Interactions 
VARIABLES  Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Delivery at harvest 13.92** (6.554) 
Advance pay -5.302*** (1.704) 
Female 3.560 (3.536) 
Age 0.148 (0.0953) 
Educated 5.165* (2.771) 
Access to credit -9.990*** (3.515) 
Nonfarm business 9.083*** (2.651) 
Agricultural land -0.0436 (0.393) 
Grow crop -1.637 (4.759) 
Crop acres -0.444 (0.820) 
High crop decision making 3.215 (3.640) 
Interacting delivery with:   
Advance pay 7.257*** (1.759) 
Female 2.409 (2.880) 
Age -0.130 (0.0805) 
Educated -2.505 (2.812) 
Access to credit 5.563* (3.194) 
Nonfarm business 3.213 (2.159) 
Agricultural land 0.470 (0.336) 
Grow crop 4.957 (3.924) 
Crop acres 0.272 (0.669) 
High crop decision making 1.533 (2.944) 
Household size -0.506** (0.221) 
Kids in school lunch program 0.342 (0.417) 
Rural 10.89*** (1.616) 
Constant 68.14*** (8.050) 
Sigma  19.63*** (2.653) 
Observations 1,157  
 
4.6.2 Minimum WTA for Beans Contract  
The minimum WTA estimates for the beans contract are presented in Table 4.10 
below. The pooled model has 229 left-censored observations and 928 uncensored 
observations; the male-sample model has 101 left-censored observations and 474 
uncensored observations; and the female-sample model has 128 left-censored observations 
and 454 uncensored observations.  
154 
 
The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum 
WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results in Table 
4.10 indicate no statistically significant change in minimum WTA for the beans contracts 
that have advance pay option compared to the beans contract with no advance pay. This 
result is reflected in all three specifications: the pooled, male and female samples.  
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest compared to delivery later, 
would lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. The results suggest that, 
rather than lower minimum WTA, ceteris paribus, the delivery at harvest compared to 
delivery later, increases minimum WTA for the beans contract. On average, the increase 
in minimum WTA for the beans contract is GHȼ60.0, GHȼ55.0 and GHȼ65.1 in the pooled, 
male and female model specifications respectively.   
Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, accesses to credit lowers minimum WTA for the beans contract while owning a 
non-farm business increases minimum WTA for the contract. On average, access to credit 
reduced minimum WTA in the pooled and male specifications by GHȼ16.8 and GHȼ18.5 
respectively, but no statistically significant difference was observed in the female 
specification. On average, the increase in minimum WTA for smallholders with a non-farm 
business was GHȼ26.8, GHȼ 31.3 and GHȼ13.0 in the respective specifications.  
 In all three specification, ceteris paribus, smallholder farmers who grow legumes 
have a higher minimum WTA on average, compared to individual who do not grow 
legumes. The increase in minimum WTA for the beans contract on average is GHȼ22.2, 
GHȼ15.9 and GHȼ72.8 respectively in the pooled, male and female model specifications. 
However, cultivating one additional acre of legumes lowers minimum WTA for the beans 
155 
 
contract by GHȼ9.3 and GHȼ43.7 in the pooled and female specifications respectively but 
not in the male specification.  
Table 4-10 Minimum WTA for Beans Contract 
  Model 
VARIABLES (1) Basic (2) Pooled (3) Male (4) Female 
Advance pay -2.425 -2.194 -1.174 -3.257 
 (1.662) (1.635) (2.289) (2.304) 
Delivery at harvest 60.48*** 59.97*** 55.04*** 65.09*** 
 (2.487) (2.488) (2.942) (4.108) 
Female  -7.300 - - 
  (5.443)   
Age  -0.0879 0.0567 0.00320 
  (0.143) (0.155) (0.229) 
Educated  -0.689 0.204 6.377 
  (4.405) (4.852) (8.342) 
Access to credit  -16.75*** -18.45*** -9.275 
  (4.806) (6.948) (7.476) 
Nonfarm business  26.76*** 31.29*** 13.04* 
  (4.500) (5.810) (6.643) 
Agricultural land  -0.771* -0.460 -2.488 
  (0.454) (0.419) (2.315) 
Grow legume  28.22*** 15.90** 72.80*** 
  (6.995) (6.720) (12.07) 
Legume acres  -9.326** -1.475 -43.66*** 
  (4.607) (4.226) (8.592) 
High cash crop decision making  10.95** 11.05 13.36* 
  (5.007) (8.103) (6.863) 
Household size  -0.525 -0.752 -0.750 
  (0.477) (0.565) (0.773) 
Kids in school lunch program  1.115 0.779 1.968 
  (0.834) (0.983) (1.224) 
Rural  1.354 -2.390 0.493 
  (3.979) (4.819) (5.793) 
Constant 312.0*** 294.2*** 290.8*** 288.1*** 
 (2.980) (9.868) (11.97) (14.27) 
Sigma 44.40*** 39.42*** 33.63*** 42.71*** 
 (2.610) (2.743) (1.300) (5.148) 
Observations 1,157 1,157 575 582 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by ID) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6.2.1 Gender Interactions in Beans Contract  
Table 4.11 below presents the results of the gender interactions. The results indicate 
that, ceteris paribus, a female who owns a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA 
of GHȼ16.4 for the beans contract, compared to a male who owns a non-farm business, on 
average.  
A female who cultivates legumes, ceteris paribus, compared to a male who cultivates 
legumes, would have higher minimum WTA of GHȼ50.5 on average. Additionally, a 
female who cultivates one additional acre of legumes, ceteris paribus, compared to a male 
who cultivates one additional acre of legumes, has a lower minimum WTA of GHȼ39.4 for 
the beans contract on average.  
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Table 4-11 Beans Contract with Gender Interactions 
VARIABLES Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Female 15.43 (18.62) 
Advance pay -1.373 (2.368) 
Delivery at harvest 56.58*** (3.139) 
Age 0.0289 (0.158) 
Educated 0.221 (4.782) 
Access to credit -18.60** (7.338) 
Nonfarm business 31.14*** (6.213) 
Agricultural land -0.587 (0.397) 
Grow legume 17.07*** (6.555) 
Legume acres -1.257 (3.737) 
High cash crop decision making  17.44* (10.06) 
Interacting female with: 
Advance pay -1.617 (3.297) 
Delivery at harvest 6.727 (4.384) 
Age -0.0428 (0.277) 
Educated 6.719 (9.749) 
Access to credit 11.01 (10.31) 
Nonfarm business -16.42* (9.055) 
Agricultural land -2.315 (2.308) 
Grow legume 50.46*** (14.33) 
Legume acres -39.42*** (9.606) 
High cash crop decision making  -12.52 (12.01) 
Household size -0.515 (0.483) 
Kids in school lunch program 1.151 (0.801) 
Rural -0.331 (3.705) 
Constant 279.3*** (13.36) 
Sigma  38.62*** (2.901) 
Observations 1,157 1,157 
 
4.6.2.2 Interactions with Contract Attributes  
Table 4.12 below presents the results of the advance pay contract attribute 
interactions.  The results indicate that a smallholder farmer who opts for advance pay and 
opts for delivery at harvest has a higher minimum WTA for the beans contract of GHȼ7.8 
on average, compared to one who opts for no advance pay.  
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The results further suggest that a smallholder farmer who is one year older and opts 
for the advance pay contract attribute has a GHȼ0.2 higher minimum WTA for the beans 
contract, compared to a smallholder who is one year older but does not opt for the advance 
pay attribute. Additionally, owning one additional acre of land and opting for the advance 
pay lowers the minimum WTA for the beans contract by GHȼ1.2, compared to owning one 
additional acre of land but not opting for the advance pay attribute.  
Table 4-12 Beans Contract with Advance Pay Interactions 
VARIABLES Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Advance pay -13.36 (10.42) 
Delivery at harvest 56.13*** (2.669) 
Female -5.270 (5.812) 
Age -0.208 (0.160) 
Educated -3.449 (4.844) 
Access to credit -14.00*** (4.831) 
Nonfarm business 26.08*** (4.880) 
Agricultural land -0.184 (0.502) 
Grow crop 27.80*** (6.829) 
Crop acres -10.57** (4.456) 
High crop decision making 11.23** (5.031) 
Interacting advance pay with:   
Delivery 7.790*** (2.958) 
Female -4.075 (4.736) 
Age 0.244* (0.144) 
Educated 5.713 (4.784) 
Access to credit -5.647 (3.659) 
Nonfarm business 1.349 (3.897) 
Agricultural land -1.180* (0.613) 
Grow crop 0.822 (4.961) 
Crop acres 2.515 (2.353) 
High crop decision making -0.587 (3.811) 
Household size -0.528 (0.477) 
Kids in school lunch program 1.108 (0.835) 
Rural 1.314 (3.978) 
Constant 299.8*** (11.04) 
Sigma  39.30*** (2.759) 
Observations 1,157 1,157 
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Table 4.13 presents the results of the delivery contract attribute interactions.  The 
results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at harvest 
option and the advance pay option will have higher minimum WTA for the beans contract 
by GHȼ7.8, on average, compared to a smallholder who opts for delivery later and advance 
pay.  
The results further suggest that, female who opts for delivery at harvest will have a 
higher minimum WTA of GHȼ15.1, on average, compared a female who opts for delivery 
later. Additionally, a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest and has one 
additional acre of agricultural land will have a GHȼ1.2 higher minimum WTA for the beans 
contract, on average, compared to a smallholder with one additional acre of land but does 
not opt for delivery at harvest.  
Moreover, a farmer who grows legumes and opts for delivery at harvest will have a 
GHȼ14.1 lower minimum WTA for the beans contract, ceteris paribus, compared to a 
farmer who grows legumes but does not opt for delivery at harvest.  
Ceteris paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest and has high 
decision-making power concerning legume production will have a GHȼ17.2 higher 
minimum WTA for the beans contract, compared to a smallholder farmer who has high 
decision-making power concerning legume production but does not opts for delivery at 
harvest. 
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Table 4-13 Beans Contract with Delivery Interactions 
VARIABLES Coefficients Clustered Robust SE 
Delivery at harvest 62.48*** (11.08) 
Advance pay -6.379** (2.996) 
Female -15.29** (7.266) 
Age 0.123 (0.203) 
Educated 2.401 (6.310) 
Access to credit -21.06*** (6.993) 
Nonfarm business 29.86*** (6.442) 
Agricultural land -1.374** (0.660) 
Grow crop 35.44*** (9.614) 
Crop acres -8.335 (6.491) 
High crop decision making 1.792 (6.810) 
Interacting delivery with:   
Advance pay 7.824*** (2.956) 
Female 15.08*** (5.694) 
Age -0.400** (0.168) 
Educated -5.865 (5.239) 
Access to credit 8.004 (5.699) 
Nonfarm business -5.968 (5.081) 
Agricultural land 1.152** (0.569) 
Grow crop -14.07* (7.215) 
Crop acres -1.683 (4.571) 
High crop decision making 17.18*** (5.258) 
Household size -0.526 (0.476) 
Kids in school lunch program 1.116 (0.833) 
Rural 1.194 (3.977) 
Constant 293.1*** (13.97) 
Sigma  38.81*** (2.792) 
Observations 1,157 1,157 
 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter examines the use of farm-to-school contracts as a means to provide 
access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban areas. The study examines the 
factors influencing male and female smallholder farmers’ minimum willingness to accept 
(WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for maize and cowpea beans. The minimum WTA 
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simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the minimum price at which 
the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study hypothesizes that  farmers’ 
minimum WTA  is not  only  influenced  by  farmer  and farm  characteristics,  but  also  
by  the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining farmers’ minimum willingness 
to accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design. In particular the study uses a 
Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and the ‘time of delivery and 
payment’ differentially influences minimum WTA for male and female smallholder 
farmers.  
The study hypothesized that the advance payment option would lower the minimum 
WTA value of smallholder farmers. The results in the female specification indicate that, 
ceteris paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA for the maize 
contract by GHȼ3 on average. This result is not observed for the beans contract.  
The study further hypothesized that delivery at harvest, compared to later, would 
lower the minimum WTA value of smallholder farmers. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, 
the results indicate respondents have a higher minimum WTA for maize contracts that 
stipulate delivery harvest compared to delivery later. Similarly, the results suggest that, 
rather than lower minimum WTA, ceteris paribus, the delivery at harvest compared to 
delivery later, increases minimum WTA for the beans contract. 
The coefficient on gender in the pooled model indicates that, ceteris paribus, on 
average, females have a GHȼ4.5 higher minimum WTA for the maize contract, compared 
to males. Again, this result is not observed for the beans contract.  
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Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results indicate that have 
access to credit lowered minimum WTA in the pooled and female sub-sample by GHȼ7 on 
average. Similarly, accesses to credit lowers minimum WTA for the beans contract; access 
to credit reduced minimum WTA in the pooled and male specifications by GHȼ16.8 and 
GHȼ18.5 respectively.  Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate that having 
a non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract and the beans 
contract. 
The study further examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder 
farmers. To examine the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and 
individual characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with 
contract attributes and individual characteristics. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, 
a female with a non-farm business has a GHȼ11.1 lower minimum WTA for the maize 
contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business. Similarly, a female who 
owns a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA of GHȼ16.4 for the beans contract, 
compared to a male who owns a non-farm business, on average.  
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual 
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as 
decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. The results suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay and delivery at harvest contract 
attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA for the maize contract by GHȼ 
7.2, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance pay but not delivery at harvest. 
Similarly, a smallholder farmer who opts for advance pay and opts for delivery at harvest 
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has a higher minimum WTA for the beans contract of GHȼ7.8 on average, compared to a 
smallholder who opts for delivery later and advance pay.  
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at 
harvest option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize 
contract by GHȼ5.6, on average, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery 
at harvest but has no access to credit. This result is not observed for the beans contract. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Summary  
In recent decades, school-lunch programs have been introduced in developing 
countries to increase access to primary education while simultaneously reducing hunger 
and child malnutrition. The Ghana School Lunch Program is an example of a school-lunch 
program implemented under a homegrown framework; such a framework requires that the 
school lunch is administered using food that is locally grown by smallholder farmers. The 
homegrown framework is designed to link caterers of school lunch programs with local 
farmers; provide economic opportunities for local farmers; increase local agricultural 
production; and stimulate economic development, while providing nutritious meals for 
schoolchildren. However, studies have shown that the ‘buy local’ policy mandate has not 
been achieved.  
The broad objectives of the study is threefold: firstly, the study seeks to document 
the missing link between school caterers who prepare and serve school lunches and local 
smallholder farmers who cultivate farm plots in the communities; secondly it seeks to 
examine a gendered approach to technology adoption and participation of smallholder 
farmers in farm-to-school contracts; and thirdly, to make policy recommendations based 
on the empirical evidence to facilitate the Ghana School Lunch Program. The data used for 
the dissertation involves a series of focus group discussions and interviews with school 
caterers and smallholder farmers in rural and peri-urban areas in Eastern and Northern 
Ghana. 
A brief background of the Ghana School Lunch Program is presented in Chapter 2. 
Subsequently, the chapter documents the constraints that have undermined school caterer 
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purchases from local farmers as stipulated by the ‘buy-local’ policy mandate of the lunch 
program. The school caterer analysis revealed that the three main hurdles to purchasing 
from local farmers are the time and frequency of remuneration, the amount of remuneration 
to the school caterers, and storage facilities. The women farmer study suggests that the two 
major constraints are land infertility and access to credit.  
The study also identifies that the school lunch provided is not always nutritionally 
balanced. One policy recommendation is to put measures in place for enhanced nutrition 
for schoolchildren. Providing reliable food for schoolchildren is important, however, 
providing adequate nutrition is as important as the total calories provided in the school 
meals. The government may have to allocate more resources to ensure that children are not 
only fed but also well nourished. These resources may be in the form of higher allocation 
to school caterers, trainings on how to prepare balanced meals on a budget, or routine 
monitoring of adherences to the recommended nutrition for schoolchildren. With more 
resources allocated, the government would then be able to require a more nutritionally 
enhanced lunch meal with recommended portions of protein, vegetables and fruits.  
The rest of the dissertation builds on the land infertility and credit constraints of 
women farmers. In recent years, there has been increasing evidence of differential adoption 
rates of agricultural technology adoption by male and female smallholder farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa. Governments, non-governmental organizations and international aid 
agencies strive to combat poverty and improve the living standards of rural and peri-urban 
households; however, some policies have not resulted in the expected outcomes. For 
example, fertilizer subsidies targeted to the head of household are assumed to have an equal 
effect on males and females living in the rural farm households, but in reality may not reach 
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females in the households. Gender conscious policies may help get a step closer to 
achieving goals of development agencies. Chapter 4 analyzes gender differences in the 
adoption of multiple improved agricultural technologies among smallholder farmers in 
Northern Ghana. It contributes to the literature on gender gaps in technology adoption 
while taking into consideration, gendered access to productive resources as well as 
gendered decision-making power in households.  
The study investigates differential adoption rates and factors affecting adoption of 
agricultural technology by male and female maize and legume farmers. Descriptive results 
indicates that maize production is male-dominated in Northern Ghana while women 
farmers predominantly cultivate legumes, such as cowpea beans. Among maize farmers, 
herbicides and fertilizers are more commonly adopted, with a higher adoption of fertilizer 
among males compared to female maize farmers.  Among legume farmers, herbicides and 
pesticides have the highest adoption rates. Female legume farmers have higher herbicide 
adoption rates while male legume farmers have higher pesticide adoption rates. 
The multivariate estimation results indicate no gender gaps among male and female 
maize farmers for improved seed, herbicide and pesticide adoption, but finds a gender gap 
for fertilizer adoption when covariates are not controlled. Access to and ownership of 
productive assets such as phones, radios, and credit increases the likelihood of improved 
seed adoption among maize farmers. Additionally, female maize farmers who have input 
into most or all decisions concerning cash crop production are more likely to adopt 
improved maize seeds. Male and female maize farmers with access to credit and education 
are more likely to adopt fertilizer, while male and female farmers in Muslim households 
are more likely to adopt herbicides.  The study further finds that, maize farmers who have 
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access to credit, who have one additional bicycle and who had input into most or all 
decisions regarding cash crop farming in the past agricultural year are more likely to adopt 
pesticides while farmers without education are less likely to adopt pesticides. 
The multivariate estimation for technology adoption among legume farmers indicate 
a gender gap for improved seed and pesticide adoption, but no gender gap for fertilizer and 
herbicide adoption. The results further suggest male and female legume farmers who have 
had access to credit in the past two years are more likely to adopt improved seed and 
fertilizer, while female legume farmers with education and access to credit are more likely 
to adopt fertilizer. Furthermore, legume farmers who own one additional television set are 
more likely to adopt herbicides. The study also finds that legume farmers who have access 
to financial resources and female legume farmers who have a say in what the use of income 
generated from cash crop farming are more likely to adopt pesticides.  
These results highlight the point that governments and non-governmental 
organizations that want to encourage adoption of agricultural technology among rural and 
peri-urban households must design and implement agricultural policies that recognizes 
gender differences within heterogeneous families. Improving and ensuring equitable access 
to productive resources that differ between men and women, particularly to credit, 
education and radios may facilitate a higher uptake of agricultural technology by female 
maize and legume farmers. Direct targeting of female farmers within rural and peri-urban 
farm households to receive input subsidies could help close the gender technology gaps 
observed within the various agricultural technologies.  
Farmers may also be encouraged to adopt flexible combinations of improved 
technology that best suit them and that would allow them to take advantage of agronomic 
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and economic complementarities. Combining varying proportions of improved seed, 
fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide to meet the small farm sizes of rural and peri-urban 
farmers may be more cost effective and affordable than large bags of all technologies. Cash 
constrained farmers may also be encouraged to bundle improved seed and fertilizer while 
using family labor for weeding and controlling large farm pests.  
Government can liaise with micro businesses in rural and peri-urban communities to 
subsidize radio, phones, and other agricultural productive assets such as backpack sprayers 
to women farmers. Additionally, government can liaise with agro-chemical sellers in rural 
and peri-urban areas to subsidize and target women farmers with improved agricultural 
inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides. The agro-products 
could also be marketed in smaller packages with the option for bundling different inputs.    
A plethora of empirical studies has documented women farmers’ differential access 
to credit in sub-Saharan Africa. The study in Chapter 5 examines the use of farm-to-school 
contracts as a means to provide access to credit for women farmers in rural and peri-urban 
areas. The study examines the factors influencing male and female smallholder farmers’ 
willingness to accept (WTA) farm-to-school-lunch contracts for maize and cowpea beans. 
The WTA simultaneously measures the decision to participate as well as the minimum 
price at which the smallholder farmer accepts the contract. The study hypothesizes that  
farmers’ WTA  is not  only  influenced  by  farmer  and farm  characteristics,  but  also  by  
the attributes of the contract. This is tested by examining farmers’ minimum willingness to 
accept with hypothetical variations in the contract design. In particular the study uses a 
Tobit model to examine whether an ‘advance pay’ option and the ‘time of delivery and 
payment’ differentially influences WTA for male and female smallholder farmers.  
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The pooled results for both the maize and beans contracts indicate no effect of 
advance pay option on WTA. However, the results in the female specification indicate that, 
ceteris paribus, having an advance pay option lowers minimum WTA for the maize 
contract but not the beans contract.  
Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate respondents have a higher 
minimum WTA for the maize and beans contracts that stipulate delivery harvest compared 
to delivery later. 
The pooled results indicate females have a higher minimum WTA for maize 
contracts but finds no gender differences regarding minimum WTA for the beans contract. 
Concerning access to assets and ownership of assets, the results indicate that have 
access to credit lowered minimum WTA for the maize contract in the pooled and female 
sub-sample; access to credit reduced minimum WTA for beans contracts in the pooled and 
male specifications.  Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the results indicate that having a 
non-farm business increased minimum WTA for the maize contract and the beans contract. 
The study further examines heterogeneity in the minimum WTA among smallholder 
farmers. To examine the possible effect of gender differences with contracts attributes and 
individual characteristics on minimum WTA, the female variable is interacted with 
contract attributes and individual characteristics. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, 
a female with a non-farm business has a lower minimum WTA for the maize and beans 
contract on average, compared to a male with a non-farm business. 
The study also analyzes the potential role of contract attributes with individual 
characteristics on WTA. Access to, ownership of, and control over assets as well as 
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decision-making power may influence respondents’ WTA. The results suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, a smallholder farmer who opts for the advance pay and delivery at harvest contract 
attribute will have, on average, a higher minimum WTA for the maize and beans contract, 
compared to a smallholder farmer who opts advance pay but not delivery at harvest. 
The results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a smallholder who opts for the delivery at 
harvest option and has access to credit will have a higher minimum WTA for the maize 
contract, compared to a smallholder farmer who opts for delivery at harvest but has no 
access to credit. This result is not reflected in the beans contract.  
The results suggest that if the government considers contractual arrangements 
between school caterers and local farmers to facilitate the buy-local policy mandate, an 
advance pay option to women farmers may yield lower premiums for contracted food 
items. 
The typical smallholder farm household tends to consume a sizeable part of their 
production, due to the subsistence nature of farming in Northern Ghana. The farm 
household cultivates both food crops (mainly for household consumption) and cash crops 
to generate farm income. Although most local producers are net buyers of food, some are 
net sellers of food seeking alternative marketing channels. The school lunch program could 
provide a suitable alternative market to smallholder farmers in the local economies.  
It is likely that if a household decided to market their produce to the school lunch 
program, the household would see significant improvement in household food supply and 
quality. These improvements would likely stem from the stable flow of income into the 
household. The incomes could be used to diversify the diets of the household and increase 
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their nutrition intake. Additionally, with a guaranteed market, farmer’s post-harvest losses 
would be minimized and smallholder farmers could reap the full profit from their farm 
business.  
If the Homegrown Ghana School Lunch program works as intended, the 
schoolchildren stand to benefit both directly and indirectly. Beyond the direct benefits of a 
hot and nutritious lunch, which aids in student learning, attendance, performance and 
retention, the students would also benefit indirectly through their parents. Most of the 
parents are local farmers. Increased incomes from the school lunch program could 
immediately translate into school uniforms, books and other educational material for the 
schoolchildren. Female children may benefit more than they do now with regards to 
increased educational opportunities. The female children often have to drop out of school 
after primary education if the parents could not afford to pay school fees for higher 
education. With increased incomes, the parents of female children would be able to 
advance to educational levels beyond primary education.  
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
The study identified a number of constraints to the efficient functioning of the 
Homegrown Ghana School Lunch Program. These constraints include i) the inability of the 
government to make payments to school caterers in a timely manner, ii) low levels of 
production and output, iii) lack of access to credit for smallholder farmers, iv) the inability 
of farmers to sell their production on credit and v) lack of storage facilities.  
One interesting point to note is that if the first constraint were to be miraculously 
resolved, the other constraints to the efficient functioning of the school lunch program 
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would not be binding. If the government were able to make timely payment to school 
caterers, the constraint of low levels of production would not be binding. School caterers 
would be able to make purchases from local farmers for school meals. The regular demand 
from school caterers to prepare school meals would encourage local farmers to invest in 
their farms and expand production to meet the increasing demand from schools, resulting 
in increased production and output. Thus, regular payments to school caterers can help 
eliminate the constraint of low production.  
Similarly, the constraints of lack of access to credit for farmers and the inability of 
farmers to sell their production on credit can be eliminated if the government were able to 
make regular payments to school caterers. With regular payments, school caterers would 
also be able to make immediate payments to local farmers for their produce. This would 
have a twofold effect; first, it would enable farmers to sell produce to school caterers as 
the caterers would not have to make purchases on credit and secondly, it would reduce the 
need for farmers to have to seek credit facilities with formal financial institutions. The 
regular purchases of food items from school caterers would provide a steady flow of 
income for the local farmers as well   guaranteed source of income for the farmers.  
Furthermore, the constraint with regards to lack of storage space can also be resolved 
with regular payment to school caterers by the government. With regular payments, school 
caters can make weekly purchases of food items from local farmers. The caterers would 
not require large storage facilities to store and preserve their weekly food items as 
compared to some purchases currently made twice or three times each term.  
Governments also face the basic economic problem of how to allocate scare 
resources among alternative uses. The government may not be able to simultaneously 
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address all the constraints that the study has identified to improve the efficient functioning 
of the Ghana School Lunch Program. Practically, they might want to rank the constraints 
in terms of priority and address them as such. However, seeing as all the identified 
constraints could be resolved if the regular payment were tackled first, the optimal ranking 
of the constraints in terms of priority ‘goes without saying’.  Addressing the regular 
payment of school caterers would likely resolve the other identified constraints and enable 
a more efficient operating of the ‘buy-local’ policy for the school lunch program.  
5.3 Future Research  
One of the constraints the study identified is the inability/unwillingness of local 
farmers to sell on credit. One direction for future research is to explore what it would take 
to get local producers to sell their production on credit. Using the setting of a field 
experiment, future research can ask farmers what would make them give out their farm 
produce on credit. The alternatives for the choice experiment could include arranged 
regular bi-weekly or monthly payments (similar to loan repayment schedules). A third 
alternative could be ‘none’ as most farmers do not trust they will be paid or cannot afford 
to have late payments especially if they need to reinvest into their small farm business.    
A second area for future research is to examine the impact on smallholder farm 
households when they supply food items to the school lunch program. A difference in 
differences approach can be used to assess the differences in the households’ food supply 
and quality using households that supply food items to the school lunch program as the 
treatment group.  
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In what way is buying from local farmers ‘better’ and in what way is buying from 
the central market better? The Ghana School Lunch Program recommends caterers to make 
80% of purchases directly from local farmers. School caterers currently make most 
purchases from the central market. The interviews with the school caterers indicated that 
although making purchases from local farmers could present a better value and could lower 
transaction/search costs, the highly perishable nature of farm produce coupled with poor 
storage facilities make purchases from the central market a more workable alternative. The 
items purchased from the central market include canned tomatoes and fish, which 
compromise freshness for storability. Moreover, some of the purchased ‘fresh’ food items 
such as tomatoes and cowpea beans are imported from neighboring countries, defeating the 
aim of the buy-local policy mandate.  Future research can explore a longitudinal study of 
school food purchases made directly from local farmers and from the central market, 
concerning storage of food items, ease of purchase, nutritional content, value for money 
and search/transactions costs.  
Finally yet importantly, further research can examine whether local farmers are 
trying to intensify in agriculture or diversify out of agriculture into other off-farm 
businesses. A section of the survey asked the respondents what they would spend an extra 
1000 cedis on. In terms of agricultural expenses, the general trend of responses indicate 
that the 1000 cedis would be spent on land preparation prior to planting, on farm inputs 
such as fertilizer and on rearing farm animals. In terms of non-agricultural expenses, the 
general trend of expenses was on trading, on food, health and educational bills and for 
general upkeep. Future research can broadly ask what respondents would spend a 1000 
cedis on, without breaking it into agricultural and non-agricultural expenses, to get a better 
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sense of whether farmers are looking to intensify into agriculture or diversify into off-farm 
businesses.    
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Women Caterer Interview Guide 
Date/Location of Interview:  
Name of Person Taking Notes:  
Description of Person Participating in Interview (School food buyer, school 
administrator, teacher, community member, etc):  
Special Comments:  
About the School 
School Name/Location: 
Grades/Classes at School: 
Total Student Enrollment: 
About the Food 
1. What is a typical weekly lunch menu?  
2. What determines the weekly menu? Which foods are served? (get specific amount 
purchased during the past year) 
Foodstuff  Usage (termly) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
3. What is the source of these foods (local, Ghana, Africa, other international)? 
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About the Buyer 
1. How did you become a caterer under the Ghana school feeding program?  
2. What qualities did they look for in you to select you as a caterer under the 
program?  
3. When did you become a caterer for the Ghana school feeding program? 
4. How long have you been a caterer for this school? 
5. How are you paid for your job as a caterer for the school feeding program? 
6. What other jobs do you do aside being a school food caterer? 
7. What job(s) did you do prior to becoming a school food caterer? 
8. Are you a member of this community? 
 
About the Site 
1. Where does the money for the school feeding come from? 
2. Are there established procedures for purchasing food under the school feeding 
program? Please explain 
3. Who has control over food procurement under the program? 
4. How often (frequently) are food supplies purchased? For what period are food 
items procured (weekly, fortnightly, etc.) 
5. Availability of storage on site? How much food are you able to store at a time in 
this facility? 
6. How is the cost for school meals determined? 
7. With what regularity are funds released to the buyer? 
8. What would you need to be able to buy and use more local foods in the school 
feeding program?  
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